ASL B734 at Amsterdam on Dec 19th 2023, insufficient rotation on takeoff

Last Update: August 28, 2025 / 18:25:55 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Dec 19, 2023

Classification
Report

Aircraft Registration
EI-STW

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-400

ICAO Type Designator
B734

An ASL Airlines Boeing 737-400 freighter, registration EI-STW performing a freight flight from Amsterdam (Netherlands) to Brussels (Belgium), was being prepared for departure with no cargo, the loadmaster had instructed to remove 5 cargo containers from the aircraft but leave the ballast block where it was (in the most aft position). However, ground workers removed both the containers and the ballast block. When the aircraft departed runway 18L with the first officer being pilot flying, the aircraft didn't rotate with normal takeoff elevator inputs, the aircraft continued to accelerate. Only when the first officer applied more than normal takeoff force onto the yoke, the nose finally rotated and became airborne. Once airborne the aircraft was trimmed out and the flight continued to destination without further incident.

The Dutch Onderzoeksraad (DSB) concluded (without releasing a separate investigation report):

The incorrect loading of the ballast block happened within the context of time pressure, where papers were signed without actually checking the correct position of the ballast block. This resulted in center of gravity being significantly further forwards than the flight crew assumed and created a mismatch of the stabilizer trim position.

Elevator deflection during rotation at the calculated Vr was ineffective because the stabilizer was seven units out of the required trim position. This delayed rotation and lift off and demanded more runway length. Despite the fact that the center of gravity was significantly out of the flight envelope, with the adjusted stabilizer trim the aircraft was controllable during the remainder of the flight.

When using intersection E4, the available runway length (TORA) and take-off distance (TODA) were adequate for the actual required runway length and threshold obstacle clearance.

The Dutch Onderzoeksraad (DSB) analysed:

The loading process

Neither the supervisor of the cargo company nor the staff of the ground handler had checked whether the aircraft had been loaded correctly, but nevertheless signed the loading papers. Airline procedures required only the captain to sign the load sheet, but not the flight crew to check the correct loading of the aircraft. The first officer - standing next to the ballast block when closing the cargo door – did not realise that it was on the wrong position. Consequently, the ballast block remained at the cargo door position causing the CG to be significantly further forward than assumed by the flight crew and with effect on the pitch controllability.

The flight crew had set the trim in accordance with the load sheet (4.42 units trim position corresponding a CG position of 10,6 % MAC). However, the actual CG position was -8,9 % MAC, which was significantly beyond the 7% forward limit. This difference in CG position represented an equivalent of 7 trim units for take-off and explaining the elevator control difficulty during rotation. With a CG position of -9 % during landing, the aircraft remained controllable at that time.

The supervisor believed that he had communicated with the foreman that the ballast block could stay on its position. However, the ground handlers nevertheless offloaded the ballast block together with the five containers as they believed this had been instructed. This misunderstanding could not be explained. As only two scanners were available for loading, not every ground handler (six in total) may have known the loading plan and miscommunication cannot be ruled out.

The take-off roll

The take-off was normal until the rotation speed was reached. The first officer applied almost full nose up elevator deflection for rotating the aircraft. Despite applying full nose up elevator, the aircraft did not rotate to a lift off attitude. Only when the airspeed increased from the calculated Vr of 118 knots up to a value of 134 knots, the first officer was able to rotate the aircraft into the air. With an airspeed of 150 knots the aircraft lifted-off and he used the elevator trim to reduce the required control force for elevator up. Once in trim, the control of the aircraft was normal.

For the take-off performance calculation, the flight crew used the maximum allowable thrust reduction as the aircraft was almost empty and with a fuel load for the short flight to Brussels. Therefore, an intersection take-off was possible, which resulted in a reduced available runway length. Even with this reduced length, the aircraft became airborne before the midway point of the available runway and crossed the reciprocal runway threshold at 718 feet.
Aircraft Registration Data
Registration mark
EI-STW
Country of Registration
Ireland
Date of Registration
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Manufacturer
THE BOEING COMPANY
Aircraft Model / Type
BOEING 737-4M0
ICAO Aircraft Type
B734
Year of Manufacture
Serial Number
Maximum Take off Mass (MTOM) [kg]
Engine Count
Engine
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Main Owner
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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Dec 19, 2023

Classification
Report

Aircraft Registration
EI-STW

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-400

ICAO Type Designator
B734

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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