Qatar B773 near Zurich on Nov 19th 2016, smoke on the flight deck

Last Update: July 3, 2017 / 21:32:03 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Qatar Airways A7-BAO, Boeing 777-300 — Qatar Airways A7-BAO, Boeing 777-300 (Photo credit: redlegsfan21 / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Nov 19, 2016

Classification
Incident

Airline
Qatar Airways

Flight number
QR-778

Departure
Miami, United States

Destination
Doha, Qatar

Aircraft Registration
A7-BAO

Aircraft Type
Boeing 777-300

ICAO Type Designator
B773

A Qatar Airways Boeing 777-300, registration A7-BAO performing flight QR-778 (dep Nov 18th) from Miami,FL (USA) to Doha (Qatar) with 359 passengers and 20 crew, was enroute at FL350 about 15nm northeast of Zurich (Switzerland) when the crew reported smoke on the flight deck and requested to divert to Zurich with CATIII ILS available for runway 16. ATC reported that only CAT I was available right at that point, CAT II was being activated. About 10 minutes later ATC reported that CAT III was now available for runway 16. The crew requested to dump fuel, but subsequently indicated they were not dumping and preparing for an overweight landing as they had problems with the fuel dump system, then the crew indicated they were now dumping fuel. The aircraft established on the localizer runway 16 still dumping fuel, reported they needed more track miles to descend, were vectored off the localizer again, finished dumping and rejoined the localizer. Tower queried "Confirm gear down and locked", response "gear down and locked, thank you", the aircraft landed safely about 24 minutes after leaving FL350, the crew indicated they would stop on the runway and requested emergency services to check whether there was any smoke visible. Emergency services reported no smoke. The crew reported everything was now normal again, the crew cancelled Mayday and decided to vacate the runway and taxi to the apron.

A replacement Boeing 777-300 registration A7-BAG was dispatched from Doha to Zurich, resumed flight QR-778 about 10:20 hours after landing of A7-BAO in Zurich, and is estimated to reached Doha with a total delay of 10 hours.

On Nov 25th 2016 Switzerland's SUST reported the crew declared emergency due to an electrical odour and light smoke on the flight deck and diverted to Zurich. The occurrence was rated a serious incident and is being investigated by the SUST.

On Jul 3rd 2017 the SUST released their final summary report releasing following combined analysis and conclusions:

It can be assumed that the electrical coils in the right cooling fan were burnt and that the resulting electrical smell, accompanied by a slight development of smoke, found its way into the E&E compartment and from there entered the cockpit, where it was detected by the flight crew.

The flight crew immediately linked the status message EQUIP COOLING FAN R with the electrical smell detected, however they continued to look for possible sources of odour in the cockpit. These actions were logical and prudent. The use of oxygen masks and the rapid decision to make a diversion landing in Zurich in response to the uncertain situation were systematic and safety-conscious.

In the meantime, commander B, who was responsible for the flight, had entered the cockpit and assisted the active crew A. Copilot B also joined them. The input of commander B as a communicator – with the cabin crew on the one hand and the aviation company on the other – was appropriate for the situation and created additional leeway for crew A.

However, the fact that commander B also assisted crew A in working through the checklist for fuel dumping must be questioned. The recordings show that there was not enough oversight in the cockpit with regard to fuel dumping. It seems that the active crew A was not sufficiently involved in working through the checklist for fuel dumping. As a result, there was a lack of clear information provided to air traffic control. However, such information is necessary, as air traffic control must take relevant guidelines for fuel dumping into account.

The voice recordings show that the various statements made by air traffic control concerning the technical category status of the ILS unsettled the flight crew with regard to the runway selection and the landing and resulted in unnecessary discussions in the cockpit concerning the prevailing weather conditions. With clear visibility of 9 km below 1000 ft above airport altitude, flight crews are able to take over control of the aircraft at any time during the short final to perform the landing manually. The technical ILS status for an autoland was therefore of minor importance in this present case.

According to the CVR recordings, a relatively long time was spent during the approach discussing the landing climb limits for the landing or a go-around. The decision of commander A to perform an overweight landing using a normal flap position was appropriate for the situation given that the weight at the time was only 6 tonnes over the maximum permissible landing weight and was in compliance with the operating procedures.

Thanks to the rapid decision-making and prudent actions of the flight crew, the passengers and crew were not in serious danger at any time.