Easyjet A320 at London on Jun 13th 2025, unplanned intersection takeoff

Last Update: June 12, 2026 / 18:09:57 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Easyjet G-EZUK, Airbus A320 — Easyjet G-EZUK, Airbus A320 (Photo credit: Alec BHX/KKC / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jun 13, 2025

Classification
Incident

Airline
Easyjet

Flight number
U2-2335

Departure
London Luton, United Kingdom

Destination
Malaga, Spain

Aircraft Registration
G-EZUK

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

Airport
London Luton Airport, London

Airport ICAO Code
EGGW

An Easyjet Airbus A320-200, registration G-EZUK performing flight U2-2335 from London Luton,EN (UK) to Malaga,SP (Spain), had planned departure from runway 25 using full length, but then lined the runway up at Intersection A, did not backtrack to utilize the full runway length and commenced takeoff. The aircraft climbed out to safety and continued to Malaga for a safe landing.

The British AAIB rated the occurrence a serious incident and opened an investigation stating: "Under the conditions of the day, it was not possible to calculate the take-off performance from intersection A."

On a second flight departing Luton that day the aircraft did backtrack and used the full length of the runway for departure.

On Jun 11th 2026 the AAIB released their final bulletin concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The aircraft took off using a shorter TORA than had been used to calculate aircraft takeoff performance. While there were a few opportunities to trap this error, they were missed, probably by a combination of the crews’ habitual behaviour and confirmation bias.

Takeoff performance serious incidents continue to occur, and this one demonstrated that crews must be resilient to confirmation bias and the normalising of regular types of departure.

The AAIB stated:

The crew calculated takeoff performance using flaps at CONF 1+F, for a takeoff from Runway 25 at LTN, at a weight of 68,887 kg. They input a wind from 160° at 4 kt as a worst case. Figure 2 shows the indications on the EFB showing that the takeoff was not permitted from Intersection Alpha for the conditions input.

The operator’s FDM recorded that the aircraft lifted off about 310 m from the threshold of Runway 07 and was at 65 ft radio altitude over the threshold of Runway 07.

Analysis by the aircraft manufacturer suggested that in the event of an engine failure at V1, with the takeoff continued, the obstacle clearance requirements of the net takeoff flight path would have been met. They also calculated that in the event of a rejected takeoff at V1 with One Engine Inoperative (OEI) that the Accelerate Stop Distance Required (ASDR) would have been 1,666 m. In the event of a rejected takeoff at V1 with All Engine Operative (AEO) the ASDR would have been 1,680 m. Given the ASDA from Intersection Alpha is 1,828 m, the margin would have been 187 m OEI and 173 m AEO. There was thus no runway overrun potential for all rejected takeoff scenarios.

The AAIB analysed:

The aircraft was ready to depart slightly ahead of schedule and there were no external distractions that may have led to the crew rushing or forgetting their requirement to depart from the full-length of Runway 25.

While the crew briefed potential threats, including the aircraft’s higher-than-normal weight, an opportunity was missed to highlight the requirement to takeoff from the lesser used full-length, as opposed to the more common intersection.

Once the push back was completed the commander requested clearance to taxi. ATC responded with, “are you [Intersection] alpha able?” to which the commander incorrectly replied “affirm”. As the commander had departed from an intersection many times recently, this was likely to have been a habitual response, and it was not noticed by the co-pilot.

Despite another aircraft stating that they were “requiring full-length”, just before the aircraft was transferred to the Tower frequency, this did not cause the crew to realise that that they too required the full-length, as they may have been busy completing other tasks before departure. Added to the fact that they observed three preceding aircraft line-up and depart from the Intersection Alpha it is likely their mental model was reinforced by confirmation bias.

The PEDS review aimed to be the final check of the actual takeoff performance data versus that computed, and it relied on crew’s memory. There was no requirement to crosscheck the performance that was stated by the PM against what was calculated. In this case the commander, as PM, believed he stated that they were taking off from the intersection and had planned to do so, probably because of habitual behaviour and confirmation bias. This was not captured by him or the co-pilot as it was likely engrained in their mental model from the initial call from ATC, and it was an habitual call.

It was not standard practice to enter the takeoff shift in the MCDU. Had it been used regularly, and had the crew seen it was blank for their full-length take off, it may have reminded them of the requirement to do so, or they might have queried why the takeoff shift distance had not been entered for the departure from the intersection.

Metars:
EGGW 130650Z AUTO 19005KT 140V230 9999 NCD 18/15 Q1019=
EGGW 130620Z AUTO 16005KT 140V210 9999 NCD 17/15 Q1018=
EGGW 130550Z AUTO 15005KT 130V190 9999 NCD 16/15 Q1018=
EGGW 130520Z AUTO 18004KT 130V220 9999 NCD 15/14 Q1018=
EGGW 130450Z AUTO 19004KT 150V230 9000 NCD 15/14 Q1018=
EGGW 130420Z 19003KT 160V220 9000 NSC 14/14 Q1017=
EGGW 130350Z AUTO 19005KT 160V220 9000 NCD 14/14 Q1017=
EGGW 130320Z AUTO 18004KT 150V220 9999 NCD 15/14 Q1017=
EGGW 130250Z AUTO 19004KT 160V220 9999 NCD 15/14 Q1017=