Texel Australasia B738 at Melbourne on Feb 17th 2026, rejected takeoff due to near collision with ground vehicle

Last Update: November 20, 2026 / 19:04:21 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 17, 2026

Classification
Incident

Flight number
TFX-36

Aircraft Registration
ZK-TXB

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800

ICAO Type Designator
B738

A Texel Air Australasia Boeing 737-800 freighter, registration ZK-TXB performing flight TFX-36 from Melbourne,VI to Adelaide,SA (Australia), was accelerating for takeoff from Melbourne's runway 34 when ATC alerted the crew to a ground vehicle at the intersection of runways 16/34 and 09/27, the crew rejected takeoff at high speed (about 140 knots over ground) crossing runway 09/27 during the slow down. The aircraft vacated runway 34 at the end. The aircraft vacated the runway at the last taxiway and stopped on the parallel taxiway for about 20 minutes. The aircraft then returned to the apron.

About one hour after arriving at the apron the aircraft taxied out again, departed and reached Adelaide without further incident.

Australia's ATSB opened an investigation into the occurrence rated a serious incident and stated: "During the take-off on runway 34 at Melbourne Airport, the pilot of a Boeing 737 was alerted by ATC to a vehicle on the runway at the intersection of runway 09/27 and as a result conducted a high-speed rejected take-off."

On Nov 20th 2026 the ATSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

Contributing factors

- The driver of an airport safety vehicle misidentified their position while collecting works lights and unserviceability markers on the closed runway. The available visual cues did not sufficiently distinguish the active runway intersection from other crossings within the works, resulting in the vehicle entering the active runway without clearance.

- The pre-shift briefing was not conducted in accordance with standard operating procedures requiring review of the changes to the local works plan. Consequently, the airside safety officer had an incomplete understanding of the revised works.

- The guidance released by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Advisory Circular 139.C-15-v1.0 Safe Planning and Conduct of Aerodrome Works, used to identify the entry to the crossing active runway, did not require sufficient distinction from those used to identify the entry to crossing taxiways to mitigate the greater potential consequences associated with inadvertently entering an active runway. (Safety issue)

Other factors that increased risk

- Melbourne Airport did not risk assess all the stages of the runway overlay project during the development of the plan, despite the closed runway crossing the active runway on a nightly basis for several months.

Other findings

- The electronic surveillance system alerted the air traffic controller to the runway incursion, enabling them to take timely action to prevent a collision.

The ATSB analysed:

Positional awareness

The driver was an experienced airside safety officer (ASO) and was familiar with conducting night-time airside tasks. However, the area for the works overlay project was a complex airside environment adjacent to 2 parallel taxiways and the active runway.

This resulted in the presentation of multiple rows of almost identical lights and markers crossing the closed runway 09/27.

Stage 2 of the local works plan (LWP) had commenced on the night prior to the occurrence, with the main change to the layout being that taxiway A was partially closed.

Significantly, this meant there were now no corresponding lights and markers on the closed runway adjacent to taxiway A.

As a result, while moving along runway 09/27 towards the active runway, the ASO, unaware of the changes, incorrectly thought that they were approaching the eastern side of taxiway V.

Although orange lights were used in addition to the red unserviceability lights to identify the entrance to the active runway, these did not provide sufficiently distinctive visual cues to override that expectation. The mandatory aerodrome guidance signs (MAGS) were also confirmed to be illuminated, however the ASO did not detect them. Similarly, with a blanket clearance to enter taxiways, auditory cues from ATC and aircraft transmissions were available on the vehicle radios, however they did not prompt the ASO to query their position.

As a result, the ASO did not identify that they were about to enter the runway and continued in the mistaken belief that they were one intersection before the runway.

Briefing

The standard operating procedure for a pre-shift briefing and review of the local works plan (LWP) was intended to ensure that team members understood the worksite configuration including any changes introduced since the previous shift. Although the ASO had assisted in collection of the works materials the previous day, stage 2 of the project had started the night before the occurrence and should have been discussed at the pre-shift brief.

Consequently, the ASO was not aware of the changes required with stage 2 of the project (no lights and markers on the closed runway adjacent to taxiway A) and commenced the task with an incomplete understanding of the current works configuration. In addition, the team had started work an hour earlier than their shift was scheduled and, as such, the ASO believed they did not have access to the work application and did not review any changes.

Having performed the same task on the previous shift, the ASO’s familiarity may have reinforced an expectation that the works site had remained unchanged. Briefings are intended to establish a shared understanding of the operational environment and reinforce the hazards associated with the task. Previous research shows that structured briefings can improve anticipation of hazards and reduce misunderstandings (Bethune and others, 2011; Crow, 2021; Flin, 2008; Wilson 2019).

Distinctiveness of worksite controls

The visual controls at the worksite complied with the requirements of Part 139 (Aerodromes) Manual of Standards (MOS). While intended to define the limits of aircraft movement for flight crews, they also formed a key part of the visual information available to those operating within the worksite.

Although on this occasion the runway intersection incorporated additional orange markers with lights, as these lights were also used elsewhere to identify the limit of works, the overall arrangement of the lights and markers remained visually similar to controls used within the works area to identify runway/taxiway intersections.

Additionally, runway holding position marking, stop lights, and runway guard lights cues do not exist in a runway-to-runway interface.

In familiar environments where available cues closely resemble an expected pattern, individuals often rely on rapid pattern recognition rather than detailed inspection.

Consequently, there were few distinct cues to alert to the ASO that they were approaching the active runway rather than their expectation that they were approaching taxiway V.

A vehicle entering an active runway may conflict with an aircraft operating at high speed, with limited time and distance for either party to respond. Given the relative energy difference, the outcome of a collision arising from an active runway incursion is likely to be substantially more severe than those associated with a collision resulting from a vehicle entering a taxiway. The incident at La Guardia Airport, where an aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicle entered the active runway and collided with a landed aircraft, illustrates that the consequences can be catastrophic.

Accordingly, visual cues for ground vehicles identifying the transition to an active runway warrants a level of distinction commensurate with the higher potential consequence. The incident at Heathrow Airport, where the driver of an airside vehicle entered an active runway, further demonstrates the value of a distinctive physical cue. In that incident, the absence of the distinct towable barrier used regularly by the airport operator to clearly define the entrance to the runway, resulted in the loss of situational awareness and unintentional entry to the runway.
Aircraft Registration Data
Registration mark
ZK-TXB
Country of Registration
New Zealand
Date of Registration
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Manufacturer
The Boeing Company
Aircraft Model / Type
737-8BK
ICAO Aircraft Type
B738
Serial Number
Aircraft Address / Mode S Code (HEX)
Maximum Take off Mass (MTOM) [kg]
Engine Count
Main Owner
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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 17, 2026

Classification
Incident

Flight number
TFX-36

Aircraft Registration
ZK-TXB

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800

ICAO Type Designator
B738

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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