Jet2.com A332 at Tenerife on Jun 27th 2017, burst two tyres on landing

Last Update: July 9, 2019 / 14:51:27 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Jet2.com G-VYGL, Airbus A330-200 — Jet2.com G-VYGL, Airbus A330-200 (Photo credit: FlickrdeChato / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jun 27, 2017

Classification
Incident

Airline
Jet2.com

Flight number
LS-917

Departure
Manchester, United Kingdom

Destination
Tenerife Sur Reina Sofia, Spain

Aircraft Registration
G-VYGL

Aircraft Type
Airbus A330-200

ICAO Type Designator
A332

Airport
Tenerife South Airport, Tenerife Island

Airport ICAO Code
GCTS

A Jet2.com Airbus A330-200, registration G-VYGL performing flight LS-917 from Manchester,EN (UK) to Tenerife Sur Reina Sofia,CI (Spain) with 321 passengers and 11 crew, landed on Tenerife's runway 07 but burst the two aft left main tyres, deflated both aft right hand main tyres and became disabled on the runway. Three passengers received minor injuries. A number of other aircraft on approach to Tenerife South Airport needed to go around and divert as result.

On Jul 6th 2017 Spain's CIAIAC reported the occurrence was rated a serious incident and is being investigated by the CIAIAC. There were minor injuries as result of the occurrence, the damage to the aircraft is still being assessed.

On Jun 28th 2018 Spain's CIAIAC released an interim statement reporting the aircraft landed on Tenerife's runway 07 when without action by the flight crew all four aft main wheels locked up simultaneously. The aircraft skidded to a halt on the runway and was disabled. There was damage to the runway, both main gear struts, the wheels and tyres. There were no injuries. The investigation focusses on information obtained from the analysis of the flight data recorder as well as by tests carried out on the BSCU (brake and steering control unit). Tests on the BSCU as well as the investigation are still continuing.

On Jul 9th 2019 the CIAIAC released their final report in Spanish only (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Spanish only release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe). The report concludes the probable cause was:

abnormal anti-skid system behaviour.

The CIAIAC reported the flight was uneventful, the approach stabilized, the autopilot was disconnected at 420 feet and the aircraft continued for a gentle touch down at +1.16G at 135 KIAS, auto braking was armed at low setting. After touchdown the brakes pressure for all brakes increased to 2500 psi causing the four aft wheels (#5, #6, #7, #8) to lock up, the brakes pressure releases again for wheels 5 and 6. While wheels #7 and #8 remained blocked, wheels #5 and #6 picked up rotation again slowing down until the aircraft came to a stop. Three passengers received minor injuries.

The CIAIAC analysed that the performance of the brakes was the result of commands by the brakes and steering control unit (BSCU), which commanded maximum brakes pressure to the aft main wheels although low braking mode had been engaged. The investigation therefore focussed on what caused this abnormal behaviour of the BSCU.

The tachometers, servo valves of all four wheels were examined and showed no anomaly. Visual, microscopic and x-ray examination of the BSCU also revealed no anomaly. Temperature and Vibration were conducted, however, also did not reveal and malfunction. It was not possible to reproduce the events during the occurrence.

The BSCU manufacturer pointed out the possibility of a failure of the BSCU operating algorithm which could have been caused by temporary corruption of variables used by the algorithm.

Metars:
GCTS 271400Z 08021KT 050V110 CAVOK 32/12 Q1015 NOSIG=
GCTS 271330Z 21006KT 150V260 CAVOK 29/18 Q1015 WS R07 NOSIG=
GCTS 271300Z 24013KT 200V270 CAVOK 29/18 Q1015 WS R07 NOSIG=
GCTS 271230Z VRB06KT 9999 FEW025 29/19 Q1015 WS R07 NOSIG=
GCTS 271200Z 03013G28KT 350V080 9999 FEW020 32/16 Q1015 WS R07 NOSIG=
GCTS 271130Z 06023KT 9999 FEW020 33/12 Q1015 NOSIG=
GCTS 271100Z 07024KT CAVOK 32/12 Q1014 NOSIG=
GCTS 271030Z 07021KT CAVOK 31/13 Q1015 NOSIG=
GCTS 271000Z 06011KT 010V090 CAVOK 31/13 Q1015 WS R07 NOSIG=
GCTS 270930Z 25008KT 220V290 CAVOK 27/18 Q1015 WS R07 NOSIG=
GCTS 270900Z 13007KT 110V170 CAVOK 27/17 Q1015 NOSIG=
GCTS 270830Z 09013KT CAVOK 29/12 Q1015 NOSIG=
GCTS 270800Z 08017KT CAVOK 28/12 Q1015 NOSIG=