Atlanta Icelandic B744 at Frankfurt on Nov 29th 2023, tail strike on departure, flew across Atlantic

Last Update: January 27, 2026 / 16:21:59 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Air Atlanta Icelandic TF-AMK, Boeing 747-400 — Air Atlanta Icelandic TF-AMK, Boeing 747-400 (Photo credit: Mike Burdett / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Nov 29, 2023

Classification
Accident

Airline
Air Atlanta Icelandic

Flight number
CC-703

Departure
Frankfurt Hahn, Germany

Destination
Greenville, United States

Aircraft Registration
TF-AMK

Aircraft Type
Boeing 747-400

ICAO Type Designator
B744

An Air Atlanta Icelandic Boeing 747-400 freighter, registration TF-AMK performing flight CC-703 from Frankfurt Hahn (Germany) to Greenville,SC (USA), departed Hahn Airport's runway 21 but struck its tail onto the runway surface. The aircraft climbed out to initial cruise level FL300, later step climbed to FL320 and FL340 and landed on Greenville's runway 22 about 8:45 hours after departure. A post flight inspection revealed substantial damage to the belly of the fuselage.

The aircraft remained on the ground in Greenville for about 13 days, then ferried to Marana,AZ (USA) on Dec 12th 2023. The aircraft remained on the ground in Marana until Jan 8th 2024 and subsequently returned to service.

On Feb 21st 2024 Germany's BFU reported the aircraft was rotating when the stall warning activated and the stick shaker operated. The pitch angle was temporarily reduced and the aircraft climbed out and continued the flight to destination. After landing it was determined that the tail of the aircraft had briefly contacted the runway surface leading to damage of the aircraft.

On Jan 27th 2026 the BFU released their final report concluding the probable causes were:

- The pilot in command confirmed that he had accidentally entered a Vr too low with 30 kt into the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit. This constitutes an unintentional action on his part that had safety-related consequences.

- The values entered in the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit were not controlled according to the standard operating procedures.

- In the rotation phase, the longitudinal angle of inclination was about 15°. The aerodynamic lift forces were too low at that point in time, which activated the stall warning, followed by the triggering of the stick shaker on the control yoke.

The investigation identified the following contributing factors:

- Crew resource management was not effective at the crucial stage of controlling the entered values in the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit.

The BFU analysed:

According to the description of the co-pilot, the take-off performance calculation was carried out by both pilots. The data from the take-off performance calculation were not correctly entered into the MCDU by the pilot in command. The co-pilot did not crosscheck whether the data had been entered error-free. Thus, the incorrect entry remained unnoticed until the stick shaker was activated during the initial take-off phase.

The airline described in detail in the Flight Crew Operation Manual, Normal Procedures, Amplified Procedures, NP.20.18, D6-30151-543, the procedure for crosschecking the calculated data in the MCDU. In addition, the EFB Task Flow Guide described a cross-check of the take-off calculation, including the assignment of the respective flight crew member to carry out the activity. Several points in the airline’s documentation explain the procedures, including the responsibilities for calculations and implementations.

The standard operating procedures represent an effective safety barrier, which should also be used in personally perceived stress situations. The procedure describes the process of the take-off performance calculation as well as the mutual review of the results and their subsequent entry into the FMS. First, the take-off parameters are calculated by the PF and the PM on the EFB. Subsequently, the PM reads the determined values aloud. The pilot in command shall enter the confirmed data into the FMS or MCDU. Finally, a mutual cross-check of the entered values is planned. In the present incident, this procedure was most likely not carried out.

The wrong entry should have been noticed by the co-pilot at the latest during the takeoff run, as the indicated speed for Vr was significantly too low for the almost maximum take-off mass. Due to the many years of flight experience of the pilot in command and the co-pilot and their experience with the handling of different take-off masses and corresponding take-off speeds, the low speed should have been noticeable to both, but in particular to the co-pilot in his function as the monitoring pilot. He represented the last safety barrier and had the opportunity to inform the pilot in command of the error.