Flybe DH8D near Dublin on Apr 27th 2016, incapacitated first officer interferes with flight controls

Last Update: January 20, 2017 / 16:15:23 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Flybe G-ECOP, De Havilland Dash 8 (400) — Flybe G-ECOP, De Havilland Dash 8 (400) (Photo credit: markyharky / Flickr / License: CC by)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Apr 27, 2016

Classification
Report

Airline
Flybe

Flight number
BE-303

Departure
Exeter, United Kingdom

Destination
Dublin, Ireland

Aircraft Registration
G-ECOP

Aircraft Type
De Havilland Dash 8 (400)

ICAO Type Designator
DH8D

A Flybe de Havilland Dash 8-400, registration G-ECOP performing flight BE-303 from Exeter,EN (UK) to Dublin (Ireland) with 33 passengers and 4 crew, was about to reach the top of descent into Dublin when the first officer (ATPL, 5,400 hours total, 200 hours on type), pilot monitoring, indicated he was feeling unwell and requested to leave the cockpit for a toilet break. The captain (35, ATPL, 5,100 hours total, 4,300 hours on type) requested the lead flight attendant to the cockpit to remain in the cockpit while the first officer was absent, then switched the fasten seat belt sign on, when the captain felt the aircraft unexpectedly yawed to the left and rolled to 18 degrees of bank. The captain disconnected the autopilot, returned the wings level and retarded engine power to ensure a stable descent, then began to investigate what had caused the upset. The suspicion of a possible rudder trim runaway did not check true although the aircraft symbol showed a full deflection on the primary flight display. When the captain asked the first officer for his opinion, the first officer did not respond, also did not respond to physical stimulation for about a minute. The captain called PAN advising ATC of the first officer being incapacitated and requesting priority for an approach to runway 28. The lead flight attendant entered the cockpit, moved the seat of the first officer back to ensure the flight controls remained free and provided assistance to the first officer administering oxygen to the first officer. The first officer recovered about 5 minutes after the first symptoms but did not participate in the aircraft operation for the remainder of the flight. The aircraft landed safely on runway 28 about 21 minutes after the first symptoms.

Ireland's AAIU released their final report commenting the occurrence:

The Co-pilot was probably under some stress on the morning of the flight considering that his young child had a hospital appointment the following day. Stress and lack of quality sleep may have been factors in his feeling unwell and incapacitation during the flight.

In this event the Co-pilot requested permission to leave the flight deck at a time when the flight crew’s workload began to increase at the commencement of descent. Before the Co-pilot could leave the flight deck, the Commander responded to an unexpected aircraft upset caused by an involuntary input from the Co-pilot as he became increasingly unwell.

Following the unexpected aircraft upset, the Commander reacted promptly and ensured that the aircraft was returned to a safe flight path. Only then did he realise that the Co-pilot was unresponsive and had become incapacitated.

As the Commander was already in communication with the SCCM, he considered the standard call to alert Cabin Crew was not required. The Crew reacted to the situation in an effective and co-ordinated manner, carried out the incapacitation drills and the CCM occupied the jump-seat for approach and landing. Notwithstanding a minor issue with a headset, there was good communication between the Commander and Cabin Crew. The Commander, assisted by the Cabin Crew, ensured that the Co-pilot was secure in his seat and away from the controls while the cabin was secured for the approach and landing with an ABP occupying the aft crew seat.

The situation was dealt with in an efficient manner by the Commander with good use of CRM by the Crew; in its own safety report the Operator commented that ‘the reaction by the rest of the crew was swift and effective and they should be commended for their calmness, initiative and attitude throughout the incident.’

The AAIU reported: "The remainder of the Crew were stood down from subsequent duties and positioned home to the UK later that day. The Co-pilot was kept in hospital overnight for observation before being released. It was determined that the Co-pilot suffered a brief loss of consciousness (syncope) due to a sudden drop in blood pressure. This condition can commonly occur in healthy people and recovery is normally prompt and without any persisting ill effects. At the time of writing, the Co-pilot had not yet returned to flying duties with the Operator."

Only in the synopsis (but not the factual portion) of the report the AAIU stated: "Before the Co-pilot left his seat, the Commander felt an unexpected aircraft upset in the form of a yaw and roll to the left. The Co-pilot, who had become incapacitated, had inadvertently made an input to the left rudder pedal."