TAME E190 at Cuenca on Apr 28th 2016, overran runway

Last Update: March 19, 2018 / 17:23:39 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Apr 28, 2016

Classification
Accident

Airline
Tame

Flight number
EQ-173

Destination
Cuenca, Ecuador

Aircraft Registration
HC-COX

Aircraft Type
Embraer ERJ-190

ICAO Type Designator
E190

A TAME Embraer ERJ-190, registration HC-COX performing flight EQ-173 from Quito to Cuenca (Ecuador) with 87 passengers and 6 crew, landed on Cuenca's runway 23 at about 08:00L (13:00Z) but overran the end of the runway and came to a stop on soft ground about 70 meters/230 feet past the runway end facing opposite to landing direction with both main gear collapsed. The aircraft was evacuated. There were no injuries, the aircraft received substantial damage however.

Late night May 4th 2016 Ecuador's DGAC reported the recovery works have been completed and the occurrence aircraft has been moved onto the apron.

On Jun 10th 2016 the DGAC reported that the black boxes have been read out by Brazil's CENIPA, the DGAC have received the report by CENIPA and are analysing the data. The investigation continues.

Cuenca features a runway 05/23 with 1900 meters/6230 feet length.

On Mar 19th 2018 Ecuador's Junta Investigadora de Accidents (EJIA) released their final report in Spanish concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

- the runway condition, the runway was contaminated with water and was slippery

- the landing was continued despite an unstabilized approach in tailwind

- non performance of maximum landing performance procedures recommended by the aircraft manufacturer for landings on contaminated runways

The following factors contributed to the accident:

- the dispatch of the aircraft with 1500kg/3300lbs more fuel than usual

- the omission of computation of the landing distance required to perform landing with the reported braking action

- the crew's decision to carry out the landing with three red lights and one white lights on the PAPI induced by Terminal Information documents which appeared to authorized the procedure

- the use of confusing terminology by the Terminal Information documents using terms applicable to Airbus fleet rather than Embraer fleet

- the crew's decision to not go around after the aircraft exceeded the maximum permitted approach speed and despite obvious degradation of visibility after the minimum height had been passed

- improper use of deceleration aids, in this case thrust reversers

- the application of emergency brakes with inhibited the anti-skid system

- the lack of adequate cockpit resource management

- the lack of training to use performance tables for calculation of runway distances

The EJIA reported that the crew carried out the approach briefing, the pilot flying indicated they would continue on glide slope, upon acquiring visual contact with the runway the glideslope warning would be inhibited and they'd continue manually. The autobrakes were set to medium. The aircraft performed the VOR ILS Zulu Approach to runway 23, a preceding Airbus A319 crew reported the runway was wet and braking action was medium. The aircraft touched down 277 meters past the runway threshold, however, did not sufficiently slow down. When the crew detected the remaining length of the runway would be insufficient to stop the aircraft he intentionally steered the aircraft into a drift with the intention to stop the aircraft in time. The aircraft overran the end of the runway and came to a stop on soft ground 49 meters past the end of the runway. The forces incurred during the drift and final impact caused the left main gear to collapse causing substantial damage to the aircraft.

The EJIA analysed that the flight was originally thought to fly from Quito to Coco (Ecuador), however, was re-assigned to Quito-Cuenca. As result the flight carried 1500kg more fuel than would be normal for the route. However, the maximum landing weight was not exceeded.

The dispatch did not take into account that the runway in Cuenca was wet with light rain being reported at the time of dispatch. Dispatch also did not request the latest 12:00Z METAR that became available before the aircraft took off.

The Security Management released two alerts regarding Cuenca Terminal Information Documents following the accident due to the documents using Airbus only procedures which were not applicable to Embraer or ATR aircraft, in particular a procedure to calculate the landing distance required on a wet runway.

The present conditions at Cuenca, also in response to the pilot report by the preceding A319, required that the crew compute their landing performance. However, the CVR did not reveal that such a calculation was done, although the crew got notified about the medium braking action 14 minutes prior to landing (in their 32 minutes flight), the crew did not discuss the runway condition as a constraint for their landing. The crew argued that they had never received instructions of how to use the landing performance tables and establish the landing distance required. The EJIA computed that had the aircraft been dispatched with the normal amount of fuel, the aircraft could have safely stopped within the runway boundaries, however, with the current mass and runway conditions on arrival and maximum auto-brakes the landing distance required was 2122 meters in excess of the 1900 meters of landing distance available. Had the crew done the calculations their only option would have been not to land.

The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 37 feet at 128 KIAS but intermittently lost visual contact with the runway due to increased rain. Although the crew, considering the runway length, had aimed to touch down as soon as possible and put the aircraft down firmly, the aircraft "greased" in at 0.985G, the main wheels made first contact 277 meters past the runway threshold, the nose gear came down another 314 meters further down the runway, the aircraft hydroplaned. 643 meters past the runway treshold maximum reverse was selected. 742 meters down the runway the crew applied light to medium manual braking gradually increasing the brake pressure. About 1338 meters past the runway threshold the reversers were returned to minimum thrust because the pilot attempted to reselect the autobrakes to HIGH, the autobrakes switch however immediately jumped to OFF as the autobrakes are not meant to be reselected during the landing run with the brakes pedals pressed. The reverse thrust was subsequently selected to maximum again. 272 meters short of the runway end the brakes pressure reached maximum, the crew detected the aircraft would not stop in time, the brakes were released, the right hand brakes pedal pressed down with the intention to invoke a drift, the emergency brakes were activated which inhibited autoskid.

The EJIA stated in their analysis that the crew did not react appropriately to the hydroplaning.

Metars:
SECU 281600Z 08003KT 6000 -RA FEW005 SCT010 OVC030 13/12 Q1029
SECU 281500Z 17001KT 6000 -RA FEW005 SCT010 OVC030 13/12 Q1029
SECU 281400Z 06002KT 6000 -RA FEW005 SCT010 OVC030 13/12 Q1029
SECU 281300Z 33003KT 8000 -RA FEW010 OVC030 13/12 Q1028
SECU 281200Z 35003KT 9999 -RA FEW010 OVC030 13/12 Q1027
SECU 281100Z 35002KT 9999 -RA FEW005 OVC030 13/13 Q1026
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Apr 28, 2016

Classification
Accident

Airline
Tame

Flight number
EQ-173

Destination
Cuenca, Ecuador

Aircraft Registration
HC-COX

Aircraft Type
Embraer ERJ-190

ICAO Type Designator
E190

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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