Belavia B735 at Kiev on Dec 9th 2018, damaged runway lights and right engine cowl on landing

Last Update: May 15, 2019 / 17:09:39 GMT/Zulu time

Bookmark this article

Photo of Belavia EW-290PA, Boeing 737-500 — Belavia EW-290PA, Boeing 737-500 (Photo credit: Anna Zvereva / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Dec 9, 2018

Classification
Incident

Airline
Belavia

Flight number
B2-845

Departure
Minsk, Belarus

Destination
Kiev, Ukraine

Aircraft Registration
EW-290PA

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-500

ICAO Type Designator
B735

Airport
Boryspil International Airport, Kiev

Airport ICAO Code
UKBB

A Belavia Boeing 737-500, registration EW-290PA performing flight B2-845 from Minsk (Belarus) to Kiev (Ukraine) with 44 passengers and 5 crew, landed on Kiev's runway 18L at 18:08L (16:08Z) and taxied to the apron.

A post flight inspection showed a dent in the right hand engine inlet, substantial damage to as well as grass embedded in the right hand engine cowl.

The aircraft was unable to depart for the return flight B2-846.

The use of runway 18L/36R stopped after the landing of B2-845, a number of departing aircraft already taxiing for departure from runway 18L changed over to runway 18R and departed from that runway. A number of aircraft diverted as far as Warsaw (Poland).

The airport reported a Belavia aircraft damaged runway lights forcing the airport to temporarily close the runway for repairs. The Belavia aircraft was taxiing for departure (editorial comment: this seems to be contradicted however by lack of all evidence of any Belavia aircraft departing the gate around that time, both in flight plan systems as well as in ADS-B data although EW-290PA was visible along the entire taxi route while taxiing to the apron).

Local source confirm EW-290PA is the accident aircraft.

On May 15th 2019 the National Bureau of Air Accidents Investigation of Ukraine (NBAAI) released their final report in Russian (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Russian only release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe). The report concludes the probable causes of the incident were:

The most probable cause of the runway excursion to the left of aircraft Boeing 737-500 EW-290AP was a persistent optical illusion in fog that the captain developed perceiving the left runway edge lights were the runway center line lights. This resulted in the aircraft landing to the left of the runway center line and subsequent runway excursion.

The NBAAI rated the main cause human factors, contributing factors were meteorological conditions.

The NBAAI reported the captain (52, ATPL, 14,800 hours total, 8,100 hours on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (21, CPL, 286 hours total, 286 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. An automatic approach was performed to Kiev's runway 18L in instrument meteorological conditions requiring CAT I capabilities. Descending throug 76 feet AGL the captain disengaged the autopilot and continued manually. At the time of the autopilot disconnect the aircraft was fully stabilized and within all landing parameters. However, after the captain took over manually, the aircraft developed an 8 degrees left bank and drifted off to the left of the runway center line with the captain commanding the left bank. The left main gear touched down first about 25.4 meters to the left of the runway center line at a left bank of 8.4 degrees. Following touch down the aircraft departed the paved runway of the runway and returned onto the runway again.

The NBAAI analysed that the approach to runway 18L (according to CAT I regulations) was performed on autopilot in single channel coupling. The crew extended the landing gear and extended the flaps to 40 degrees on approach, autothrust maintained a speed of 130 KIAS after the flaps reached 40 degrees. Autothrust was disconnected at 119 feet AGL, after disconnecting the autothrottle the aircraft slightly drifted to the left. At 76 feet AGL the autopilot was disconnected, the slight drift to the left had remained, the speed was 131 KIAS, the aircraft was within all landing criteria and fully stabilized. Descending through 16 feet AGL steering input was provided to roll the aircraft to the left, the left bank angle increased to about 8 degrees. The aircraft touched down 517 meters past the runway threshold and 25.4 meters to the left of the runway center line. Within a second after touchdown the left main gear went off the paved surface of the runway. Subsequently full right rudder input was provided.

The NBAAI reported that while the radio altimeter calls 50, 40, ... occurred, there was a call "Go left!" on the CVR.

The NBAII analysed that it was most likely the captain had developed a mental image of the left hand runway edge lights being the runway center line lights, which also caused him to not decide for a go around. Once he realized the error after touchdown, a balked landing/go around was no longer possible.

Metars:
UKBB 091800Z 22004MPS 0450 0350W R18L/0550 R18R/0450N FZFG VV001 M00/M00 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO -FZDZ=
UKBB 091730Z 22004MPS 0400 0350NW R18L/0550N R18R/0450N FZFG VV001 M00/M00 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO -FZDZ=
UKBB 091705Z 21003MPS 0350 0300NW R18L/0450N R18R/0350 FZFG VV001 M00/M00 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO -FZDZ=
UKBB 091700Z 21004MPS 0350 0300NW R18L/0500N R18R/0375N FG VV001 00/00 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO -FZDZ=
UKBB 091630Z 20004MPS 0400 0350NW R18L/0550 R18R/0400N FG VV002 00/00 Q1004 R88/611040 NOSIG=
UKBB 091600Z 20003MPS 0600 0450NW R18L/0750 R18R/0550 FG VV002 01/01 Q1004 R88/611040 NOSIG=
UKBB 091530Z 21003MPS 0800 0550NW R18L/0900N R18R/0650N PRFG OVC002 01/01 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO 0400 -SHRASN FG BKN001 SCT015CB=
UKBB 091500Z 22003MPS 1000 0700NW R18L/1300D R18R/0750 PRFG OVC002 01/01 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO 0400 -SHRASN FG BKN001 SCT015CB=
UKBB 091446Z 21002MPS 1200 0750NW R18L/1600D R18R/0900D PRFG OVC002 01/01 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO 0400 -SHRASN FG BKN001 SCT015CB=
UKBB 091430Z 19002MPS 1600 1000NW R18L/P2000N R18R/1100D BR OVC002 00/00 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO 0400 -SHRASN FG BKN001 SCT015CB=
UKBB 091400Z 23003MPS 1800 1300NW R18L/P2000N R18R/1700N -RA BR BKN002 OVC028 01/01 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO 0400 -SHRASN FG BKN001 SCT015CB=
UKBB 091330Z 21003MPS 190V260 1600 1200SE R18L/P2000N R18R/1600U -RA BR BKN002 OVC028 01/01 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO 0400 -SHRASN FG BKN001 SCT015CB=
UKBB 091300Z 24002MPS 210V310 1300 1100W R18L/1900U R18R/2000U -RA BR BKN002 OVC028 01/01 Q1004 R88/611040 TEMPO 0400 -SHRASN FG BKN001 SCT015CB=