DAT AT72 at Karup on Jan 25th 2016, aligned with runway edge lights for takeoff
Last Update: August 25, 2016 / 17:30:49 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jan 25, 2016
Classification
Incident
Airline
Danish Air Transport
Flight number
DX-171
Departure
Karup, Denmark
Destination
Copenhagen, Denmark
Aircraft Registration
OY-LHA
Aircraft Type
ATR ATR-72-200
ICAO Type Designator
AT72
Airport
Karup Airport, Karup
Airport ICAO Code
EKKA
The airline confirmed that the aircraft hit a number of runway lights during takeoff roll in dense fog, the takeoff was rejected and the aircraft returned to the apron. The circumstances of the incident are under investigation.
The flight was cancelled, the passengers were rebooked onto the next flight DX-175. DX-175 was upgraded to be flown by a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration OY-RUE, and reached Copenhagen 3 hours past scheduled arrival of DX-171.
On Feb 3rd 2016 the French BEA reported based on notification by Denmark's HCL, that the crew lined up runway 27L on the runway edge lights in the belief they were aligning with the runway center line lights. During takeoff roll the aircraft's nose wheels and main wheels contacted runway edge lights and a nearby arrestor cable. The occurrence was rated a serious incident and is being investigated by Denmark's HCL.
On March 9th 2016 Denmark's Havarikommissionen (HCL) released their preliminary report stating that the commander (38, ATPL, 3,514 hours total, 1,134 hours on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (35, CPL, 1,530 hours total, 390 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. During taxiing out for departure in dark night and instrument meteorological conditions tower reported the winds from 230 degrees at 5 knots, the runway visual range (RVR) at midpoint was 1600 meters. While lining up on runway 27L the crew worked the before takeoff checklist comprising 13 challenge and response items. The aircraft was moving forward at ground idle power, the right hand main gear contacted a red runway edge light in the runway underrun area while the aircraft was moving towards the threshold of the runway. After reaching the threshold the captain applied takeoff power, in the initial stages of the takeoff run there was a thumping noise from the nose gear prompting the captain to align slightly to the left believing the nose gear was running over the recessed runway center line lights, however, the right main gear was contacting the elevated right runway edge lights. When the aircraft neared the military arrestor cable mechanism at the right hand side of the runway the captain realized the aircraft was lined up with the edge lights instead of the runway center line lights, rejected takeoff and steered the aircraft towards the center line.
The aircraft sustained damage to the nose gear taxi lights, both gear doors of the right main gear, two blades of the left propeller, the lower fuselage skin and the tyres of nose and right main gear. In addition a number of runway edge lights and the lighting system of the military arrestor cable mechanism were destroyed.
On Aug 25th 2016 the HCL released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
In darkness and hazy weather conditions, the flight crew lined up the aircraft on the runway edge lights along the right-hand side of runway 27L instead of the runway centreline lights of runway 27L.
This resulted in a misaligned take-off roll over the elevated runway edge lights along the right-hand side of runway 27L leading to damages to the runway edge lights and the aircraft itself.
A combination of environmental, operational, and human factors contributed to the sequence of events:
- Dark night operation
- Reduced visibility
- Runway and taxiway environment, including an extra tarmac width on runway 27L, the absence of runway shoulder markings, the absence of taxiway centreline lighting, and the use of a displaced threshold
- Flight crew divided attention unintentionally provoked by the before take-off procedures and checks
- Flight crew fatigue
The serious incident occurred in dark night and under instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
The HCL analysed that the reduced visibility existing did not require low visibility procedures by both operator or aerodrome. However, in combination with the dark night the reduced visibility "most likely impaired flight crew visual acuity".
The HCL analysed that the work schedule of both flight crew was in accordance with existing EU and Danish regulations. The HCL continued analysis:
In general, flight crew fatigue is a complex subject.
But by using a generic fatigue evaluation tool and taking into consideration the actual duty and rest period and the flight crew reported sleep quantity and quality, the AIB considers the flight crew to be fatigued in the morning on 25-1-2016. With reference to the output data of the fatigue evaluation tool, the commander might have suffered from accumulated fatigue, and the first officer due to his circadian rhythm might have suffered from acute fatigue.
Due to the recent sleep and the time of day, flight crew performance was impaired equivalent to more than 0.05% blood alcohol concentration. For that reason, flight crew vigilance and reaction times might significantly have been impaired.
Furthermore, flight crew fatigue might have impacted the flight crew decision making process and the flight crew night vision adaption and visual acuity.
With respect to complacency the HCL stated: "The flight crew was very familiar with flight operations in EKKA. It was a routine morning flight towards EKCH. Mental expectations might unknowingly have overshadowed the external information flow and inadvertently lowered the vigilance and the positional awareness of the flight crew. It is possible that the combination of routine, familiarity and flight crew fatigue might have provoked flight crew complacency."
The HCL analysed that the flight crew was still processing the flight controls check checklist while lining up dividing the attention between line up and flight control tests, in particular spoiler tests. The HCL wrote:
Completing checklists is a normal and necessary part of the departure phase of flight, but it might also be a distracter to the critical runway line-up phase.
With respect to the aerodrome environment the HCL wrote: "Runway 27L had an extra tarmac width with no markings (for instance a provision of transverse stripes) at intersection E, where the aircraft entered the underrun of runway 27L. In dark night and reduced visibility, the areas of additional not marked tarmac around the runway threshold area of runway 27L might have provided erroneous visual cues for the flight crew. Operating from a runway with a greater width than most standard runways might have led to a belief of being in the center of the runway when the aircraft was actually lined up on the edge."
However, the HCL concluded that analysis section:
The AIB does not consider the runway lighting system of runway 27L at EKKA to have contributed directly to the sequence of events, because:
- the latest photometric aerodrome calibration of the runway lighting system (runway 27L) revealed compliance with ICAO recommendations
- in the morning on 25-1-2016, the were no remarks to the runway inspection
- neither EKKA ATC nor the flight crew reported runway lighting system anomalies
- the area directly north of runway 27L was in darkness and thereby not contributing to flight crew visual illusions and loss of positional awareness
- the flight crew reported the actual ATC setting of runway lighting intensity to be appropriate
Metars:
EKKA 250623Z 22007KT 0800 R09/P2000N R27/P2000N FG VV002 07/06 Q1019 TEMPO 0200
EKKA 250620Z 22007KT 0750 R09/P2000N R27/P2000N FG VV003 07/06 Q1019 TEMPO 0200
EKKA 250550Z 23006KT 0350 R09/1200N R27/1300N FG VV002 07/07 Q1019 TEMPO 0200
EKKA 250520Z 23007KT 0400 R09/1300N R27/1700N FG VV002 07/07 Q1019
EKKA 250450Z 23008KT 0400 R09/1200N R27/1600N FG VV002 07/07 Q1019
EKKA 250435Z 23008KT 0400 R09/1200N R27/1700N FG VV002 07/07 Q1019
EKKA 250420Z AUTO 23009KT 0650NDV R09R/1400N R27L/1800U FG VV003 07/07 Q1018
EKKA 250350Z AUTO 23005KT 0400NDV R09R/1100D R27L/1200N FG VV003 07/07 Q1019
EKKA 250320Z AUTO 22003KT 0350NDV R09R/1200N R27L/1000N -SHRA FG VV003 06/06 Q1019
EKKA 250301Z AUTO 21003KT 0300NDV R09R/1100N R27L/1000N -SHRA FG VV003 06/06 Q1019
EKKA 250302Z AUTO 21003KT 0300NDV R09R/1100N R27L/0900N -SHRA FG VV003 06/06 Q1019
EKKA 250250Z AUTO 22003KT 0350NDV R09R/1100N R27L/1100N -SHRA FG VV003 06/06 Q1019
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jan 25, 2016
Classification
Incident
Airline
Danish Air Transport
Flight number
DX-171
Departure
Karup, Denmark
Destination
Copenhagen, Denmark
Aircraft Registration
OY-LHA
Aircraft Type
ATR ATR-72-200
ICAO Type Designator
AT72
Airport
Karup Airport, Karup
Airport ICAO Code
EKKA
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
Article source
You can read 2 more free articles without a subscription.
Subscribe now and continue reading without any limits!
Read unlimited articles and receive our daily update briefing. Gain better insights into what is happening in commercial aviation safety.
Send tip
Support AeroInside by sending a small tip amount.
Related articles
Danish AT72 at Bornholm on Dec 3rd 2016, smoke in cockpit and cabin
A Danish Air Transport Avions de Transport Regional ATR-72-200, registration OY-LHA performing flight DX-31 from Bornholm to Copenhagen (Denmark)…
Danish Air Transport MD83 near Ashgabat on Sep 29th 2011, captain incapacitated due to violent seizures
A Danish Air Transport McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration OY-RUE performing flight DX-3098 from Kabul (Afghanistan) to Trabzon (Turkey) and…
Newest articles
Spring Japan A321 at Sapporo on Nov 29th 2024, runway incursion by vehicle
A Spring Airlines Japan Airbus A321-200 freighter, registration JA82YA performing flight IJ-407 (dep Nov 28th) from Tokyo Narita to Sapporo New…
Fleet type match
Commut E145 near Monroe on Dec 2nd 2024, smoke in cockpit
A CommutAir Embraer ERJ-145 on behalf of United, registration N14148 performing flight UA-4830 from Little Rock,AR to Houston Intercontinental,TX…
Subscribe today
Are you researching aviation incidents? Get access to AeroInside Insights, unlimited read access and receive the daily newsletter.
Pick your plan and subscribePartner
A new way to document and demonstrate airworthiness compliance and aircraft value. Find out more.
ELITE Simulation Solutions is a leading global provider of Flight Simulation Training Devices, IFR training software as well as flight controls and related services. Find out more.
SafetyScan Pro provides streamlined access to thousands of aviation accident reports. Tailored for your safety management efforts. Book your demo today
AeroInside Blog
Popular aircraft
Airbus A320Boeing 737-800
Boeing 737-800 MAX
Popular airlines
American AirlinesUnited
Delta
Air Canada
Lufthansa
British Airways