Red Air MD82 at Miami on Jun 21st 2022, runway excursion causes gear collapse on landing

Last Update: April 25, 2024 / 20:57:15 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jun 21, 2022

Classification
Accident

Airline
Red Air Dominicana

Flight number
L5-203

Departure
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

Destination
Miami, United States

Aircraft Registration
HI1064

Aircraft Type
McDonnell Douglas MD-82

ICAO Type Designator
MD82

Airport
Miami International Airport, Miami

Airport ICAO Code
KMIA

A Red Air Dominicana McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registration HI1064 performing flight L5-203 from Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) to Miami,FL (USA) with 130 passengers and 10 crew, landed on Miami's runway 09 at 17:37L (21:37Z) maintaining routine communication but suffered the collapse of its landing gear. Tower pressed the crash button and instructed the next approaches to go around. The MD-82 came to a stand still off the runway with a fire developing at the right hand wing, where a fuel spill occurred. The aircraft was evacuated via slides. Three people received minor injuries and were taken to the hospital. Emergency services quickly extinguished the fire.

Miami's Emergency Services reported they are on scene of an aircraft fire, their crews have been able to control the fire at the left hand wing and to mitigate the fuel spill. All people on board were checked for injuries, three have been hospitalized.

The airline reported the aircraft encountered technical difficulties after landing.

ADS-B Data transmitted by the aircraft suggest the aircraft was on center line of the runway until slowing below 80 knots over ground, then veered left, crossed the green between runways 09/27 and 12/30 and taxiways T8 and T taking the glideslope antenna mast for runway 30 with it and came to a stop just before runway 12/30.

The NTSB have dispatched a Go-Team to Miami to investigate the occurrence.

On Jun 23rd 2022 the NTSB reported: "The airplane experienced a collapse of the left main landing gear during landing on Runway 9, departed the runway and came to rest in a grassy area between runway 9 and 23. A post-crash fire on the right side of the airplane followed the runway excursion." The CVR and FDR were recovered.

On Jul 15th 2022 the NTSB released their preliminary report reporting that both FDR and CVR have been secured and providing that summary of the sequence of events:

The accident flight was the second of the day for the flight crew. The captain was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer (FO) was the pilot flying. The incident flight departed SDQ at 1535 after a 36-minute delay. The aircraft was cleared for the ILS runway 09 at MIA and the crew reported that the approach was normal. The FO stated that the landing was smooth, and they first touched down on the right main gear followed by the left main gear slightly right of centerline. The crew felt an increasing vibration on the left side of the airplane shortly after the left main gear touched down. During the landing roll out the left main gear collapsed, the airplane traveled to the left where it eventually departed the paved surface and impacted the runway 30 glide slope equipment shelter. During departure from the paved surface and impact with the steel and concrete shelter, the airplane’s right main landing gear and nosewheel collapsed, and the fuel tanks were breached. Shortly after the airplane came to a stop, a postcrash fire began on the right wing. All 130 passengers and 10 crew evacuated the airplane, of which 4 passengers sustained minor injuries. MDFR successfully extinguished the post-crash fire, and all airplane occupants were bussed to the terminal.

On Jul 31st 2023 the NTSB opened their investigation docket.

On Apr 25th 2024 the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

The structural failure of the left main landing gear downlock following ineffective shimmy dampening during the landing roll which caused the collapse of the left main landing gear, resulting in a runway excursion and post-flight fire.

The NTSB analysed:

The collapse of the left main landing gear during the landing roll resulted in a runway excursion due to a loss of controllability on the runway, during which the aircraft impacted a small equipment building, breaching the right-wing fuel tank and causing a post-crash fire. The performance of the crew was thoroughly evaluated during this investigation and found to be appropriate for the circumstances of the accident.

The focus of this analysis is the cause of the left main landing gear collapse. Particularly (1) the left shimmy damper’s failure to adequately dampen vibration during landing and (2) the failure of the left main gear downlock mechanism due to excessive vibration. Figure 1 is a representation of how vibrations are typically dampened by a fully functioning shimmy damper. Figure 2 shows the rubber tire transfer markings that indicate the left main landing gear was shimmying down the runway.

Left Shimmy Damper Failure

The left shimmy damper was examined and found to be assembled correctly. However, the check valve was found to be leaking and the cap for the check valve service port was missing.

The damper requires sufficient hydraulic fluid to adequately dampen normal vibrations in the system. For a significant amount of fluid to leave the damper, there would have to be failure of both the check valve and the cap for the service port.

If the leak in the check valve existed prior to the accident flight, there was potential for it to be discovered by maintenance when servicing the shimmy damper with hydraulic fluid. When a damper is serviced, documentation of that service must be made in the maintenance logs. The investigation’s review of maintenance logs revealed that the last time the left shimmy damper was serviced was in June of 2021, 12 months prior to the accident.

Damage to check valves typically occur during servicing and any leaks would occur following a servicing event. Considering the last documented servicing of the shimmy damper occurred 1 year prior to the accident, it is likely that the check valve leak had silently developed and was sitting latent until a problem with the service port cap occurred.

The shimmy damper was checked the day before the accident per the “S” check. There was no record of the damper being serviced during this “S” check suggesting that the service port cap was present and hydraulic fluid levels were above minimums. Therefore, the investigation deduced that the cap went missing or was compromised at some point in the 2 flights and 24 hours between the last “S” check and the accident touchdown. After the service port cap failed, sufficient fluid likely leaked from the damper through the leaking check valve and the uncovered service port in the hours prior to the accident, ultimately compromising the functionality of the shimmy damper.

Unfortunately, the physical breach of the reservoir inflicted during the gear collapse resulted in the release of hydraulic fluid and precluded evaluation of whether the damper was properly serviced. This limited the investigation’s ability to definitively determine the root causes behind the apparent check valve and service port cap failure. The investigation explored potential contributions of operator organizational oversight and regulatory oversight of operator’s maintenance, however insufficient evidence existed to establish a direct link between any of these factors and the accident.

Left Main Gear Downlock Failure

Facing severe undampened axial vibration on rollout, the left main gear lower torque link (downlock) failed due to overload. When the downlock failed, the side braces were free to, and did, fold in the opposite direction from normal as the gear folded inboard and collapsed.

Related NOTAMs:
!MIA 06/412 MIA NAV ILS RWY 30 GP U/S 2206220012-2207012000EST
!MIA 06/409 MIA RWY 12/30 CLSD 2206212237-2206232200
!MIA 06/410 MIA RWY 09/27 CLSD 2206212238-2206232200
!MIA 06/411 MIA TWY Q BTN TWY U AND TWY Q10 CLSD 2206212246-2206222200

Metars:
KMIA 212353Z 03008KT 10SM FEW030 SCT250 28/21 A3007 RMK AO2 SLP183 T02780211 10306 20278 58004 $=
KMIA 212253Z VRB04KT 10SM FEW030 BKN250 29/19 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP185 T02940194 $=
KMIA 212153Z 05009G16KT 10SM FEW030 FEW045 BKN250 30/16 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP187 T03000161 $=
KMIA 212053Z 05010G18KT 10SM FEW030 BKN250 30/19 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP187 CB DSNT SE AND SW MOV S 6//// T03000194 $=
KMIA 211953Z 05013G18KT 10SM FEW030 BKN250 30/21 A3010 RMK AO2 SLP191 CB DSNT SE-S T03000206 $=
KMIA 211853Z 06011G20KT 10SM SCT037 SCT110 BKN250 30/22 A3011 RMK AO2 SLP197 CB DSNT SE-S MOV SW T03000217=
KMIA 211753Z 04014G19KT 10SM SCT030 SCT085 BKN250 30/22 A3013 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT SE SLP201 CB DSNT E-SE-SW MOV S 60021 T03000222 10311 20261 58001 $=
KMIA 211653Z 07011G20KT 10SM SCT028CB SCT065 BKN085 29/24 A3013 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT E RAB15E34 SLP204 CB E-SE-SW MOV S P0021 T02890239 $=
KMIA 211633Z 05010KT 10SM -RA SCT025CB SCT060 BKN090 27/24 A3013 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT E AND S RAB15 CB E-SE-SW MOV S P0021 T02720244=
KMIA 211619Z 04011G23KT 3SM +RA BKN025CB BKN047 27/23 A3014 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT S RAB15 CB OHD MOV S P0006 T02670233=
KMIA 211553Z 03007KT 10SM SCT035CB SCT050 BKN250 31/23 A3013 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT S SLP202 CB N-NE MOV S T03060228=
KMIA 211453Z 04008KT 10SM SCT030 SCT060 BKN250 31/23 A3013 RMK AO2 SLP202 CB S T03060228 51015=
KMIA 211353Z 03008KT 10SM SCT026 BKN035 BKN250 29/24 A3012 RMK AO2 SLP198 T02940239=
KMIA 211253Z VRB05KT 10SM FEW023 FEW045 SCT250 29/24 A3010 RMK AO2 SLP192 T02890244=