Saudia B773 at Islamabad on Oct 14th 2024, landed on wrong runway

Last Update: January 9, 2026 / 17:52:39 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Saudi Arabian Airlines HZ-AK21, Boeing 777-300 — Saudi Arabian Airlines HZ-AK21, Boeing 777-300 (Photo credit: Alec BHX/KKC / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Oct 14, 2024

Classification
Report

Airline
Saudi Arabian Airlines

Flight number
SV-724

Departure
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Destination
Islamabad, Pakistan

Aircraft Registration
HZ-AK21

Aircraft Type
Boeing 777-300

ICAO Type Designator
B773

A Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 777-300, registration HZ-AK21 performing flight SV-724 from Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) to Islamabad (Pakistan) with 399 passengers and 18 crew, was cleared to land on Islamabad's runway 10R but touched down on runway 10L and rolled out without further incident.

Pakistan's Bureau of Aircraft Safety Investigation (BASI) released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The flight crew's incorrect interpretation and insufficient adherence to ATC instructions led to landing on the wrong runway.

Contributory Factors

- Inadequate cross-verification and monitoring within the flight crew regarding ATC clearances and navigational alignment.

- Air traffic controllers did not adequately monitor the crew’s read-backs of landing clearances and failed to prompt for correction when omissions occurred.

- Approach Controller missed earlier signs of misalignment during the approach phase, which could have allowed for timely corrective action.

- The Tower Controller issued appropriate clearances and followed standard protocols but lacked real-time corrective intervention.

The BASI stated, that the crew was told multiple times during the approach to expect an ILS Z approach to runway 10R, the crew readbacks remained unclear however mostly omitting the L or R and only stating runway 10 and not mentioning the type of approach. The BASI wrote (after landing): "SVA-724 contacted Islamabad Tower stating that the aircraft was cleared for RNP Approach RW 10L instead of ILS Approach RW 10R."

The BASI analysed:

SVA-724 took off from King Khalid International airport (OERK), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and intended to land at Islamabad International Airport (OPIS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Ground operations were all normal and aircraft departed Riyadh, Saudi Arabia at 2327Z.

Incomplete ATC Clearance Read-Backs – Upon initial contact with the Islamabad Area Control, the pilots did not read-back the complete ATC clearance, even when insisted by the Area Surveillance Controller. A similar behaviour can be observed in further co-ordinations during the initial descent and approach clearance phases; the crew read back only the routing (to SUMEB and IS416) but omitted mentioning “ILS Z Approach” and “RW 10R”.

Crew Expectation Bias – RT extracts indicate that the crew was so focused on the ATS route sequence that they discounted or “filtered out” the runway and approach type; consistent with expectation bias.

Crew Resource Management (CRM) failure – Neither pilot adequately attended to the full ATC clearances or challenged one another throughout the flight, resulting in repeated omissions. This mutual inattentiveness to ATC instructions and lack of inter-crew challenge represents a significant CRM discrepancy, as it removed critical cross-checking layers designed to catch and correct errors before they led to a wrong-runway landing.

Hesitant Read-Back Suggesting Unchallenged Runway Misalignment – When the Tower Controller issued clearance to land for RW 10R, the pilot’s read-back “RW 10…” was followed by a brief hesitation, while omitting the left/right RW designator. This pause and omission implies that the crew might have recognized the aircraft’s alignment with the wrong runway, but still chose not to question the clearance.

Failure to Execute Go-Around under Runway Ambiguity – Crew Resource Management (CRM) protocols mandate that a go-around be initiated whenever there is any doubt about runway alignment or landing clearance during the final approach. In this incident, despite recognizing ambiguity the flight crew continued the descent and touchdown. By not executing a go-around, the pilots bypassed a primary safety barrier designed to prevent runway incursions and misidentification. This deviation from standard CRM procedure eliminated the opportunity to re-establish situational awareness, re-verify the assigned runway, and conduct a stabilized approach. A timely go-around would have allowed the crew to climb to a safe altitude, confirm the correct runway alignment with ATC, and re-attempt the approach under clear, verified conditions.

Weather

The reported weather conditions 4 over Islamabad at 020000 indicate a stable and benign meteorological environment with light south-westerly winds at 06 knots. Visibility of 6,000 meters and the absence of significant cloud cover (NSC) indicate unobstructed flight paths and no ceiling limitations. A temperature of 19°C with a dew point of 14°C reflects moderate humidity which was reported 73% at that time, reducing the likelihood of fog or condensation-related issues. Overall, the conditions were favourable and posed no operational or safety concerns.

Air Traffic Control

Area Control (Islamabad ACC)

Incomplete Read-Back Follow-Up – Although the controller repeated the full clearance after the first incomplete read-back (020407), there was no subsequent challenge to ensure a correct read-back the second time, despite the crew omitting the “ILS Z Approach” and “Runway 10R” elements in their second read-back. Transmissions focused heavily on waypoint sequencing (SUMEB, IS416), but the controller did not reinforce or highlight the runway and approach portion of the clearance when the crew fixated on fixes alone.

Approach Control (Islamabad Approach)

Lack of Read-Back Enforcement on Reissued ILS 10R Clearance – At 021828, Islamabad Approach reissued the identical ILS Z 10R clearance but did not insist on a full, correct read-back. The pilot again replied only with routing (SUMEB and IS416). Controller accepted the partial read-back without requiring the crew to confirm the critical approach / RW elements.

Ambiguous “Report Established” Call – The controller instructed to “report established” at 022429, but did not follow up on the content of that report. A proper ATC Clearance should have reiterated “ILS Z Approach Runway 10 Right” at that point.

Altimeter Setting Read-Back – When QNH 1015 was passed at 022607, the crew’s read-back was not clear, yet the Approach Controller did not prompt for clarity or confirmation.

Omission of Runway Side Designator – In the last approach-control transmission, the controller specified the track miles from RW “10” without specifying “Left” or “Right,” thereby omitting the crucial runway-side qualifier.

Aircraft Flight-path monitoring – As per the Job Description (CAAF-031-HRBS-1.0) of Approach Controller (Radar) at OPIS, Islamabad, the Approach Controller is responsible to “monitor the traffic to be incompliance with ATC Clearance and be aware of any possible abnormal situation”, as well as to “provide radar monitoring service to all aircraft operating within the area of responsibility and the traffic on the final approach till landing”. In this incident, the Approach Controller failed to detect SVA-724’s deviation from the cleared ILS Z approach RW 10R, thereby not providing the required monitoring service.

2.4.3. Tower Control (Islamabad Tower)

Ambiguous Read-Back Accepted – At 022641, Tower Controller issued landing clearance stating “Clear to land Runway 10R”, yet accepted the pilot’s truncated read-back “Runway 10” without querying “Left or Right”, hence failing to challenge an ambiguous read-back directly; enabling the aircraft to continue aligning with RW 10L.

Failure to Issue Go-Around Clearance – Even when the Tower Controller recognized that the aircraft was aligned with the wrong RW, the controller hesitated to issue a Go-Around. By failing to do so, the controller allowed the aircraft to continue its approach unchecked, significantly increasing the potential for a runway incursion or collision.

Organizational Factors

PAA

Dual Supervisory and Operational Roles – The assignment of both Supervisory duties and Approach Control responsibilities to the same individual increased workload and reduced opportunities for independent oversight. With no separate supervisor to crosscheck clearances or relieve the controller during peak traffic periods, critical read-back omissions and procedural lapses become more likely to go unnoticed.

Instruction to Go-Around – Although landing is a critical phase, PCAA Air Safety Circular (ASC-003-ARAN-2.0) Unstable Approaches Air Traffic Control Consideration, explicitly requires ATC to advise the aircraft to consider executing a missed approach “if the position or identification of the aircraft is in doubt during any portion of the final approach”. Despite official instructions, the controller was still hesitant to issue Go-Around clearance to the aircraft even when the position of the aircraft was observed to the left of track, showing lack of confidence and decision making.