JAC AT42 at Kagoshima on Jan 8th 2022, cleared to land, instructed to go around due to runway incursion

Last Update: July 10, 2026 / 17:22:59 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Japan Air Commuter JA04JC, ATR ATR-42 — Japan Air Commuter JA04JC, ATR ATR-42 (Photo credit: 湯小沅 / Flickr / License: Public Domain Dedication (CC0))

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 8, 2022

Classification
Incident

Airline
Japan Air Commuter

Flight number
3X-3653

Departure
Fukuoka, Japan

Destination
Kagoshima, Japan

Aircraft Registration
JA04JC

Aircraft Type
ATR ATR-42

ICAO Type Designator
AT42

A Japan Air Commuter Avions de Transport Regional ATR-42-600, registration JA04JC performing flight 3X-3653 from Fukuoka to Kagoshima (Japan), was on final approach to Kagoshima's runway 34 when tower cleared the flight to land on the runway. Tower instructed another aircraft, a Cessna 172, to hold short of the runway, the Cessna however went past the hold short line and entered the runway prompting tower to instruct the arriving ATR to go around. The aircraft climbed to 4000 feet, positioned for another approach to runway 34 and landed safely about 10 minutes later.

Japan's TSB opened an investigation into the occurrence.

On Jul 10th 2026 the JTSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The JTSB concludes that the probable cause of this serious incident was certainly that Aircraft A, which had been instructed to hold short of the runway, entered the runway, when Aircraft B was cleared to land on the runway.

The reason why Aircraft A, which had been instructed to hold short of the runway, entered the runway is because Trainee A most likely inferred from the ATC instructions that Trainee A had received a clearance of entering the runway, which Trainee A had expected while unable to understand the holding instruction.

The JTSB analysed:

(1) Response of Trainee A

The JTSB concludes that Aircraft A certainly entered the runway despite of being instructed by Tower C and Tower D to hold short of the runway.

Trainee A was certified as having aeronautical skills required for solo flight in checkrides with flight instructors in the Company, but Trainee A was sometimes pointed out the failure of confirmation such as missing to hear ATC instructions or unable to understand the contents of ATC instructions. In addition to this, when the serious incident occurred, Trainee A misunderstood the ATC instructions during taxiing, and failed to confirm the contents of ATC instructions with the Controller despite of being unable to understand them, therefore it is highly probable that Trainee A did not fully master the skills for radio communication with the Controllers at a hightraffic airport like the Airport. As Trainee A himself admitted not to be good at radio communication with the Controllers, Trainee A more likely felt pressure not to miss to hear the instructions and clearances from Tower C. Therefore, skipping the step “To make sure to confirm with the Controller about the instructions when not understanding them”, without understanding the Tower C’s instruction to hold short of the runway, Trainee A most likely figured that Trainee A had received an instruction equivalent to “LINE UP AND WAIT” which Trainee A was expecting.

Furthermore, Trainee A was unable to monitor radio communications between Aircraft B and the Controllers, and as seeing Aircraft B's preceding arriving aircraft land, Trainee A most likely thought that there would be no subsequent arriving aircraft after that. For that reason, it is highly probable that although Aircraft A was instructed to hold short of the runway, Trainee A inferred the ATC instructions failing to correctly understand its situation (sequence of the runway use) where the Aircraft was placed, and entered the runway. In addition, Trainee A likely expected there would be points-out from the Controller if his aircraft’s movement had not been in accordance with the ATC instruction. Without confidence in the understanding of the ATC instructions, Trainee A should not have entered the runway by inferring them.

(2) Trainings for radio communications before the solo flight

By the time this serious incident occurred, Trainee A had made three solo flights and there were no particular problems in the radio communications. In the flight training with an instructor on board, there was also no problem in radio communications related to runway line-up and holding short of runway. In addition, in the familiarization flight made before the solo flight on the day of the serious incident, there were also no problems in radio communications. Therefore, Captain A certified that there were no problems for Trainee A to make solo flight. However, the JTSB concludes that as seen in this serious incident, Trainee A was inclined to stay silent without confirming them with the Controller when Trainee A was unable to understand the contents of the ATC instruction, therefore, especially in order to improve this point, before the solo flight, probably Captain A should have provided Trainee A with simulation exercises and trainings assuming such a case where there is a discrepancy in radio communications between Trainee A and the Controller.

The Company more likely thought that it would be more effective to select and teach only minimum phraseologies required for flight trainings at the Airport, rather than all of the ATC phraseologies specified in the ATC Standard. However, it is absolutely essential for student pilots to be able to correctly understand and use the instruction of holding short of runway and all relevant ATC phraseologies. The Company had checked whether or not the student pilots had radio communication skills necessary for solo flight not by confirming them separately but through their radio communication with the Controllers during flight training with a flight instructor on board. However, as the traffic volume at the Airport is large, in some cases, the ATC instructions and clearances expected by the aircraft may not be issued immediately. Therefore, when granting a solo flight to the student pilot, it is important for the Company to ensure to confirm and certify the students' aeronautical skills required for the solo flight, especially those for all the radio communication with the Controller that could be assumed at the time of the runway use.

(3) Response of Tower C

JTSB concludes that as Tower C recognized Aircraft A was flying solo, and had been listening to the radio communication between Tower D and Aircraft A since before taking over the duty, Tower C more likely gave consideration to the radio communications in order not to put a burden on Aircraft A.

On the other hand, it is desirable for the Civil Aviation Bureau to continue to deliberate how to deliver easy-to-understand ATC communications, using this serious incident as a case study, and considering not only the aircraft operators inexperienced in ATC communications but also the circumstances where a diversity of aircraft operators exist.

(4) Classification of Severity

The JTSB concludes that the distance between Aircraft A and Aircraft B was most likely approximately 2,160 m (about 1.17 nm), when Aircraft B was instructed by Tower C to go around and started to climb.

The serious incident certainly falls under the severity classification of Category C (An incident characterized by ample time and/or distance to avoid a collision) of "the Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions" of ICAO with classification tools provided by ICAO.