Germanwings A320 near Barcelonnette on Mar 24th 2015, first officer alone in cockpit, initiated rapid descent, aircraft impacted terrain

Last Update: March 14, 2025 / 13:40:36 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 24, 2015

Classification
Crash

Airline
Germanwings

Aircraft Registration
D-AIPX

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

Gene Kranz, NASA Mission Manager of Apollo 13, said: "Failure Is Not An Option".
And Albert Einstein said: "Condemnation before investigation is the highest form of ignorance."

Just about 49 hours after the crash the States Attorney of Marseille Brice Robin announced the "verdict", that the first officer had flown the aircraft into the ground with the intention of committing suicide. At that time the investigation had not even really begun.

France, Germany and Spain are members of ICAO and have ratified the ICAO treaties which require in Annex 13 that the goal of investigations into aircraft accidents is to find the most probable causes of the accident in order to avoid a repeat of such accidents with same or similiar causes. The accident investigation is never to assign blame. An investigation that does not determine these most probable causes of an accident thus fails the sole purpose of such investigations.

After releasing the last update on our coverage on Apr 2nd 2017 almost 8 years ago, we have engaged in a background research. Investigation documents that were brought to light at that time raised serious enough question marks to doubt the entire official narrative and to question, whether the correct most probable cause of the crash had been identified.

If that official investigation had not identified the most probable cause of this crash, then there was a real possibility that another crash like this could happen again and more families would mourn losses of their relatives and friends for the very same reason that brought D-AIPX down. In order to prevent this, I engaged in that background research on my own und funded it out of the current income of The Aviation Herald.

It took until November 2018 before I finally got hold of the complete released investigation folder by the states attorney of Dusseldorf out of Germany, consisting of about 16,000 pages, and until 2020 before I got hold of the entire released investigation folder of the Investigative Court of Marseille containing about 5000 pages of documents. The Investigative Court of Marseille was the investigation leader (not the BEA). I used these folders to base my background research on. I also used the official A320 Aircraft Maintenance Manual to explore the possibilities of a technical cause of the crash sequence. In 2024 I also used actual certified A320 Flight Control Units to experimentally verify and demonstrate any technical possibilities, that may have played a part in the crash.

The investigation documents by the Investigative Court of Marseille and the states attorney of Dusseldorf are also the only relevant materials, as the BEA - although continuing the safety investigation - had to relinquish the lead of the investigation to the Investigative Court of Marseille.

The BEA, other than is usual in their final reports, have not released any transcript, FDR data or materials to support their final report, merely relying on their official status as a Government Authority. It is worth remembering that human factors however also prevail in government bodies that are run by humans.

As result of my research I found evidence, purely based on the official investigation documents of Investigative Court of Marseille and the investigation documents produced by the states attorney of Dusseldorf, later also the Airbus A320 Aircraft Maintenance Manual and actual hardware of A320 Flight Control Units, that:

1) There was no motive whatsoever for either of the pilots to deliberately crash the aircraft.

2) According to information out of Germanwings the keyboard for the cockpit door was defective, so that the emergency entry code did not work at all.

3) There are several gross factual errors in the BEA final report which misrepresent papers in the investigation folder; in turn these render the final report factually incorrect and unreliable.

4) It is not clear who remained in the cockpit. The investigation documents clearly suggest that the captain remained in the cockpit and it was the first officer who left the cockpit. According to the documents in the investigation folders voice identification of the CVR was never done - neither family of the captain nor family of the first officer were ever played the CVR in an attempt to identify the voices, nor was any other person who knew the captain and/or the first officer ever played the CVR either.

5) Both BEA and BFU excluded their recognized human factors experts including Dr. Didier Delaitre and Aviation Psychologist Karsten Severin from the core of the investigation. There is no evidence in the folders that the Investigative Court of Marseille or the states attorney of Dusseldorf ever contacted psychologists, psychiatrists, human factor experts to determine, whether it was even humanly possible to perform the alleged suicide and 149 counts of murder. There is no evidence, that the cockpit voice recorder was ever heard by any psychologist, psychiatrist or human factors expert to determine the condition of the human in the cockpit.

6) The human in the cockpit seemed to be incapacitated within seconds of the other pilot leaving the cockpit as was indicated by his accelerated breathing. The accelerated rate of breathing at 26 breaths per minute was assessed from the transcript by doctors, psychologists and human factors experts involved by the AVH. The French Gendarmerie who compiled the transcript also stated they could not determine whether the "human in the cockpit" (their phrase!) was conscious or not; this implies that there was not a single sound on the CVR after the cockpit door was closed for the last time that would allow the conclusion that there was further human action after the closing of the cockpit door.

7) The lack of associated sounds on the CVR indicates that there was no human interaction with the aircraft from the time the accident sequence began until the aircraft impacted the ground. The remarks of the transcript authors note this, while also noting that those sounds such as changing the selected altitude via the relevant rotary were clearly transcribed during the climb out of Barcelona. According to the transcript the breathing continued absolutely regularly at 26 breaths per minute indicating incapacitation from a few seconds after closing the cockpit door to impact. This implies that the person in the cockpit did not engage in any physical or mental activity throughout that time.

8) When applying human factors it was found that it is not humanly possible to perform the "test" of suicide as asserted by the investigation. Instead, the FDR data for SALTFCU (Selected Altitude on FCU) as contained in the folders of the French Investigative Court of Marseille show that a technical fault already existed at the time of the flight to Barcelona with a probability so high that it is bordering on certainty. It is thus likely that the pilot present in the cockpit at that time had already prevented a crash twice on the flight to Barcelona by resetting the selected altitude.

9) If we ignore the human factors, the chances that a person could have done all these changes of the selected altitude in total synchronisation with the FDR sampling are less than 1:370400; this includes the documented changes during the flight to Barcelona and the accident flight. That figure is less than the odds of winning the German Lotto Class 4 prize (5 correct numbers in a batch of 6 selected from 49 numbers, a probability of 1:60223), whereas the probability of a technical fault was bordering certainty (99.999%).

10) Throughout the accident flight there are multiple pointers to an already existing technical fault based on the little FDR data that has been printed out in the French investigation documents.

11) For this research I bought two A320 Flight Control Units, one certified as airworthy part that had been used on an Air India A320 (evidence FCU), the other known to have worked in a Baltic A320 (work FCU). The analysis of the behaviour of both FCUs together with the aircraft maintenance manuals revealed that a technical possibility did indeed exist that could change the selected altitude WITHOUT any human intervention. Following months of analysis work with the work FCU I was able to demonstrate the accident sequence as well as the "training sequence" in front of the cameras of the TV documentary on both work and evidence FCU.

12) In the year 2024 I was able to demonstrate the accident sequence on an A320 Neo/Ceo full flight simulator (and thus a third FCU) without even touching the FCU stunning the highly experienced A320 captain and training instructor that were with me.

The entire argument line as well as all the evidence leading to these findings exceed the scope of this AVH report and therefore have been laid down in a separate book (see below).

Each of the two kernel points - the captain remaining in the cockpit as well as no human action with the aircraft - immediately and completely invalidates the BEA final report as well as any statements the States Attorneys of both Marseille and Dusseldorf have ever made from the day of the crash to date.

I submitted a statement of fact consisting of 299 pages with ICAO as well as EASA.

I include a few translated paragraphs of this statement of fact here in this PDF containing the relevant argument lines to explain why the altitude changes were not possible for a pilot, but do indicate a technical fault. These paragraphs show that it was not humanly possible to perform the changes on the SALTFCU (Selected Altitude on FCU) as established by the investigation (both BEA and Investigative Court of Marseille). However, the investigation claimed these changes of target altitude were only possible by human action on the relevant rotary knob.

The paragraphs show further that the chances of a human to "synchronise" these recorded selections of the altitude to the sampling of the flight data recorder is quite impossible. Mathematically the chances of a human action in concurrence with the technical monitoring is 1:370400, whereas the probability of these changes by a technical fault is extremely close to certainty.

Considering human factors; two changes of altitude, from 100 to 21000 and one from 100 to 25000 feet, both done within one second, both done without any overshooting or undershooting straight onto the target altitude within that second, are impossible for a human to achieve. However, these altitude changes match system behaviour as designed in case of a technical failure.

In studying the Aircraft Maintenance Manual I discovered how this SALTFCU curve could have been possibly produced by a technical fault involving the FCU. With the two FCUs purchased and after strict analysis of the FCU behaviour I was able to experimentally demonstrate the changes from 38000/25000/21000 feet to 100 feet and back within microseconds (millionths of a second which is well within one sample of the FDR) on both FCUs as well as on a third FCU in an A320 Neo/Ceo Simulator. The experimental results completely match the FDR curves recorded during both the flight to Barcelona and the accident flight.

The French Gendarmerie who did the investigative work on behalf of both the Investigative Court of Marseille and the States Attorney of Marseille, Monsieur Brice Robin, wrote in the investigation papers (this is taken from German translation by the States Attorney of Dusseldorf):

"Aufgrund der bei diesen Arbeiten zusammengetragenen Sachverhaltsmerkmale können wir vermuten, dass die kräftige von den verschiedenen Spuren erfasste Stimme die des Flugkapitäns ist." (On the base of the evidence gathered during this work, we can assume, that the strong voice recorded by the various tracks is the one of the flight captain)

This mere assumption, which is not even any circumstantial evidence not to mention proof/evidence, guides the investigation to stating with respect to the CVR recordings (translated from French to German by the States Attorney of Dusseldorf):

"Wir legen fest, dass die von den verschiedenen Spuren ausgegebene starke Stimme die des Flugkapitäns, Herrn .... ist, und die schwache Stimme die des Herrn ...."
„Die Spur 1 entspricht einer qualitativ hochwertigen Aufzeichnung der 30 letzten Minuten des Helms des Kopiloten
Die Spur 2 entspricht einer qualitativ hochwertigen Aufzeichnung der 30 letzten Minuten des Helms des Flugkapitäns.“

Translated to English by AVH:
We specify, that the strong voice recorded on the various tracks is the one of the captain of the flight, Mr. ...., and the weak voice the one of Mr. ....
Track 1 represents the high quality recording of the last 30 minutes of the headset of the first officer.
Track 2 represents the high quality recording of the last 30 minutes of the headset of the captain.
End of Translation

This however is opposed to the technical and organizational circumstances. Channel 1 is always and always the left hand and captain's seat, Channel 2 is always and always the right hand and first officer's seat.

Hence whenever the investigation talks about the first officer, it actually is the captain and vice versa.

In the French transcript it becomes clear, the crew talked German to each other. Immediately prior to one of the pilots leaving the cockpit and the last descent of the aircraft the transcript documents:

Squence number Time Channel transcript (translation by AVH)
372 09:30:08 2: Jetzt gehe ich mal weg, ja? (I go away, yes?)
373 09:30:09 2: Dein Funk! (Your radio!)
374 09:30:10 1: Mein Funk! (My radio!)

According to the transcript the pilot in the right hand seat, that would be the first officer, leaves the cockpit, the pilot in the left hand seat, that would be the captain, acknowledges and also takes control of the radio.

However, based on the assumption the stronger voice being the captain, the investigation claims the captain (in the right hand seat) departed the cockpit and the first officer (in the left hand seat) accepted the radio and remained in the cockpit. Yet according to

- the electrical wiring schematics by Airbus specific for D-AIPX
- the transcript
- and flight crew conventions

it was the first officer in the right hand seat who left the cockpit and the captain in the left hand seat who accepted the radio and remained in the cockpit until impact.

Ground personnel in Dusseldorf and Barcelona did not notice anything unusual with both pilots, according to their testimonies in the folders, hence also did not see the pilots in the wrong seats as is claimed by the investigation.

There are a lot more independent indications in the documents by both the French Investigative Court of Marseille and the folders of the States Attorney of Dusseldorf supporting that the captain was in the cockpit at the time of the last descent and impact, and the first officer had left the cockpit and was in the cabin. The full argument line however would exceed the scope and capacity of this web server, hence, was only laid down in my book documenting the whole development from the day of the accident to today (see below).

One of such circumstantial evidence chains may become irrefutable proof of who remained in the cockpit.

- The Gendarmerie had written in their reports that they had put yellow hats and flags with consecutive numbering at pieces of wreckage and red hats and flags with consecutive numbers at human remains. They took photos of all these sites. The court approved expert witness, who was lowered from a helicopter to the crash site on the day of the crash, took a photograph of a part of the windscreen in the impact crater that obviously showed the exit point of a human body because parts of the body remained attached to the windscreen. Obviously, these human remains would also have received a red flag, a number and a photograph and would thus be documented. It can also be expected that upon recovery of these remains it would be documented in which body bag this part was packaged and transported to the lab, closing the chain between the wreckage field and the laboratory and making the human remains witnessed on that first day's photo definitely identifiable. However, none of the documentation (the photos and the lists or records of which human remains from which site were packaged in which body bag) is included in the French folders as presented to (or requested by) the States Attorney of Dusseldorf. That documentation was also not delivered to relatives of the victims who requested and received access to the records.

- The laboratory field numbers, which determine the area (including the impact crater) of the wreckage field that a human remains was found in, tell us that only the remains of the captain were found in the impact crater and that no remains of the first officer were found in that impact crater. Without the recovery/wreckage field protocols and thus not being able to identify under which number the human remain attached to that windshield was taken to the laboratory, this observation can only be circumstantial evidence. However, with the protocols identifying which bag that human remain was packaged in and delivered to the laboratory for DNA analysis, this photograph and the corresponding human remains could become proof of who remained in the cockpit.

My investigative work was continuously monitored by aviation professionals who included one Airbus captain who is also a human factors expert lecturing about human factors at aviation conferences all around the world, a retired governmental investigator who is a human factors and pilot suicide expert and an additional sworn and court approved non-governmental aviation accident investigator.

In addition, I had the findings cross checked by an external independent accident investigator of another government aircraft accident investigation authority who found the work factually correct, technically plausible and even went on to successfully verify my resulting statement of facts by reproducing the accident sequence (as described by myself) in a full flight simulator.

I decided to make these findings available via a TV Documentary demonstrating for example, that without touching the Flight Control Unit at all it was possible to make the FCU selected altitude (or other values like speed, heading, vertical speed) jump between any values of choice. The editorial team of that TV documentary, both the actual filming team in Germany as well as the Sky Teams in Germany and England again applied huge scrutiny on my work, verifying my work and every single word, before accepting my statements and entering into the filming works. The TV documentary focussed on the main line to demonstrate the technical possibility but was not able to expand on all argument lines due to time limits on each episode of the documentary. The trailer of the TV documentary already being broadcast is online at:



The first episode of three of the German version of the Documentary is already available online in the German speaking countries Germany, Austria and Switzerland via:



The investigative departments of highly reputed German Media also reviewed my work and found the work credible enough to rewrite the narrative of this crash. The lead attorney for the families called my work impressive, convincing and plausible and stated so in front of the families of the victims and in the TV documentary.

The States Attorney of Dusseldorf, Dr. Kumpa, admitted in his written statement to the Sky TV documentary amongst other points that he alone and without consulting with relevant doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists or other similiar experts concluded that the first officer was suffering from an anxiety disorder. Dr. Kumpa's conclusion was based purely on a suspicion voiced by the general practitioner who was conducting a checkup of the first officer. This was in direct contravention of the statements made by psychiatrists in January 2015 and on March 16th 2015 that the first officer was not suffering from any psychiatric problem and was not suicidal. Dr. Kumpa thus publically provided the motive that the official investigation needed so that it could conclude that the aircraft was brought down by the first officer's suicide:

"Die Krankenakten des Co-Piloten wurden vom Unterzeichner beurteilt. Der Hinzuziehung von Sachverständigen bedurfte es insoweit nicht. Der Unterzeichner verfügte als langjähriger Dezernent für Kapitalstrafsachen, Todesermittlungsverfahren und Verfahren wegen ärztlicher Behandlungsfehler über hinreichende eigene Sachkunde. Für eine Verifikation der Daten bestand kein Anlass, es haben sich keine Hinweise darauf ergeben, dass die Krankenakten nach Erstellung bei den behandelnden Ärzten manipuliert worden sein könnten, zumal sie zeitnah nach dem Absturz auf richterliche Anordnung beschlagnahmt worden sind. Im Übrigen hat es sich um ein Todesermittlungsverfahren gehandelt. Ein psychiatrisches Sachverständigengutachten zur Frage der Schuldfähigkeit des verstorbenen Co-Piloten war im Rahmen eines Todesermittlungsverfahren gerade nicht veranlasst."

Translation by AVH: "The co-pilot's medical records were assessed by the undersigned. There was no need to call in experts. As a long-standing department head for capital crimes, death investigation procedures and medical malpractice proceedings, the undersigned had sufficient expertise of his own. There was no reason to verify the data; there was no indication that the medical records could have been manipulated by the treating doctors after they were created, especially since they were confiscated by court order shortly after the crash. In any case, this was a death investigation procedure. A psychiatric expert opinion on the question of the deceased co-pilot's criminal responsibility was not required in the context of a death investigation procedure."

It became clear during my background investigation that the accident investigation did not follow all the leads in their own documents and findings, but focussed only on the suicide theory. There is no evidence in the investigation folders that any other lead was ever followed up, investigated, ruled out or perhaps confirmed which might have disproved the investigation theory of a suicide. In particular, the exclusion of their own human factors experts by both BEA and BFU raises big question marks as to whether their involvement would have disproved the suicide theory immediately and led the investigation into an entirely different direction. As such, the investigation did not even check whether it was humanly possible to produce the changes of the SALTFCU as a test of an actual suicide, nor did the investigation ever check (without considering human factors) whether their theory was even probable. In fact, the restriction to investigating only the suicide theory had already been indicated by the States Attorney of Marseille Monsieur Brice Robin 49 hours after the crash when he essentially stated that they already knew it had been the copilot committing suicide and that changed their investigation methods.

It is clear that I do not have access to the actual CVR recordings nor the FDR recordings, hence I can not state the most probable cause of the crash beyond saying that the evidence as presented in the documents producd by the Investigative Court of Marseille and the documents produced by the States Attorney of Dusseldorf rule out any human action in the cockpit as cause of the crash and identify a technical fault to have existed with a probability bordering certainty. The investigation also seems to have misidentified the person that remained in the cockpit (which can only be verified by voice identification on the actual CVR recordings or the protocols and photos on the wreckage field). Hence the investigation into the Germanwings Flight 9525 accident needs to be re-opened and conducted by an independent accident investigation authority who has not been involved in the investigation so far.

As result of my research I also decided to write a book "Germanwings: Die Untersuchung" about these findings (in order to regain the funds my company and I invested into the background research), possibly generating a new genre in literature: I call it a "Dokukrimi" ("documentary detective story"), written mainly in German and some parts in English as Simon Hradecky and narrating the events from the day of the accident to today as myself over the past 10 years (so far in German, an English version is planned). The E-Book will become available today, on Mar 14th 2025, the hardcover will become available in August 2025. All my questions, argument lines, findings, all evidence, all circumstantial evidence and all conclusions are contained in that book on 714 pages including all key pages out of the investigation folders.

Click here to preorder the hard cover book ETA August/September 2025

Click here to order the E-Book for immediate reading
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 24, 2015

Classification
Crash

Airline
Germanwings

Aircraft Registration
D-AIPX

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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