Thai AirAsia X A333 at Tokyo on Feb 14th 2017, runway incursion

Last Update: April 5, 2018 / 14:30:28 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 14, 2017

Classification
Incident

Flight number
XJ-607

Aircraft Registration
HS-XTC

Aircraft Type
Airbus A330-300

ICAO Type Designator
A333

Airport ICAO Code
RJAA

A Thai AirAsia X Airbus A330-300, registration HS-XTC performing flight XJ-607 from Tokyo Narita (Japan) to Bangkok Don Muang (Thailand), was taxiing for departure from Tokyo Narita's runway 34R at about 20:15L (11:15Z) and had been instructed to hold short of runway 34R, the crew acknowledged.

A China Airlines Airbus A330-300, registration B-18361 performing flight CI-106 from Taipei (Taiwan) to Tokyo Narita (Japan), was on final approach to runway 34R about 1.1nm before touch down, when HS-XTC crossed the hold short line prompting air traffic control to instruct B-18361 to go around.

B-18361 climbed out and positioned for another approach while HS-XTC departed. Both aircraft landed safely at their destination.

Japan's TSB reported HS-XTC had been instructed to hold short of runway B and acknowledged the instruction, but crossed the hold short line. B-18361 was instructed to go around therefore.

On Apr 5th 2018 the JTSB released their final report identifying Aircraft A as HS-XTC and Aircraft B as B-18361 concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

It is highly probable that this serious incident occurred because the Aircraft A entered the runway across the Stop Line despite the instruction given to it by the Tower to hold short of the Stop Line of the runway 34R, and the Aircraft B which had been given landing clearance attempted a landing to the same runway.

It is somewhat likely that the Aircraft A entered the runway when the PIC and the FO failed to notice the Stop Line and the Runway Guard Lights because they were concentrating to operate the switches in the cockpit and forgot to pay attentions to the outside.

The JTSB analysed that B-18361 was about 2000 meters/1,1nm before the runway 34R threshold when HS-XTC crossed the hold short line and the radar display of the tower controller changed the runway condition to yellow indicating a warning another aircraft was about to enter the runway. Tower immediately instructed B-18361 to go around. Following the instruction by tower the crew of B-18361 complied and went around.

The JTSB analysed with respect to HS-XTC:

The PIC ordered the FO to turn on the Runway Turn Off Light during taxiing when the Aircraft A was approaching B9 and turning to the right. Because the FO turned on strobe lights by mistake, it is probable that the PIC ordered the FO to correct it and the PIC was distracted by the FO’s switch operation during the time until it corrected, and it is somewhat likely that the PIC and the FO had failed to notice the Stop Line and Runway Guard Lights. It is probable that the PIC stopped the Aircraft A according to the confirmation from the Tower, but the position where it stopped was already crossed the Stop Line by approximately 60m.

It is somewhat likely that the FO did not have the images where it should stop, when he had to stop short of the Stop Line of B9, because he had little experiences of departing from the runway 34R.

The JTSB analysed with respect to the taxiway B9 (used to enter the runway):

Taxiway at common airport is crossing a runway at right angle and aircraft would stop as directly facing runway, therefore, it is probable that they are useful for a pilot of departing aircraft to confirm the stop position or to see landing aircraft by sight.

However, B9 is crossing the runway at right angle, but there is not enough space to stop, therefore when a large aircraft stops at the Stop Line of B9 position, it cannot take a position facing the runway in 90º. Because of this, it is highly probable that it is necessary for a large aircraft to stop on the Taxiway B which is short of runway.

It is desirable for the Airport Installation Manager to implement the study how to prevent a runway incursion or how to study the visibility of the Stop Line.

The JTSB characterized the serious incident as Category C with ample time/distance to avoid a collision according to ICAO's "Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions".

Metars:
RJAA 141300Z 32005KT 9999 FEW030 02/M08 Q1023 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3022
RJAA 141230Z 31005KT 270V340 9999 FEW030 02/M07 Q1023 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3022
RJAA 141200Z 32005KT 9999 FEW030 03/M07 Q1023 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3021
RJAA 141130Z 32005KT 9999 FEW030 04/M06 Q1022 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3020
RJAA 141100Z 29004KT 9999 FEW030 02/M05 Q1022 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3020
RJAA 141030Z VRB02KT 9999 FEW030 02/M06 Q1022 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3019
RJAA 141000Z 35004KT 260V040 9999 FEW030 03/M08 Q1022 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3019
RJAA 140930Z 03004KT 350V080 9999 FEW030 07/M08 Q1021 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3018
RJAA 140900Z 04006KT 350V070 9999 FEW030 07/M08 Q1021 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3017
RJAA 140830Z 04009KT 010V080 9999 FEW030 08/M08 Q1021 NOSIG RMK 1CU030 A3017
RJAA 140817Z 04010KT 9999 FEW030 08/M08 Q1021 RMK 1CU030 A3016
RJAA 140800Z 33005KT 9999 FEW030 07/M11 Q1021 NOSIG
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 14, 2017

Classification
Incident

Flight number
XJ-607

Aircraft Registration
HS-XTC

Aircraft Type
Airbus A330-300

ICAO Type Designator
A333

Airport ICAO Code
RJAA

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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