Brit Air CRJ7 at Lyon on Aug 15th 2011, engine shut down in flight
Last Update: July 7, 2015 / 14:33:44 GMT/Zulu time
The NTSB reported the BEA have initiated an investigation.
Another flight experienced a problem out of Lyon the same day, see Incident: Brit Air CRJ1 near Lyon on Aug 16th 2011, smoke in cabin, possible depressurization.
On Jun 9th 2015 the French BEA released their final report in French concluding the probable cause of the incident was:
The detachment of the fuel pressure line at the operability bleed valve (OBV) from its connector created a fuel leak in the left engine which in contact with hot parts of the engine started a fire.
Forces affecting the fuel pressure line have been sufficient to loosen the connector by wear down of the mounting thread at the housing.
The absence of scheduled maintenance except for visual inspection of the engine on that part, to be replaced only in case of failure, meant that the anomaly could not be detected before failure.
The BEA reported the aircraft departed runway 36L and was climbing through 2800 feet when the crew heard two bangs and checked the engine parameters, which remained normal. The crew therefore continued the climb. At 4000 feet the crew received a fire indication for the left hand engine, worked the memory items to shut the engine down and discharge both fire suppression systems, then the fire indication ceased. The aircraft returned to Lyon for a safe landing on runway 36R.
The BEA reported the occurrence happened after the engine had accumulated 14,343 cycles and 15,413 flying hours. The OBV was still the original factory mounted one. There were no maintenance records regarding the OBV even though the engine had undergone two checks at the manufacturer facilities.
The BEA reported there had been two similiar cases of fuel pressure line separating from the OBV due to connector failure.
The BEA reported that the manufacturer changed the maintenance requirements mandating, that the new OBVs (less than 6000 hours accumulated) should be replaced before reaching 12000 hours or within 4 years after the AD becoming effective (whichever occurs earlier), older OBVs (6000 hours or more) should be replaced before accumulating another 6000 hours or two years after the AD (whichever occurs first).
On Jul 7th 2015 the French BEA released their English version of the final report.
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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