Air Europa A332 near Madrid on Feb 13th 2011, engine shut down in flight

Last Update: August 26, 2015 / 13:31:48 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Air Europa EC-LKE, Airbus A330-200 — Air Europa EC-LKE, Airbus A330-200 (Photo credit: airlines470 / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 13, 2011

Classification
Incident

Cause
Engine shut down in flight

Airline
Air Europa

Flight number
UX-63

Departure
Madrid, Spain

Destination
Cancun, Mexico

Aircraft Registration
EC-LKE

Aircraft Type
Airbus A330-200

ICAO Type Designator
A332

An Air Europa Airbus A330-200, registration EC-LKE performing flight UX-63 from Madrid,SP (Spain) to Cancun (Mexico) with 333 passengers and 11 crew, was climbing out of Madrid about 10 minutes into the flight when the crew levelled off at FL250 and shut the right hand engine (Trent 772) down due to excessive vibrations. The airplane subsequently returned to Madrid for a safe landing on runway 18R about 20 minutes later, vacated the runway and stopped on the adjacent taxiway, where passengers disembarked via mobile stairs and were bussed to the terminal.

Pictures show parts of the right hand engine's inlet cowling are missing in the area of the fan.

Rolls Royce reported that one fan blade was found missing just above the annulus line and the trailing blade missing from about 50% height. Although there is damage to the inner and outer skin of the engine intake, all blade material seems to have been contained inside the engine. The aircraft received no damage.

On Mar 28th 2012 Spain's CIAIAC released an intermediate report stating, that the aircraft was cleared to climb to FL270 and was climbing through FL241 when the right hand engine partially released a fan blade resulting in a loud bang followed by strong vibrations. The crew declared MAYDAY and shut the engine down about 35 seconds after the fan blade release. The aircraft returned to Madrid for an overweight landing on runway 18R. While taxiing to the apron a small brakes fire on the #4 wheel on the left main gear occurred, emergency services extinguished the fire by applying water to all landing gear.

A post flight inspection revealed a section of the #4 fan blade's airfoil had detached exhibiting a loss of 80% of blade material. The adjacent blade also showed damage, about 50% loss of blade material, as result of that blade detachment. The nose cowl inlet panel showed perforation. Analysis revealed the section had separated as result of a fatigue crack that originated in an area of about 200 micrometers of unbonded material at the bond line between the airfoil panel and the internal membrane of the blade. The CIAIAC wrote: "The feature is likely to have occurred during the original manufacture of the blade."

The CIAIAC characterised the damage as minor limited to the right hand engine.

On Aug 26th 2015 the CIAIAC released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:

The incident on aircraft EC-LKE occurred due to the detachment of fan blade n.o 4 (P/N FW23741 S/N RGF18472) on the right engine (Trent 772B-60 S/N 41222) after 4,367 cycles due to a crack propagated by fatigue starting from a bonding defect measuring 600 ~ 70 ƒÊm and located 150 mm away from the root and 113 mm away from the leading edge, at the bond line between the suction panel and internal membrane.

This defect, caused by the presence of an organic contaminant during the manufacturing process, in addition to impeding the bonding of the material, modified the materialfs properties locally without causing any visible microstructural changes. Under normal operating conditions, this defect, in isolation, could not have grown and fractured the blade after 4,367 cycles. It is thus likely that the blade was subjected to higher than normal loads. The circumstances under which said loads could have been produced could not be determined.

The CIAIAC analysed:

The appearance of the fault was so evident, due to the noise and strong vibration that it generated, that it was immediately detected by every crew member. The captainfs reaction was also immediate and the first thing that was heard was the verbalization of the fault presented on the ECAM, which the first officer repeated. Thus, both crew members were focused on the problem and on the procedure they were going to use to combat it.

The appearance of the fault led to a change in the crewfs functions. Before then, the first officer had been the pilot flying, and normally would have remained the PF for the rest of the flight. However, as specified in the FCTM, it is always the captainfs prerogative to take control of the aircraft, as happened in this case. This change in roles was not expressed by the captain; instead, he directly started taking actions corresponding to the PF. It should be noted that while this change was not communicated, the fact that he verbalized each and every one of the actions he was taking left no room for doubt as to the new status, and the first officer was fully cognizant of this change from the beginning, as evidenced by the first officerfs statement gYou have control and communicationsh after the captain took control.

The captainfs input to the engine was practically instinctive; within five seconds the throttle lever for the n.o 2 engine was at IDLE and within eleven seconds the initial actions were complete. There was no confusion or hesitation as to what to do, and from the start they were aware of the seriousness of the fault and that there was no chance to recover the engine. There was no mention of the cause of the fault and they focused on handling the emergency. The situation facing the crew was complicated by the overweight condition (for landing purposes), by the vibration, which was so strong that it not only hampered flying but actions as basic as reading a checklist, and, as they noted after the flight, by the unusual nature of the situation and the uncertain scope of the fault.

The tension was evident in the captain, probably exacerbated by the fact that his family was onboard. The presence of relatives in the cockpit is not allowed by the company; in fact, one of the relatives interrupted the execution of the ENGINE STALL checklist.

This tension, for example, was reflected in the initial failure comply with the task sharing between the PF and PNF, asking the pilot to do tasks he should have done as the PF, and interrupting the ENGINE STALL procedure, which delayed the securing of the engine until the 35 second mark. Both the call to ATC and the call to the purser should have been done once the procedure was complete.

The first officerfs reaction and performance throughout the flight were impeccable. He remained calm at all times, was assertive in gremindingh the captain that he was responsible for communications and in advising him on certain flight and navigational aspects. He adhered to procedures at all times and to the distribution of functions as trained. He was constantly vigilant and took the initiative when the captain did not in areas like starting checklists or suggesting stopping the aircraft while taxiing in anticipation of a problem with the gear, as eventually happened.

The first officerfs workload in this incident as the PNF, and in emergencies in general, was high, since he took charge of handling the emergency. The presence of a third pilot in the cockpit was positive in that it helped the first officer do his tasks. This pilot aided by looking for checklists and doing calculations. He also offered an additional guarantee that the procedures were being done correctly. In this regard, the captainfs role was decisive since he took explicit advantage of the third pilotfs presence in the cockpit by involving him in the emergency from the start. It should be noted that the mood on the cockpit in terms of teamwork, delegation of functions, confidence and assertiveness was driven by the captain, who constantly encouraged this type of activity, accepting and appreciating all of the first officerfs comments and asking them both to monitor the flight.

The procedures were fully executed and the start of each could be identified on the CVR. All of the captainfs and first officerfs actions were announced out loud at all times, not just at the start of the emergency. This helped every crew member remain perfectly aware of the status of the flight, of its evolution and of their immediate intentions.

Interruptions to checklists were handled properly, with the first officer starting every list from the start, thus ensuring they were completely executed. Every action involving certain switches (bottle discharge and engine switch) that required a cross-check from both crew members was carried out as specified by procedure, with the first officer asking for the captainfs attention when needed.

During the approach they were concerned with the airplanefs overweight, speed and altitude as they prepared for the landing. They were very aware of their situation. They were in a hurry to return to Madrid as soon as possible, but also realized that the approach had to be made properly and that the aircraft had to be properly configured. In fact, they considered holding over LALPI to lose altitude if necessary.

All of the emergency procedures were carried out very quickly (in under two minutes) and with no mistakes. The situation in the cockpit was calm with the situation under control, a mood that would prevail for the rest of the flight until the landing ...

With respect to the blade failure the CIAIAC analysed: "In conclusion, the defect in the blade originated in an area where the suction panel and the membrane had not bonded due to a mistake in manufacturing process. This mistake could have resulted from the presence of a contaminant that kept the surfaces from bonding and that, on a very localized level, diminished the materialfs fatigue resistance. The growth and propagation of a crack from the defect, however, would have required loads higher than those normally seen in service. The circumstances under which the blade might have been subjected to those higher than normal loads could not be established or confirmed, though it seems clear that some event with this characteristic was needed to trigger the growth of the bonding defect."