Air India A321 at Mumbai on Feb 15th 2015, tail strike on landing

Last Update: December 13, 2017 / 15:32:45 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 15, 2015

Classification
Accident

Cause
Tail strike on landing

Airline
Air India

Flight number
AI-680

Departure
Mangalore, India

Destination
Mumbai, India

Aircraft Registration
VT-PPD

Aircraft Type
Airbus A321

ICAO Type Designator
A321

Airport
Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai

Airport ICAO Code
VABB

An Air India Airbus A321-200, registration VT-PPD performing flight AI-680 from Mangalore to Mumbai (India) with 187 passengers and 7 crew, landed on Mumbai's runway 27 at about 14:40L (09:10Z) but struck its tail onto the runway. The aircraft rolled out without further incident. There were no injuries, the aircraft sustained substantial damage.

Air India reported both pilots were suspended, an investigation has been opened by India's DGCA.

India's DGCA reported the aircraft sustained a tail strike on landing in Mumbai. An investigation has been opened.

VT-PPD remained on the ground for repairs.

On Dec 13th 2017 India's DGCA released their final report concluding the probable causes of the occurrence rated a serious incident by te DGCA (Editorial note: the report confirms substantial structural damage warranting an accident rating according to ICAO Annex 13 and the AVH definitions hence we maintain the accident rating) were:

The crew did not initiate the proper corrective actions after the first bounced landing which subsequently resulted in a tail strike.

The PIC not briefing the First officer prior to landing and not monitoring the First Officer on controls during flare and touchdown was the contributory factor to the incident.

The DGCA reported the first officer (40, CPL, 2,500 hours total, 1,800 hours on type) was pilot flying, the captain (41, ATPL, 8,000 hours total, 6,000 hours on type therefore 3000 hours as pilot in command PIC) was pilot monitoring. The first officer disconnected the autopilot at about 600 feet AGL, autothrust remained connected with the thrust levers in the CLIMB detent, and continued the ILS approach to runway 27 manually with about 8-10 knots headwind and 4000 meters visibility. At 40 feet AGL the captain reminded the first officer to reduce rate of descent, at 20 feet AGL the "RETARD" automated call occurred, the aircraft touched down and bounced, the captain took control, retarded the thrust levers from CLIMB to IDLE and increased the pitch perceiving the aircraft was sinking too fast, the aircraft touched down hard a second time. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied the gate, the occurrence was not reported the ATC.

During the walk around following the landing and prior to next departure the crew observed damage to the aft fuselage.

The DGCA listed following damage:

1. AFT fuselage Station no. 17 and Station no. 18 suffered damage of skin and internal structure due to tail strike and contact with the runway.
2. Airframe Frame no. 59 to Frame 68 suffered damage.
3. Frame No. 61 deformed and flattened at bottom.
4. Frame No. 62 heavily distorted and cracked. Aft Belly damaged during tail strike Aft frame No.63 cracked due tail strike
5. Crack was observed on the upper flange of frame 63.
6. Both the main landing gear shock absorbers, sliding tubes, wheels and tyres exceeded the design load limits.
7. Through and through hole was observed between the stringer no 43RH and 44RH.
8. Cargo Door support beam was damaged.

The DGCA analysed that the weather did not contribute to the occurrence.

The DGCA further analysed that according to the flight data recorder both thrust levers were still in the CLIMB detent during first touch down and wrote: "The rate of descent increased from 670 ft/min to 780ft/min just before the flare initiation.The flare was initiated at 50 ft RA. The aircraft touched down with both thrust levers on the “MAX CLIMB” detent. Since the thrust levers were not retarded to the “IDLE” detent prior to first touchdown, the A/THR remained engaged and consequently increased the thrust in order to maintain the speed target. As the touchdown speed was high the aircraft bounced during landing. After the first bounce the commander took over the controls and the thrust levers progressively retarded from “CLIMB” to the “IDLE” detent, leading to Auto Thrust disengagement."

The DGCA analysed that the first touchdown occurred at +1.66G, due to the thrust levers remaining in the CLIMB detent the ground spoilers did not deploy, the partial spoiler deployment could not reduce the severity of the bounce. During the bounce the thrust levers were retarded to IDLE by the captain which enabled the ground spoilers to deploy in full. The DGCA wrote: "The nose down input applied during the bounce and thereafter a strong full back stick input applied just before the second touchdown rapidly increased the pitch angle and significantly reduced the tail strike margin while the aircraft was coming down. In accordance with the following ground clearance diagram, with the main landing gears fully compressed, the aft fuselage enters in contact with the ground when the pitch angle exceeds +8.1° associated with the full ground spoiler extension significantly reduced the lift and caused the second severe hard landing. The maximum pitch angle recorded by the DFDR at touchdown (+8.1°) is smaller than the pitch limit indicated by the ground clearance diagram (+9.7°) this probably taking into consideration the resolution of the recorded parameters, the aircraft fuselage flexibility and the aircraft dynamic at touchdown. However, the “DRAINMAST HEATER AFT” message recorded by the PFR at GMT 09:10, the damage report and the damages recorded on the aft belly further to the event enable to confirm that a tail strike occurred at that time."

Metars:
VABB 151040Z 27009KT 4000 FU NSC 29/19 Q1010 NOSIG
VABB 151010Z 26009KT 4000 FU NSC 30/19 Q1010 NOSIG
VABB 150940Z 26008KT 4000 FU NSC 30/17 Q1010 NOSIG
VABB 150910Z 27009KT 4000 FU NSC 30/18 Q1011 NOSIG
VABB 150840Z 26010KT 4000 FU NSC 31/18 Q1011 NOSIG
VABB 150810Z 26010KT 4000 FU NSC 30/18 Q1012 NOSIG
VABB 150740Z 26008KT 4000 FU NSC 30/18 Q1012 NOSIG
VABB 150710Z 26007KT 4000 FU NSC 30/17 Q1013 NOSIG
VABB 150640Z 25008KT 4000 FU NSC 30/16 Q1014 NOSIG
VABB 150610Z 26006KT 4000 FU NSC 30/12 Q1014 NOSIG