Easyjet A320 at London on Jul 16th 2015, incorrect takeoff performance computation

Last Update: January 14, 2016 / 16:28:56 GMT/Zulu time

Bookmark this article

Photo of Easyjet G-EZUH, Airbus A320 — Easyjet G-EZUH, Airbus A320 (Photo credit: Anna Zvereva / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jul 16, 2015

Classification
Report

Airline
Easyjet

Flight number
U2-2029

Departure
London Luton, United Kingdom

Destination
Montpellier, France

Aircraft Registration
G-EZUH

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

An Easyjet Airbus A320-200, registration G-EZUH performing flight U2-2029 from London Luton,EN (UK) to Montpellier (France) with 178 passengers and 6 crew, was prepared for departure from Luton's runway 08. The commander intended to use full runway length (2162 meters of takeoff run/accelerate stop distance available), use flaps 1, the takeoff performance was computed, cross checked by the first officer and entered into the flight management and guidance system (FMGS). The aircraft subsequently taxied to the holding point for runway 08, another aircraft was waiting for departure from full distance runway 08, and tower advised the crew that they had difficulties obtaining their clearance from the next sector. The captain offered to use an intersection departure from taxiway B1 (takeoff run available/accelerate stop distance of 1,688 meters) to resolve the issue, tower confirmed this would solve the problem, and the crew decided to use B1 for line up. The captain decided to use flaps 2 for takeoff, the takeoff performance was recalculated for flaps 2, with emphasis on flaps 2, and full runway length, the computation was cross checked by the first officer and entered into the FMGS. During the subsequent takeoff run the commander noticed that the remaining runway was shorter than expected, the aircraft became airborne 180 meters before the runway end. The crew discussed the takeoff performance later into the flight and discovered that the performance data had been incorrectly computed. The aircraft landed safely and without further incident in Montpellier.

The United Kingdom's AAIB released their bulletin (page 81) reporting the captain (41, ATPL, 6,995 hours total, 4,841 hours on type) later commented that he was using his electronic flight bag (EFB) to compute takeoff performances. After the decision to use line up at B1 he intended to change the runway length accordingly on his EFB, however, it was likely runway 08 full length remained selected due to finger size and/or the laptop's screen calibration. The captain also believed he was distracted from cross checking the correct runway length had been selected due to the need to confirm the change of flap setting with the first officer.

The AAIB reported that the aircraft became airborne 180 meters before the runway end and crossed the runway threshold at a height of 117 feet measured by the radio altimeter.

The AAIB reported following immediate safety actions were taken by the operator:

As a result of this and other recent incidents the operator will publish an article in the next edition of its Flight Safety Bulletin outlining their severity and the hazards of not crosschecking all performance calculations.

Also, the operator has added a briefing note on all of its Operational Flight Plans highlighting the importance of crosschecking takeoff performance calculations when changes are made as a result of intersection departures or other last‑minute changes to aircraft configuration or takeoff distances.