Bridge Cargo B748 at Amsterdam on Jan 13th 2017, runway excursion on landing

Last Update: July 19, 2018 / 21:06:55 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Air Bridge Cargo VQ-BLR, Boeing 747-8 — Air Bridge Cargo VQ-BLR, Boeing 747-8 (Photo credit: oliver.holzbauer / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 13, 2017

Classification
Incident

Cause
Runway excursion

Airline
Air Bridge Cargo

Flight number
RU-548

Departure
Novosibirsk, Russia

Destination
Amsterdam, Netherlands

Aircraft Registration
VQ-BLR

Aircraft Type
Boeing 747-8

ICAO Type Designator
B748

An Air Bridge Cargo Boeing 747-800 freighter, registration VQ-BLR performing flight RU-548 from Novosibirsk (Russia) to Amsterdam (Netherlands), landed on Amsterdam's runway 36R at 19:22L (18:22Z) and taxied to the apron.

Netherland's Onderzoeksraad (DSB) tweeted at 23:04L (22:04Z) that they are responding to a runway incident at Schiphol.

One Dutch newspaper reported following the tweet, a passenger aircraft touched down 300 meters short of the runway, no further details known. (Editorial note: had this been true for any runway in use except 36C, this would have been a major accident, no anomaly however was observed on runway 36C, which has about 450 meters of paved surface ahead of the runway threshold).

According to information The Aviation Herald received, VQ-BLR took out a number of runway edge lights.

The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Amsterdam 22 hours after landing.

On May 15th 2017 the Dutch Onderzoeksraad (DSB) reported in their quarterly bulletin, that the aircraft struck a number of runway threshold lights shortly before landing on runway 36R. The aircraft sustained damage as result.

On Jul 19th 2018 the DSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The hard landing was caused by a high rate of descent. The flare manoeuvre was insufficient to reduce the sink rate satisfactorily.

The fact that the aircraft hit the runway threshold lights was a combination of the continued flight below the glideslope, from the moment the captain disconnected the autopilot at 700 feet and took over the controls manually, and a high sink rate shortly before the touchdown. There was a stable approach until just before the landing.

Right before landing two automatic GPWS warnings were generated (“glideslope” and “sink rate”) whereby the stable approach criteria were exceeded. This should have been a reason to make a go-around. However, this was not carried out by the captain, although the procedures required it.

According the Operations Manual of Air Traffic Control the Netherlands, ATIS messages should include any reported windshear conditions. Flight crews are hereby made more aware of sudden wind changes and the necessity to make a go-around in case the approach becomes unstable. Air Traffic Control the Netherlands has not been able to demonstrate that the windshear conditions reported by aircraft crews did result in the ATIS being modified.

The measures taken by the operator after the event are necessary to avoid occurrences like hard landings as well as landing short. Those measures underline the importance of adhering to international established guidelines concerning the stabilized approach criteria and the importance of making a go-around when the approach becomes unstable.

The DSB reported the right hand main landing gear contacted and destroyed three runway threshold lights when the aircraft touched down just before the threshold.

The DSB reported the approach to runway 36R was normal until 700 feet AGL, when the captain disengaged the autopilot and continued the approach manually. Almost immediately the aircraft was below the glideslope however within one dot deviation until 100 feet AGL, when the sinkrate increased to 1070 fpm and the glideslope deviation increased to more than 3 dots, the "Glideslope" automatic aural alert sounded followed by the "sink rate" automatic aural alert. Immediately after, within 2-3 seconds, the aircraft touched down at +1.76G, bounced and touched down a second time at +1.84G. The aircraft decelerated normally and taxied to the apron, the flight crew did not notice any control anomaly.

The DSB reported: "After the landing the flight crew heard on the ATC frequency that another aircraft in the approach for runway 36R made a go-around following a windshear warning. In the captain’s interview, windshear shortly before landing was mentioned as a suspected cause of the event."

The DSB reported that no windshear warning had been generated on board of the incident flight. There is also no ground based equipment at Amsterdam that could detect windshear. Air Traffic Controllers thus depend on pilot reports of windshear.

The DSB reported Boeing analysed the flight data and wrote:

Shortly before landing the aircraft mainly experienced updrafts and to a lesser degree downdrafts which decreased in magnitude while approaching the runway. From 200 feet altitude the glideslope deviation continuously increased. Three seconds before landing the aircraft sink rate increased to 1070 feet/minute which triggered a sink rate warning. The captain pulled on the control column where after the “sink rate” reduced to 500 feet/minute. This was however insufficient to avoid a hard landing. Boeing concluded in their analysis that windshear could not be confirmed with the data available as cause for the increase in sink rate shortly before landing.

The DSB analysed the approach:

During the approach the aircraft was continuously flying below the glideslope but to a degree that a go-around based on the stable approach criteria was not necessary. While the aircraft approached the runway the deviation from the 3 degree glidepath increased. At an altitude of 100 feet the glideslope deviation exceeded 1 dot whereby one of the stable approach criteria was not met. This should have been a trigger to execute a goaround.

Shortly before landing the automatic generated GPWS warnings (“glideslope” and “sink rate”) were also indications for a go-around. The captain stated in his interview that before he realized that a go-around was necessary the aircraft already had touched the runway. From the interviews with the flight crew it could not be determined that the first officer had communicated to the captain that the approach became unstable nor that a go-around was necessary.

Metars:
EHAM 132025Z 33022G35KT 300V360 9999 FEW010 FEW025CB 05/02 Q1003 NOSIG=
EHAM 131955Z 32023G34KT 290V360 9999 VCSH FEW022CB SCT040 05/01 Q1003 TEMPO 7000 -SHRA=
EHAM 131925Z 32023G34KT 300V360 9000 -SHRA FEW018CB SCT025 05/03 Q1002 TEMPO 7000=
EHAM 131855Z 32022G32KT 280V340 9999 FEW018CB 05/02 Q1002 TEMPO 7000 -SHRA=
EHAM 131825Z 32027G41KT 9999 -SHRA FEW012 FEW018CB SCT035 05/02 Q1001 TEMPO 7000=
EHAM 131755Z 32026G38KT 290V360 9999 FEW012 FEW018CB SCT035 06/02 Q1000 TEMPO 7000 -SHRA=
EHAM 131725Z 32022G36KT 290V360 9999 FEW012 FEW018CB SCT025 06/03 Q1000 TEMPO 7000 -SHRA=
EHAM 131655Z 32012G23KT 280V360 9999 FEW012 FEW018CB SCT045 06/03 Q1000 TEMPO 7000 -SHRA=
EHAM 131625Z 28010KT 210V330 7000 -SHRASN FEW007 SCT012 BKN016 SCT018CB 04/03 Q1000 BECMG 9999 NSW=
EHAM 131555Z 25008KT 220V280 4500 SHRASN FEW007 SCT009 BKN012 BKN018CB 03/02 Q1000 TEMPO 2500 BKN008 BECMG 32028G38KT=
EHAM 131525Z 25013KT 220V280 7000 -SHRA FEW009 BKN011 SCT018CB BKN035 03/02 Q0999 TEMPO 2500 SHRASN BECMG 32028G38KT=
EHAM 131455Z 26016KT 9000 -SHRA FEW011 FEW018CB SCT028 03/02 Q0999 TEMPO 4500 SHRA SCT010 BKN015 BECMG FM1530 32028G38KT=