Batik A333 at Madinah on Jun 12th 2023, hydraulic leak

Last Update: September 30, 2026 / 20:29:41 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jun 12, 2023

Classification
Incident

Airline
British Airways

Flight number
XY-5146

Departure
Hahaia

Destination
Madinah, Saudi Arabia

Aircraft Registration
PK-LEM

Aircraft Type
Airbus A330-300

ICAO Type Designator
A333

A Batik Air Airbus A330-300 on behalf of Nas Air, registration PK-LEM performing flight XY-5146 from Hahaia (Comores) to Madinah (Saudi Arabia), was descending towards Madinah when the crew declared emergency reporting their green hydraulic quantity was reading zero, the leak appeared to come from the nose gear. They would not have normal brakes. The aircraft continued for a safe landing on runway 18 but became disabled on the runway.

Saudi Arabia's AIB rated the occurrence a serious incident reporting, that after landing it was established the green hydraulic leak had caused a complete loss of the green hydraulic system, normal braking was unavailable and the crew needed to apply emergency braking. After roll out all tyres showed zero pressure on the ECAM. The aircraft was disabled on the runway.

On Sep 30th 2026 Saudi Arabia's NTSC released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:

The NTSC determined the probable cause for the surprise loss of the Alternate Braking on the landing was the improper installation of the Right-Hand Master Cylinder within the low-pressure circuit of the alternate braking system, and the flight crew's incomprehension of the failed alternate braking system, as indicated by the Triple Gauge Indicator.

Equally significant is the 4-month failure in detecting the Alternate Brake System in the degraded condition, followed by the improper installation of the Right-Hand Master Cylinder.

Successful stopping of the aircraft on the usable runway was a result of the pilot flying quick response to memory checklist actions.

The contributing causes were:

(1) Incorrect Maintenance compliance with Airbus technical documents;
(2) the likelihood of a patchy wavysurface runway damage effect on the Right-Hand Trimmer Actuator.

The NTSC summarized the sequence of events:

Five minutes after takeoff, climbing through 10,800 feet, the green hydraulic system pressure began to drop. The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) gave a green system low hydraulic pressure “G SYS LO PR” and a green reservoir low level “G RSVR LO LVL” amber warnings presentations. The “NORM BRK” and “AUTO BRK” ECAM fault amber messages shortly followed. The Pilot in Command (PIC) called to the cockpit the onboard maintenance crew to evaluate the situation. Based on the availability of the Blue hydraulic system and concerned with the length of the departure airport runway being comparatively shorter (2900 meters), Maintenance Control Center (MCC) agreed that it was best to continue to Madinah destination.

While in cruise, the flight crew took time to review all related checklists and actions associated with the landing with the LOSS of the GREEN system.

Approaching Madinah (OEMA – in clear, nighttime visual conditions), the flight crew advised Madinah Approach Control of the Green Hydraulic system failure, requesting assistance after the landing due to loss of “steering capability”. Subsequently, Madinah Approach Control declared an emergency.

Air Traffic Control suggested using runway 18, and it was accepted. During the approach and with respect to the loss of the green system, the flight crew extended the landing gear using Alternate Gear Extension procedures. The aircraft landing utilizing the Alternate Braking system also led to

(1) Inoperative Auto brakes;

(2) left, right, and nose gear doors in OPEN position;

(3) Inoperative nose Wheel Steering; and Loss of Spoilers 1 and 5.

The aircraft landed at 19:40, with Full Thrust reverse immediately after touchdown, and on the first brake pedal application, the captain who was the pilot flying (PF) felt the breaking to be ineffective and then reacted by acting on the QRH memory recall “Loss of Braking" checklist instructing the Pilot Monitoring (PM) to select the Anti-skid Nose and Wheel Steering (A/SKID & N/W STRG) switch to the OFF position. A second brake application, the PF perceived insufficient braking. Subsequently, the PF pulled and rotated the Parking Brake handle. The selection of the Parking Brake stopped the aircraft approximately 600 meters short of the runway end ... bursting all main landing gear tires and additional minor secondary damage. There was no fire.

ATC notified the Aircraft Rescue Fire Fighting service (ARFF), which was prepared and quickly surrounded the aircraft as it came to a stop. Passengers disembarked safely using mobile stairs, and no injuries resulted.