GOL B38M at Rio de Janeiro on Feb 11th 2025, rejected takeoff after collision with car
Last Update: August 6, 2025 / 10:56:08 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Feb 11, 2025
Classification
Accident
Airline
Gol Transportes Aereos
Flight number
G3-1674
Departure
Rio de Janeiro Galeao, Brazil
Destination
Fortaleza, Brazil
Aircraft Registration
PS-GPP
Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800MAX
ICAO Type Designator
B38M
Airport ICAO Code
SBGL
The airport reported there had been an incident between a maintenance car and an aircraft on one of the runways, there had been no injuries. The passengers have disembarked normally, operation of the airport was not affected.
The airline reported the aircraft collided with an airport vehicle on the runway during the takeoff procedure. Takeoff was rejected and all passengers and crew disembarked safely. A replacement flight to Fortaleza was made available. The airline is cooperating with CENIPA's investigation into the accident.
A passenger (a public prosecutor) stated, that the aircraft was close to becoming airborne, when there was a jolt and a noise followed by the crew braking the aircraft.
On Feb 17th 2025 Brazil's CENIPA reported the crew rejected takeoff when they saw an airport administration vehicle on the runway. The aircraft and vehicle collided. There were minor injuries to two people on the ground.
On Aug 6th 2025 the CENIPA released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
- Attention – a contributor.
The presence of distracting stimuli in the control room led to reduced selective attention, the occurrence of lapses, and loss of situational awareness, impairing risk perception and timely decision-making. As a result, the ATCO performing the TWR Control function did not pay attention to the operational scenario at the time of the occurrence and cleared the takeoff of aircraft PS-GPP on runway 10, which was occupied by a maintenance vehicle.
- Attitude – a contributor.
The ATCO performing the TWR Control function did not conduct a visual scan of the runway, evidencing an attitude of noncompliance with the established operational procedures.
At the time of the occurrence, the Supervisor was not attentive to the activities being carried out by the on-duty controllers, as he was handling a cell phone, diverting from his duty to maintain continuous supervision. Furthermore, the passive stance adopted during and after the emergency proved inadequate, contrary to the responsibilities inherent to the role.
- Work group culture – a contributor.
The climate of excessive informality, tolerance for cell phone use, and non-operational conversations revealed a permissive group culture that normalized behaviors incompatible with operational safety, fostering the repetition of errors and weakening defensive barriers.
Furthermore, during interviews conducted by the SIPAER Investigation Committee, it was found that some ATCOs believed that, after the formal deactivation of the Supervisor function at 22h00min, the controller previously designated for this role ceased to be responsible for monitoring the control and surveillance actions performed by the other onduty ATCOs.
Based on this mistaken interpretation, the controller who had been acting as Supervisor considered himself exempt from the responsibility of instructing the ATCO at the TWR Control position to abort the takeoff of aircraft PS-GPP, as well as from providing proper support to the other controllers in the emergency response actions.
- Organizational culture – a contributor.
The recurrence of operational failures, even after similar events, combined with the low effectiveness of the corrective actions adopted, revealed weaknesses in the organizational culture. The tolerance of behaviors not in compliance with standards and regulations – particularly regarding cell phone use and failure to use headsets – pointed to shortcomings in the institutional mechanisms for positively reinforcing a safety culture.
- Team dynamics – a contributor.
Failures were observed in the interaction among members of the TWR-GL team, characterized by the absence of support from the Supervisor, confusion among the ATCOs after the collision, and inefficiency in task management at this critical moment. These aspects indicated dysfunctions in mutual collaboration mechanisms, which compromised the effectiveness of the services provided by TWR-GL and the timeliness of actions related to the emergency response in the context of the occurrence.
- Memory – a contributor.
The omission of the runway visual scan and the verification of the locking screen on the TATIC system evidenced operational lapses related to memory failures associated with the execution of routine procedures. Such lapses were exacerbated by distractions and interruptions in the operational environment, which impaired the retention and retrieval of critical information.
As a result of this memory lapse, the ATCO responsible for the TWR Control function inadvertently cleared the aircraft for takeoff while the runway was still occupied by a vehicle, contributing to the occurrence.
- Perception – a contributor.
The failure to perceive the vehicle on the runway indicated impairments in the process of organizing and interpreting environmental stimuli and revealed a degraded state of situational awareness, which facilitated the continuation of an incorrect operational procedure.
Thus, by not correctly perceiving the scenario and its critical elements, the ATCOs were unable to anticipate the high probability of a collision between the aircraft and the vehicle, compromising the safety of the operation.
- Decision-making process – a contributor.
The decision to maintain the takeoff clearance, even after recalling the presence of the vehicle on the runway, evidenced a failure in the controllers’ decision-making process. The hesitation to cancel the clearance revealed poor judgment and difficulty in assessing the risks, compromising timely analysis of the scenario.
Had the clearance been revoked within seconds after the recollection, the aircraft would have initiated a low-speed rejected takeoff, allowing it to come to a safe stop before the collision. Thus, the ATCOs’ incorrect decision proved to be a determining factor for the event, highlighting deficiencies in identifying viable alternatives and executing an appropriate response in the face of imminent risk.
- Organizational processes – a contributor.
Although mitigation measures had been adopted, the persistence of the same
operational behaviors demonstrated their ineffectiveness in addressing the contributing factors identified in previous events. This indicated the need to revise organizational strategies, focusing on actions that would strengthen the safety culture, the effectiveness of operational barriers, and governance over critical processes. In this way, the prevailing organizational system contributed to the persistence of significant operational vulnerabilities.
- Supervision (ATS) – a contributor.
In the moments leading up to the collision between the aircraft and the vehicle, the Supervisor did not adequately monitor the control and surveillance actions performed by the ATCO responsible for the TWR Control position. Such monitoring could have enabled a timely and assertive intervention capable of preventing the occurrence.
- Managerial oversight (ATS) – a contributor.
The recurrence of operational errors and of the corrective actions adopted revealed shortcomings in the oversight exercised by CRCEA-SE, whose duties included ensuring compliance with applicable regulations, guaranteeing the effectiveness of the SMS, and promoting an organizational culture focused on operational safety.
CENIPA analysed:
This was a scheduled passenger transport flight operated by Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes. At approximately 01:08 UTC, the aircraft was departing from SBGL, bound for SBFZ, on a public regular air transport, with six crew and 103 passengers on board.
During the takeoff roll, the aircraft collided with a runway-lighting maintenance vehicle that was stationary at the center of runway 10, between taxiways BB and CC.
The SIPAER Investigation Committee initially verified that all operational requirements related to the flight crew and the aircraft were in compliance with the regulations established by the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority.
The weather conditions were favorable for the conduction of the flight.
No technical anomalies were found in relation to the navigation aids.
According to audio transcripts obtained from the ATS units, it was established that both the aircraft and the runway-lighting maintenance vehicle maintained radio contact with TWRGL, and no technical abnormalities were observed in the communication equipment.
The configuration of the TWR-GL operational consoles was consistent with the
Operational Model in effect at the time.
The individual duty rosters of the air traffic controllers involved in the occurrence – covering the months of December 2024, January, and February 2025 – were analyzed. It was verified that the ATCOs’ workload was within the limits established by current legislation, and no discrepancies related to this aspect were reported at interviews.
Given the characteristics of this serious aeronautical incident, the investigation was based on the model developed by James Reason (Reason, 1997), as it provides a solid framework for understanding the contributing factors of the so-called ‘organizational accidents.’
Such events are characterized by multiple causes involving various actors operating at different levels within their respective organizations.
Based on the facts established during the investigation, the active failures were identified. According to the adopted approach, these correspond to the errors committed directly by operators in the execution of their tasks and which result in immediate adverse effects.
In complex and highly reliable systems, such active failures are typically the consequence of a set of latent failures, stemming from decisions or actions taken long before the occurrence of the undesired event, whose effects may remain hidden for extended periods.
From this perspective, the analysis of the factors contributing to this occurrence was structured into two complementary parts: the first one, named "Active Errors," addresses the actions taken by the ATCOs that directly contributed to the collision between the aircraft and the vehicle; the second one, "Latent Conditions," examines systemic deficiencies within the organizational environment that pose risks for future runway incursions.
Active Errors
Runway scanning and lock screen with TATIC display
As described in item 1.18 Operational Information, the ATCO occupying the TWR Control position cleared aircraft PS-GPP for takeoff while the RWY-lighting maintenance vehicle was still on the runway.
This action was taken without performing the runway visual scanning procedures and locking screen with the TATIC display, as established in items 6.7.3.7 and 6.7.3.9 of TWRGL Operational Model and item 4.2.6 of ICA 81-4 – Program for the Prevention of Runway Incursion Occurrences in the Provision of Air Traffic Services.
Such errors, related to memory or attention – in which the operator inadvertently omits an essential step of the task or temporarily loses awareness of critical elements of the situation – are called lapses and are frequently associated with low situational awareness.
The Human Error Classification Model, developed by Reason (1990), clearly and objectively exemplifies the conditions under which such errors occur.
According to the author, a necessary condition for the occurrence of a lapse is the capture of the individual’s attention, usually associated with distraction. In this case, 'attention capture' means that the limited attention at that moment is focused on something other than the ongoing routine task.
In fact, footage from the internal TWR-GL cameras showed, at the time of the occurrence, the presence of several distracting elements in the operational environment, such as social conversations, use of mobile devices, an excessively informal atmosphere, and a low workload.
These sources of distraction were decisive in lowering the level of situational awareness in the control room, compromising the continuous monitoring by the ATCOs and leading to a loss of focus on critical operational information.
Based on Endsley’s Model of Situational Awareness in Dynamic Environments (1995), it is observed that such distractions negatively affected all three levels of situational awareness:
Level 1 – Perception of environmental elements: Distractions diverted the controllers’ attention, impairing the timely identification of information relevant to the operation, such as the presence of the vehicle on the runway.
Level 2 – Comprehension of the current situation: The lack of adequate perception impaired the interpretation of the risk involved in authorizing takeoff, leading the controller to act as if the runway was clear.
Level 3 – Projection of future states: Without correctly perceiving the scenario and its critical elements, the ATCO was unable to anticipate the possibility of a collision between the aircraft and the vehicle, compromising the safety of the operation.
With the objective of preventing the degradation of situational awareness in the operational environment, various civil aviation authorities around the world have recommended the adoption of the sterile control room concept.
One of the main pillars of the sterile control room is the minimization of distractions.
Non work-related conversations are prohibited, and the use of personal devices – such as cell phones, tablets, and laptops – is strictly forbidden to avoid attention shifts.
In addition, the environment is acoustically designed to reduce external noise, contributing to the controllers’ concentration. Safety procedures are strict, and behaviors that could affect ATCO concentration are not permitted. In some organizations, there is even continuous monitoring to ensure compliance with established protocols.
The application of this practice contributes significantly to maintaining situational awareness by eliminating or reducing cognitive interferences that compete for the controllers’ attention.
By promoting a focused, distraction-free environment, the sterile control room facilitates the accurate perception of relevant elements, a clear understanding of the realtime scenario, and the appropriate projection of possible operational developments. Thus, the consistent implementation of this concept serves as an effective barrier against errors resulting from attentional lapses, strengthening system safety.
ATS Supervision.
In the moments preceding the collision between the aircraft and the vehicle, the ATCO occupying the Supervisor position did not monitor the control and surveillance actions performed by the ATCO occupying the TWR Control position, as set forth in item 4.2.1 – Supervisor Position Duties, letters n and z, of TWR-GL Operational Model.
This inaction occurred due to the ATCO’s low situational awareness, as he was handling his mobile phone. Although the Supervisor had formally ended his shift, he remained in the control room, coordinating the movement of the vehicle on the runway.
Thus, both the Technical Report and the ATS Technical Report prepared by DECEA considered that the ATCO was still performing his duties at the moment of the collision. This understanding was also adopted by the SIPAER Investigation Committee.
In this regard, item 4.1 – Operational Positions of TWR-GL Operational Model established that no ATCO was allowed to use a mobile phone in the operational environment, as required by ICA 200-17. Moreover, according to item 4.2.1 Supervisor Position Duties, letter bb, one of the functions of this ATCO was precisely to “prohibit the use of electronic devices within TWR-GL operational environment (camcorder, camera, radio, television, cell phone, laptop, tablet, etc.).”
As described in item 4.1.1 of this Analysis, the use of mobile devices in ATC degrades ATCOs’ situational awareness, diverting their attention from critical activities and impairing the perception of traffic, communications, and other relevant operational information. This degradation negatively impacts the ability to correctly interpret data and anticipate events, which are essential aspects for safe decision-making in ATS.
Additionally, the cognitive overload caused by dividing attention between operational tasks and mobile phone use can result in delayed responses, failures in error detection, omissions of information, and, consequently, an increased risk of aeronautical occurrences.
As observed in this serious incident, the loss of situational awareness reduces the controller’s ability to maintain a clear and continuous picture of traffic development and potential conflicts, directly affecting the efficiency and safety of operations. Therefore, mitigating this distracting factor is essential for preserving safety standards and the integrity of the air traffic control system.
With the aim of mitigating risks associated with distractions in the ATS operational environment – with special emphasis on those of an electronic nature – a collaborative initiative was launched in 2013 by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), named “Turn Off, Tune In.”
During its period of implementation, the “Turn Off, Tune In” campaign proved effective in promoting behavioral changes among professionals working in ATS. Data from safety reports and internal assessments indicated a significant reduction in events related to loss of situational awareness due to distractions, especially those associated with mobile phone use. In addition, improvements were observed in operational discipline, strict adherence to established procedures, and the strengthening of an organizational safety culture.
Use of Headsets
At the time of the aeronautical occurrence, the ATCOs on duty at TWR-GL control room were not using headsets.
This fact contravened the guidelines established in the TWR-GL Operational Model, which, through items 6.7.3 – Recommendations for the Prevention of Runway Incursions and 6.10 – Use of Headsets, provided specific guidance regarding the mandatory use of this equipment.
TWR-GL Operational Model required that ATCOs assigned to the operational positions ‘Clearance Delivery’, ‘Ground Control’, and ‘TWR Control’ were to “use headsets while performing these functions, in accordance with the provisions of item 4.2.5.2 of ICA 81-4 – Program for the Prevention of Runway Incursion Occurrences in the Provision of Air Traffic Services and item 3.11.1 of ICA 100-31 – Air Traffic Services Requirements.”
Specifically, ICA 100-31, Section XI – Use of Headsets in ATC Units, articles 50 and 51, established that the Chief of the ATC Unit ought to mandate the use of headsets, define their operating parameters – including this information in the operational model of the respective Unit – and ensure that headsets were available for each air traffic controller, maintaining a reserve stock a for replacement when necessary.
The adoption of this procedure aimed not only to reduce noise levels but also to preserve communication quality and, above all, to maintain situational awareness – fundamental elements for operational safety in air traffic control.
Error Management
Still within the scope of active errors, the last failure in the chain of events that culminated in the collision between PS-GPP and the maintenance vehicle was the decision by the ATCOs not to abort the aircraft’s takeoff as soon as they realized that the said vehicle was still on the runway.
According to the information collected, at that moment, the pilots had not yet applied engine power, and the aircraft was practically positioned over threshold 28, approximately 2,000 meters from the point of impact and about 39 seconds from the collision.
Had the ATCOs canceled the takeoff clearance at the moment they recalled the presence of the vehicle on the runway – or within a period of up to 15 seconds – the rejected takeoff (RTO) would have taken place at a low speed. Under such circumstances, it would have been possible for the aircraft to come to a safe stop and not collide with the vehicle.
Internal TWR footage indicated that the air traffic controllers, after perceiving the error, focused on attempting to visually locate the vehicle’s position and have it removed from the runway without interfering with the aircraft’s takeoff.
In interviews conducted by the SIPAER Investigation Committee, the ATCOs could not explain the reasons that led them to manage the error in this way. However, it is possible to state that the low level of situational awareness in the control room compromised an adequate assessment of the risk involved, reducing the team’s ability to perceive the severity of the situation and to recognize the need to promptly cancel the aircraft’s takeoff clearance.
This degradation directly affected Levels 2 and 3 of situational awareness, related to the comprehension of the operational scenario and the projection of future consequences, resulting in a decision-making process incompatible with the principles of flight safety.
According to Dekker (2007), another factor that may have contributed to the ATCOs’ inadequate error management is related to some operators’ hesitation to act in the face of evident operational failures, driven by fear of being exposed, held accountable, or formally implicated in internal inquiries or State-led investigations.
The author points out that such attitudes are often found in organizational settings where a fully developed just culture is lacking. In these contexts, professionals tend to hide mistakes or downplay their significance, which undermines risk management, degrades collective situational awareness, and hinders sound decision-making.
Hesitation to act in response to an error - due to fear of exposure or accountability - reflects a deeper systemic weakness than the technical error itself. The primary risk lies not in leaving a vehicle on the runway, but in the organizational culture that may discourage proactive action, or in the group culture, where individuals may fear how mistakes will be treated. Correcting this is essential to enhancing ATS system resilience.
4.1.5 Phraseology
When contacting the maintenance vehicle to request its exit from the RWY, the Supervisor simply instructed it to vacate the runway, transmitting the following message: “Manutenção Balizamento, livre pista 10.” (“Lighting Maintenance, vacate runway 10.”)
In the face of an imminent collision between the aircraft and the vehicle, the most appropriate course of action would have been to explicitly alert the driver about the presence of an aircraft in the takeoff procedure and to issue a clear and emphatic instruction for an immediate exit from the runway. The absence of this critical information contributed to the vehicle occupants’ failure to recognize the severity of the situation or the approaching aircraft.
Moreover, the phraseology used by the ATCO was not in accordance with item 6.3.5 of CIRCEA 100-86, which prescribed the RTF phraseology to be utilized in the communications between aerodrome control and vehicle drivers, or other services, operating in the maneuvering area whenever an aircraft was to take off and the presence of a vehicle posed a risk to the operation.
Had the correct phraseology been used, the vehicle’s readback would likely have followed the standard: “Manutenção Balizamento, abandonarei a pista 10 via taxiway Charlie-Charlie à direita. Notificarei pista livre” (“Lighting Maintenance, will vacate runway 10 via taxiway Charlie-Charlie to the right, will report runway vacated,”) as established in the Directive Circular. This information would have alerted TWR-GL controllers to the vehicle’s presence on the runway, enabling immediate corrective actions.
However, the vehicle’s response to the Supervisor’s request – “Roger Ground, team vacating the runway here at Charlie-Charlie” – was interpreted by the ATCO as if the vehicle had already completed the action, as there was clearly an expectation that the runway would be promptly vacated.
It was also observed a delay of 14 seconds before the vehicle occupants responded to the call made by TWR-GL. According to statements from those involved, this delay occurred due to the non-standard phraseology used by the Supervisor, as the prescribed initial call – “Manutenção Balizamento, Torre Galeão” (“Lighting Maintenance, Galeão Tower”) – was not employed. As a result, the vehicle occupants took a few seconds to realize that the message was directed to them.
Finally, it is worth noting that the ATCO’s intervention to request the vehicle’s exit from the runway occurred 26 seconds before the collision, at which point the aircraft had an indicated airspeed of 75 kt.
Had the communication been made on the TWR frequency – in accordance with the ‘One Runway, One Frequency’ principle, to be addressed in item 4.2 Latent Conditions – it is possible that the pilots would have become aware of the vehicle’s presence on the runway and, consequently, rejected the takeoff while still in a low-energy regime.
Emergency Response
The pilots spotted the vehicle 0.5 second before impact, at a distance of 185 meters, when the aircraft had an indicated airspeed of approximately 153 kt.
After performing an abrupt evasive maneuver on the ground to avoid a direct impact with the vehicle, the crew contacted TWR-GL to report the occurrence.
The first message transmitted by the aircraft after the collision, at 01:08:57 UTC, informed that the takeoff had been aborted due to the presence of a vehicle on the runway.
This message was not answered by TWR-GL. For a few moments, the ATCOs at the TWR Control and Ground Control positions exchanged information among themselves, trying to understand what had happened.
The ATCO at the Ground Control position commented that the aircraft was not cleared for takeoff; the ATCO at the TWR Control position, in turn, confirmed that he had issued the clearance. Subsequently, the Ground Control ATCO questioned whether it was the aircraft waiting at the holding point. The TWR Control ATCO replied that it was not, but rather the GOL airlines aircraft PS-GPP, which had already initiated takeoff.
In the second message, the pilots reiterated that the aircraft had collided with the vehicle: “We aborted the takeoff; we hit a car in the middle of runway 10.”
Although this condition was reported at 01:09:14 UTC, the activation of the Aerodrome Emergency Plan only occurred at 01:11:40, when one of the maintenance vehicle occupants – visibly in shock – radioed that they had been struck by the aircraft and requested immediate dispatch of the fire brigade to the scene.
The analysis of audio and video recordings showed a delay of 2 minutes and 26 seconds between the confirmation of the collision and the TWR-GL’s formal emergency call – a period considered excessive in light of operational guidelines and best practices for critical situation response.
In the face of the runway accident scenario, it would have been the Supervisor’s responsibility to promptly initiate the activation of the PLEM, as established by the DECEA’s regulations.
However, the Supervisor initially adopted an inert posture, remaining seated at his console and failing to provide the necessary support to the other ATCOs, who were clearly disoriented in carrying out the response measures to the aviation occurrence.
Internal CCTV footage further revealed that, during the unfolding emergency, the Supervisor even abandoned the intercom radio between the TWR Control and Ground Control positions, withdrawing from his responsibilities. This behavior overburdened the remaining ATCOs and compromised the coordination of actions at that critical moment.
A prompt emergency response is not merely a procedural formality; it is an essential requirement for safeguarding lives, protecting the aircraft, preserving airport infrastructure, and ensuring continuity of operations.
This breakdown in the response chain generates additional risks both for those directly involved – in this case, the aircraft and vehicle occupants – and for other operations at the aerodrome, while also creating an environment conducive to further errors due to the absence of control and coordination in managing the emergency.
It should be noted that, although the pilots maintained composure during communications with TWR-GL – and did not formally declare an emergency – the controllers lacked precise information about the condition of the vehicle occupants, who could have been seriously injured and in urgent need of medical assistance.
Additionally, the first fire brigade team to arrive at the scene found that the aircraft’s right main landing gear was in an overheated condition, posing an imminent risk of structural damage and fire outbreak – a situation that reinforced the need for a swift, coordinated, and effective emergency response.
Immediate activation is critical because response time, particularly in the initial moments following the occurrence, is a determining factor in the success of rescue and damage mitigation actions. The effectiveness of firefighting, victim assistance, aircraft evacuation, and containment of situations that could escalate into more critical scenarios depends directly on how quickly emergency services are mobilized.
Any delay, even of a few minutes, can worsen the consequences of the accident, such as the onset and intensification of fire, structural collapse of the aircraft, an increase in the number of casualties, or irreversible damage to airport infrastructure.
From an operational standpoint, delays in activation hinder the execution of response actions outlined in the PLEM, undermining the coordinated performance of various agencies and services involved, such as airport fire services, emergency operations centers, medical services, operational safety teams, and ATS units themselves.
Therefore, activation must occur immediately after identifying the emergency, limited only to the time required to recognize the situation and execute the alarm. Failure to observe this principle seriously compromises not only the effectiveness of the response but also the safety of operations in the maneuvering area, leading to operational consequences and, most importantly, unacceptable risks to human life.
Related NOTAM:
K0149/25 NOTAMN
Q) SBCW/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/2249S04315W005
A) SBGL
B) 2502120339 C) 2502121200
E) RWY 10/28 CLSD DUE TO ACCIDENTED ACFT
Metars:
SBGL 120300Z VRB02KT CAVOK 26/21 Q1012=
SBGL 120200Z 13003KT 100V160 CAVOK 27/21 Q1012=
SBGL 120100Z 10003KT CAVOK 28/21 Q1011=
SBGL 120000Z 10005KT CAVOK 29/21 Q1011=
SBGL 120000Z 10005KT CAVOK 29/21 Q1011=
SBGL 112300Z 10007KT CAVOK 30/22 Q1010=
SBGL 112200Z 13006KT 9999 FEW035 29/22 Q1010=
Aircraft Registration Data
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Feb 11, 2025
Classification
Accident
Airline
Gol Transportes Aereos
Flight number
G3-1674
Departure
Rio de Janeiro Galeao, Brazil
Destination
Fortaleza, Brazil
Aircraft Registration
PS-GPP
Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800MAX
ICAO Type Designator
B38M
Airport ICAO Code
SBGL
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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