Dniprovia E145 at Ivano-Frankovsk on Feb 7th 2017, overran runway on landing
Last Update: September 20, 2017 / 16:46:04 GMT/Zulu time
Date of incident
Feb 7, 2017
ICAO Type Designator
Airport ICAO Code
The aircraft was subsequently towed to the apron.
Ukraine's NBAII opened an investigation into the occurrence rated a serious incident.
The occurrence aircraft returned to service about 30 hours after landing.
Ivano-Frankovsk offers a runway 10/28 of 2510 meters/8230 feet length.
On Sep 20th 2017 Ukraine's NBAAI released their final report in Ukrainian concluding the probable causes of the runway overrun were:
- exceeding Vref by 8 knots
- insufficient/ineffective braking during first half of the landing roll
- differences regarding braking intensity needed on wet, slippery or contaminated runways in documents provided by the airline and the aircraft manufacturer
- probable discrepancy in reported runway friction values 0.3/0.3/0.3 at the time of landing for at least one third of the runway
- intense precipitation in form of torrential snow, which contributed to the deterioration of the runway condition
The NBAAI reported the crew intensively reviewed weather information in consultation with airline dispatch before the captain decided the flight could go ahead. The pilot flying for the sector was the first officer (51, ATPL, 8,179 hours total, 1,670 hours on type), the captain (55, ATPL, 11,601 hours total, 3,234 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.
The aircraft joined and performed the final approach for Ivano-Frankovsk's runway 10 on automation but went beyond the end of the runway coming to a stop 160 meters/525 feet past the end of the runway along the extended center line of the runway. The aircraft sustained minor damage as result of the overrun, one wheel needed to be replaced.
The NBAAI analysed that takeoff and landing mass and center of gravity were within limits. The captain's decision to depart Kiev was correct based on the information available at that time.
Descending towards Ivano Frankovsk ATC mistakenly identified runway 28 as runway in use providing correct but incomplete weather information to the crew, the NBAAI annoted that the information did not include weather phenomena, their intensity or proximity, air and dew temperatures and the weather trend. The crew subsequently prepared for an approach to runway 28. About one minute later the controller adjusted the runway lights, he corrected and advised, that runway 10 was in use. The captain had already computed their landing performance establishing Vapp=145 KIAS at flaps 22, using Vref of 138 KIAS plus wind correction of 7 knots (wind speed 14 knots) establishing they required 2125 meters of landing distance based on the runway condition report that reported 3mm of snow on the runway and an adhesive coefficient of 0.3/medium braking).
While descending towards 5000 feet ATC provided the crew with a storm warning indicating strong snow fall, visibility of 1300 meters, cloud ceiling at 120 meters. The crew acknoledged the information. ATC subsequently cleared the crew for the ILS approach to runway 10 and cleared the flight to 3200 feet MSL and further to 3000 feet MSL. The crew extended flaps to 9 degrees first, then 22 degrees and lowered the gear while turning final, about 9nm before touch down they were handed over to tower.
The crew reported they were fully established, tower provided weather information indicating winds from 080 degrees at 6m/s (12 knots), visibility 1300 meters (4260 feet), cloud ceiling 120 meters (400 feet AGL), QNH 1018 and cleared the flight to land.
Immediately after capturing the glide slope the crew sensed icing was becoming an issue and activated the anti-icing systems. As no icing alarm occurred within 60 seconds the crew turned the anti-icing systems off again.
The aircraft descended through 128 feet AGL at 148 KIAS (Vapp+3) on localizer and glideslope, engines were operating at 45.3% N1, however, thrust was increased to 60% N1 indicating turbulence on final approach. Below 126 feet the engine thrust reduced again to 42% N1 remaining there until almost touch down. The vertical speed increased from about 750 to 930 fpm and descended below glideslope. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 20 feet AGL (instead of 50 feet AGL) and touched down at 146 KIAS (Vref 138 KIAS + 8 knots), 8 knots above landing speed. According to the AOM for wet runways the runway threshold must be strictly crossed at 50 feet AGL and Vref, in this case 138 KIAS. Due to the increased speed the required landing distance had increased to 2329 meters. The aircraft touched down 230 meters past the runway threshold at 144 KIAS and 133 knots over ground. The spoilers deployed immediately after touch down, the engines were idle, about 4 seconds after touch down the crew began to apply brake pressure which amounted to about 195 psi during the first stages of the landing run (which the commission annotated was insufficient). Later in the landing run the brakes pressure increased to 310 psi and further reached 650 psi. The aircraft crossed the runway end at 34 knots over ground and departed paved surface at 28 knots over ground. Immediately prior to coming to a stop the brakes pressures reached 2850 psi and 1560 psi. After coming to a stop the crew radioed tower about their runway overrun, tower activated emergency services.
Following the overrun another runway inspection was conducted which revealed 5mm of snow on the runway and a friction value between 0.22 and 0.26.
The NBAAI analysed that the runway had been cleared 13 minutes prior to landing, 8 snow ploughs were involved and released about 1000kg of reagent against icing. Following this clearing the crew reported 3mm of snow layer on the runway and friction coefficients of 0.3/0.3/0.3.
The information relayed to the crew thus did not match the actual runway conditions at the time of touch down.
Based on video evidence and measuring the speed of the aircraft from the video the commission concluded that the runway friction value was 0.24 for the first third, 0.26 for the second third and 0.22 for the last third of the runway. At the moment the aircraft touched down the aircraft encountered "moderate torrential snowfall", prior to touchdown the ambient temperature as well as the dew pointed dropped from -2 degrees C to -4 degrees C. Therefore the weather conditions reported to the crew at the time of final approach did not match the actual conditions. The commission such stated that the measurements taken by the airport did not reflect the actual condition of the runway.
UKLI 071100Z 09005MPS 3700 -SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M04/M04 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 071047Z 09004MPS 2900 -SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M03/M04 Q1018 R10/590330 TEMPO0500 +SHSN BKN004
UKLI 071030Z 09005MPS 060V120 1400 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M04/M04 Q1018 R10/590330 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN004
UKLI 071027Z 09005MPS 1600 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M04/M04 Q1018 R10/590330 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN004
UKLI 071000Z 08004MPS 040V110 1400 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M04/M04 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070934Z 10006MPS 1400 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M04/M04 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070930Z 09006MPS 1800 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M04/M04 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070925Z 08005MPS 1900 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M04/M04 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070915Z 08005MPS 1400 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M03/M03 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070900Z 09005MPS 1600 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M03/M03 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070844Z 09006MPS 050V110 1400 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M03/M03 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070830Z 08004MPS 1900 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M03/M03 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070814Z 08004MPS 040V110 1900 FZRASN BKN004 BKN014CB M03/M03 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070800Z 09005MPS 1600 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M03/M03 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070730Z 08005MPS 050V120 1700 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M03/M03 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
UKLI 070700Z 09005MPS 1300 SHSN BKN004 BKN014CB M02/M02 Q1018 R10/590330 NOSIG
Date of incident
Feb 7, 2017
ICAO Type Designator
Airport ICAO Code
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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