TACA A320 at Tegucigalpa on May 30th 2008, overran runway and crashed into embankment

Last Update: February 22, 2017 / 23:55:53 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
May 30, 2008

Classification
Crash

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

On Feb 22nd 2017 The Aviation Herald was able to obtain a copy of the final report, which carries no date of when it was published. El Salvador's Civil Aviation Authority (AAC) website to date still only offers the preliminary report, the final report was never released onto the website. The Aviation Herald is unable to publish the final report due to personal remarks present on the scan of the paper report.

The final report concludes the causes of the accident were:

The investiation determined that the probable cause of this accident was the decision to land on a runway without proper assessment of the operational conditions, weather, aircraft's landing weight and runway conditions and disregarding the operator procedure, while missing essential information on the runway conditions.

Contributory Causes:

- the landing was long, probably due to the tailwind and high energy of the aircraft with a ground speed around 160 knots.

- the operating crew did not recalculate the maximum landing weight permissable and the actual landing distance prior to commencing the approach.

- the non-precision approach with a subsequent circle to a visual landing was conducted in poor weather conditions, which resulted in high cockpit workloads.

- the manufacturer provided procedure does not provide guidance on applicable actions for a touchdown beyond the recommended touchdown zone.

- contributing to the severity of the accident was the lack of a stopway and a cliff at the end of runway 02.

- contributing to the reduced braking efficiency was the lack of pavement grooving, which resulted in inadequate runway drainage.

The AAC reported the captain (40, ATPL, 11,899 hours total, 8,514 hours on type) was pilot flying, he had completed 52 landing at Tegucigalpa's Toncontin Airport before the accident flight. The first officer (26, ATPL, 1,607 hours total, 250 hours on type) was pilot monitoring and had completed 5 landings at Toncontin prior to the accident flight.

Due to winds reported from 200 degrees at 6 knots the aircraft performed an approach to runway 20, a VOR/DME approach to runway 02 circling runway 20, however, when about to begin the circling for runway 20 the captain decided he couldn't perform the circling due to low visibility and went around. The aircraft climbed to 8000 feet and joined a hold over the Tegucigalpa VOR. The captain decided that despite the tailwind (recommended limit for Toncontin at 5 knots) they would land on runway 02, if the wind was 5 knots or less, as landing on runway 20 was not possible due to a low clouds obscuring the hills around the aerodrome.

The crew contacted dispatch asking whether they should divert to San Pedro Sula in case of another go around.

The aircraft positioned for another VOR/DME approach to runway 02, upon being handed off to tower requested to circle to land on runway 02. Tower queried the crew reporting winds from 200 degrees at 10 knots. The crew repeated the request to land on runway 02 reasoning that circling to runway 20 was not possible due to visibility. Tower accepted the request and reported the winds from 190 degrees at 10 knots, then cleared the aircraft to land on runway 02 advising the runway was damp.

At 15:45:12Z the aircraft, flaps were set at 40 degrees/full, touched down 400 meters past the runway threshold at 160 knots over ground and 135 KIAS, the spoilers and reversers were deployed, maximum reverse thrust selected, the crew felt the aircraft did not slow, about 4 seconds after touchdown the crew began to apply manual brakes disengaging the automatic brakes, the brakes pressure was released in between, then the brakes pressure rose up to maximum pressure, in the first 2 seconds after reaching the maximum brakes pressure the aircraft rolled 150 meters (145 knots over ground), the aircraft experienced about 0.3-0.45G deceleration reaching the maximum between 15:45:22 and 15:45:27Z, the first officer eventually called "70 knots", 70 KIAS with 90 knots over ground, at 15:45:27Z, the reversers were disengaged (forward idle thrust), due to lack of deceleration the first officer disenages anti-skid and now feels deceleration. and overran the end of the runway at 15:45:35Z, dropped down a cliff of 75 feet height onto a public road and two cars, hit a concrete pole carrying power lines, the pole penetrated the right wing root and started a fire. A fire truck, who passed by the accident site at that time, immediately began to extinguish the fire thus allowing the surviving passengers to be rescued.

The captain and two passengers died in the accident, two occupants of the cars crushed by the aircraft died, 39 people received serious injuries and 93 persons survived with minor or no injuries. The aircraft was destroyed.

The AAC reported that there was no runway friction measurement prior or after the accident. The Jeppesen Approach plates warned that the runway was slippery when wet. The runway had been re-surfaced prior to the accident and was not grooved at the time of the accident. Runway 02 has a landing distance available of 1649 meters (5410 feet) due to the displaced threshold, runway 02 has a downslope of 0.88%.

The AAC reported that examination of the braking system showed no malfunction or anomaly, all brakes were within normal wear. There were no leakages.

Examination of the tyres #1, #2 and #3 revealed tyre damage consistent with blocked wheels on a wet surface, likely occurring after the anti-skid was disengaged. Tyre #4 showed no such damage consistent with a blocked wheel.

The AAC reported that the aircraft landed with a gross mass of 64,389 kg. Landing on a dry runway 02 with no winds and flaps full would have permitted up to 66,300kg, on a wet runway a maximum weight of 59,700kg was possible (no wind). For the actual landing weight and runway condition the landing distance required, as computed by the AAC, was 1807 meters with a landing distance available of 1649 meters. The AAC warned - see in the analysis - that this was not a practical number but a certification figure.

The AAC analysed that when tower cleared the flight to land on runway 02 reporting winds from 190 degrees at 10 knots, the aircraft should have gone around considering the recommended tail wind limit was 5 knots.

The AAC analysed that the aircraft touched down 400 meters past the (displaced) runway threshold and about 150 meters past the first perpendicular taxiway. According to Airbus procedures for a wet runway a landing should be discontinued if the touchdown does not occur at or before the first perpendicular taxiway.

The AAC analysed that even if anti-skid had not been deactivated, the aircraft would have overrun the end of the runway.

The AAC analysed that the aircraft, touching down at the same touchdown point as during the accident flight, could have stopped 68 meters before the runway end had the crew derotated the nose in 3 instead of 7 seconds, initiated braking 2 seconds and reaching maximum braking 3 seconds after main gear touchdown instead of 4 and 14 seconds, maximum reverse 1 second after touchdown (identical to accident flight), idle reverse thrust at 70 KIAS, maximum pedal brakes until full stop.

The AAC analysed that the landing distances determined during the aircraft certification are aimed at demonstrating the shortest possible landing distance for a given landing weight with a test pilot at the controls and are established with full awareness that operational rules for normal operations require additional factors to be added for determining minimal operational field lengths. If pilots are unaware of these considerations, they might believe that they need less landing distance than they actually do or have an inaccurate perceiption of how much braking effort will be needed on landing.
Incident Facts

Date of incident
May 30, 2008

Classification
Crash

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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