Mahan B463 at Kharg on Jun 19th 2016, overran runway on landing

Last Update: November 8, 2017 / 18:27:35 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jun 19, 2016

Classification
Accident

Cause
Overran runway on landing

Airline
Mahan Air

Departure
Ahwaz, Iran

Destination
Kharg, Iran

Aircraft Registration
EP-MOF

Aircraft Type
BRITISH AEROSPACE BAe-146-300

ICAO Type Designator
B463

Airport
Khark Island Airport

Airport ICAO Code
OIBQ

A Mahan Air British Aerospace BAe-146-300, registration EP-MOF performing W5-4525 from Ahwaz to Kharg (Iran) with 79 passengers and 9 crew, landed on Khark's runway 13 at about 13:00L (08:30Z) but overran the end of the runway and came to stop on the unpaved surface about 60 meters past the runway end with the nose gear collapsed. There were no injuries, the aircraft received substantial damage.

On Jun 20th 2016 Iran's Civil Aviation Authority reported that investigators have been dispatched on site. There were no injuries, the aircraft received damage when it exited the runway.

Kharg Airport features a runway 13/31 of 2334 meters/7655 feet length.

Iran's CAO released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

The main cause of this accident is wrong behavior of the pilot which descripted as:

- Decision to make a landing on short field RWY 13 with tailwind.

- Un stabilized landing against on normal flight profile

- Weak, obviously, CRM in cockpit.

- Poor judgment and not accomplishing a go around while performing a un-stabilized approach.

- Improper calculating of landing speed without focusing on the tailwind component

Contributing factors:

- Anti-skid failures of RH landing gear causing prolong landing distance.

- Instantaneous variable wind condition on aerodrome traffic pattern.

- Late activating of airbrakes and spoilers (especially airbrakes) with tailwind cause to increase the landing roll distance.

Other found deficiencies:

- Route Check; No cockpit crew’s Route Check in their training file.

- Jeppesen Manual; No updated airport layout chart in Jeppesen manual at the time of accident.

- SOP Manual; SOP Manual not updated and maximum tailwind not mentioned in it.

- Clearway does not exist for Khark Island Airport

The CAO reported the aircraft performed a visual approach to Khark's runway 13. The captain (46, ATPL, 5,494 hours total, 1,290 hours on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (28, CPL, 300 hours total, 120 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. The captain continued an unstabilized approach ("hot and high", higher speed than target speed, 145 KIAS instead of 121 KIAS at 100 feet AGL, and above vertical profile) to touchdown a 2285 feet/685 meters past the runway threshold, the aircraft overran the end of the runway and came to a stop 54 meters past the runway end with the nose gear collapsed. The captain initiated an emergency evacation.

There were no injuries. The aircraft however sustained so substantial damage that it was beyond repair and was written off.

The CAO reported tower communicated very different winds to those provided in the METARs, the investigation therefore went into a deep review of the wind data and wrote:

The research helped the investigation team to know more about the real situation of the flight. The position of wind indicator sensor for ATC tower is located at the ATC tower building approximately in the Middle of Khark aerodrome. Two edges of the airport are located in the coast location of the Khark Island near to the Persian Gulf water. So the value of the wind may differ from the value of Indicated wind observed by the ATC man in the control tower. This difference is observed more in the middle of the day caused by sunlight effect on the ground and the water. This geographical phenomenon causes tailwind for flight inbounds RWY 13 and headwind for the flight inbounds the RWY 31. The conclusion of the research shows that at the time of the accident, the reported wind valve by MET was more valuable than reported wind by ATC tower so the actual tailwind for the flight was more than 10 knots.

The CAO analysed that during the landing roll the anti-skid system of the right hand main gear failed (not mentioned at what point of the landing roll, probably near the end of runway 13 about abeam the aiming marker runway 31) causing a longer roll out distance.

The CAO analysed: "According to aircraft flight manual performance chart regarding present wind speed and its direction the required runway length for safe landing was 1570 meters." and continued: "The available RWY length was 2334 meters which was suitable for normal landing but missing 685 meters and failure of antiskid system made landing for this flight to the critical condition."

Metars:
OIBQ 191000Z 30016KT CAVOK 35/23 Q1002
OIBQ 190900Z 30016KT CAVOK 34/25 Q1003
OIBQ 190800Z 30012KT CAVOK 33/26 Q1003
OIBQ 190700Z 30014KT CAVOK 32/26 Q1003
OIBQ 190600Z 30010KT CAVOK 32/25 Q1003
OIBQ 190500Z 30010KT CAVOK 32/24 Q1003
OIBQ 190400Z 30008KT CAVOK 31/26 Q1002
OIBQ 190300Z 29006KT CAVOK 31/24 Q1002