Kazan AN26 at Magadan on Jan 3rd 2015, runway excursion, collapsed right main gear
Last Update: May 19, 2015 / 17:39:20 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jan 3, 2015
Classification
Accident
Cause
Runway excursion
Departure
Magadan, Russia
Destination
Mirny, Russia
Aircraft Registration
RA-26082
Aircraft Type
Antonov An-26
ICAO Type Designator
AN26
Russia's Ministry for Emergency Situations (MCHS) reported the aircraft was carrying cargo from Magadan to Mirny when the aircraft went off the runway. There were no injuries, no fuel spill and no fire.
Ground observers reported the aircraft was accelerating for takeoff when the right hand engine failed and the aircraft went off the runway coming to a stop in rough terrain in deep snow.
On Jan 12th 2015 the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) reported the 4 main crew and 4 backup crew remained uninjured, the AN-26 RA-26082 sustained substantial damage however. The MAK have opened an investigation into the accident.
On Jan 20th 2015 Rosaviatsia reported that during the takeoff run the nose gear steering wheel had not been disengaged, which disabled nose gear steering via the rudder pedals. The captain, instead of rejecting takeoff, attempted but failed to disengage the steering wheel, only at rotation speed of 250kph (135 knots) the crew rejected takeoff but could not keep the aircraft on the runway, which veered to the right and exited the runway about 2300 meters down the runway, went 490 meters over snow covered soft ground and stopped 24 meters to the right of the runway edge. During the movement over terrain the aircraft sustained substantial damage, nose and right main gear collapsed, right engine, right propeller and right wing damaged. The crew remained uninjured. The captain had 2290 hours on type, the first officer 94 hours on type.
On May 19th 2015 the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) released their final report in Russian concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
The accident occurred as result of the aircraft departing the side of the runway after the commander rejected takeoff after having been unable to use the elevator because of the yoke's locked position.
The roll beyond the edge of the runway was likely caused by the flight engineer while attempting to operate the handle to release the flight controls lock while the aircraft was already accelerating for takeoff.
The accident was thus caused by this combination of factors:
- violation of requirements by FCOM to ascertain the flight controls were free and usable before engine start
- failure by the crew to execute the checklists to check elevator, rudder and ailerons were free to move before takeoff
- flight crew receives insufficient practise in real flight to maintain skills acquired during simulator training in the management of the aircraft and its systems resulting in negative impact during emergency situations
The MAK recommended that a warning should be installed to make the crew aware the yoke was still locked.
The MAK reported that during the takeoff roll the captain (54, ATPL, 3,783 hours total, 2,240 hours on type and in command) was unable to rotate the aircraft for takeoff and decided to reject takeoff, but could not keep the aircraft on the runway, the aircraft veered right off the runway. The crew reduced both engines to idle and brought the propellers into beta range. The aircraft crossed rough terrain and received substantial damage as result of the forces created by the rough terrain. There were no injuries to the occupants of the aircraft.
The captain had been assisted by a first officer (56, ATPL, 11,986 hours total, 94 hours on type), a flight engineer (59, FEL, 9,057 hours total, 9,057 hours on type) and a navigator (63, NavL, 7,196 hours total, 2,910 hours on type).
The MAK reported the aircraft crossed the right edge of the runway 2454 meters down the runway, went over soft ground for 360 meters, then crossed a road encountering forces that caused the nose gear, right main gear and right wing to fracture, the fuselage to bend and the right engine and propeller to receive damage, and came to a stop a further 133 meters past the road, 2940 meters past the runway threshold and 24 meters off the right edge of the runway. Immediately when the aircraft departed from the runway tower, observing the takeoff roll, activated the crash button sounding a sirene, which called 65 emergency personnel on 18 vehicles, 3 of them being fire engines, into action.
The MAK reported, that a lever is used to lock all control surfaces, including elevator, ailerons and rudder. If the lever is in the upper position, all surfaces are locked. If the lever, after pushing its unlock button, is moved to the down position, all flight surfaces are released and are free to move. With the control surfaces locked it was not possible to advance the power levers beyond 30% of power setting.
Experiments showed however, that an intermediate position of the lever was possible, in which all control surfaces, elevator, rudder and aileron were free, but the yoke's movement remained locked and power levers were free to move to takeoff power.
In violation of the FCOM requirements to check elevators, ailerons and rudders to freely move before commencing takeoff the crew did not check whether elevators, ailerons and rudder were free to move.
After the aircraft had begun the takeoff roll and the elevator could not be moved, the captain as well as the flight engineer attempted to release the flight controls by moving the handle to unlock the flight controls. This caused the decision to reject takeoff to be delayed until the departure from the runway could no longer be prevented.
The MAK analysed that in the before start engines checklist the checklists require flight crews to check that elevator, ailerons and rudder are free to be moved to their mechanical stops. This has first to be checked by the first officer, then the captain. However, during preflight preparation the navigator announced the controls were free, although he had no possibility to check the status of the flight controls, and neither first officer nor captain performed their flight controls checks.
After engine start, while taxiing towards the departure runway, the crew set the flaps to 15 degrees, the checklist again called for a check of the flight controls, both first officer and captain called "flight controls free" however without conducting the checks.
The aircraft lined up, the engines were set to takeoff power and the takeoff roll appeared normal. The aircraft reached 200 kph (108 KIAS), decision speed V1, the captain called "go", at 210 kph the call "rotate" occurred about 1170 meters down the runway, however, no response was seen on the elevator. Instead the captain called an expletive indicative of first recognition of an abnormal situation on board. The captain attempted to release the flight controls in order to free the controls.
The MAK further analysed that the runway was much longer than needed for the takeoff of the AN-26. The crew therefore did not appreciate how dangerous the situation had become, after the captain attempted to release the flight controls lock the flight engineer attempted to unlock the controls. Only then the takeoff was rejected.
The MAK analysed that only after reaching decision speed and the decision to continue takeoff the emergency arose putting the crew into an unusual and rare situation. Regulations only stated that takeoff should be discontinued if conditions occur before V1 that the captain assesses as a risk to the safe conduct of the flight, there was no guideline for a situation that prevented safe flight after reaching V1.
The MAK analysed that had the crew rejected takeoff shortly after reaching V1 at 210kph, the aircraft would have needed a total of 2100 meters for acceleration and deceleration until coming to a stop, with 3452 meters of runway available this would have posed no problem. However, after the captain attempted to unlock the flight controls the aircraft had accelerated to 260kph (140 knots), at this time the aircraft had already travelled 1780 meters and had just 1670 meters of runway remaining, when the captain asked the flight engineer to attempt unlock the flight controls. While attempting to move the lever it is likely from the data recorder that the rudder moved a bit though remaining near the neutral position which caused the aircraft to slightly veer to the right.
The takeoff was finally rejected when the aircraft had travelled about 2000 meters down the runway after the commander had concluded the aircraft would not be able to fly. The engines were brought to idle, the propellers put into beta, the aircraft departed the right edge of the runway 2454 meters down the runway at a speed of 250kph, crossed a road which caused substantial damage to the aircraft, that came to a stop 2940 meters past the runway threshold and 24 meters to the right of the runway right edge.
Metars:
UHMM 030300Z 34006MPS 9999 DRSN BKN100 OVC200 M10/M18 Q0987 NOSIG RMK QFE726 88420260=
UHMM 030230Z 34006MPS 9999 DRSN BKN100 OVC200 M10/M18 Q0987 NOSIG RMK QFE726 88420250=
UHMM 030200Z 30004MPS 260V340 9999 OVC100 M10/M18 Q0988 NOSIG RMK QFE726 88420250=
UHMM 030130Z 32004MPS 9999 FEW040 OVC100 M09/M18 Q0988 NOSIG RMK QFE726 88420250=
UHMM 030100Z 33006MPS 9999 FEW040 OVC100 M09/M17 Q0988 NOSIG RMK QFE726 88420250 FBL TURB 0-1000=
UHMM 030030Z 32004MPS 9999 FEW040 BKN100 OVC200 M09/M17 Q0988 NOSIG RMK QFE727 88420250 FBL TURB 0-1000=
UHMM 030000Z 31004MPS 9999 FEW040 BKN100 OVC200 M09/M16 Q0989 NOSIG RMK QFE727 88420250 FBL TURB 0-1000=
UHMM 022330Z 34003MPS 300V090 9999 FEW040 BKN100 OVC200 M09/M17 Q0989 NOSIG RMK QFE727 88420250 FBL TURB 0-1000=
UHMM 022300Z 06003G08MPS 350V140 9999 SCT040 OVC100 M06/M15 Q0989 NOSIG RMK QFE727 88420250 MT OPEN=
UHMM 022230Z 04005G10MPS 010V090 9999 SCT040 OVC100 M07/M15 Q0989 NOSIG RMK QFE727 88420250=
UHMM 022200Z 04005MPS 360V070 9999 SCT040 OVC100 M07/M15 Q0989 RMK QFE727=
UHMM 022100Z 07004MPS 9999 SCT040 OVC100 M09/M16 Q0989 RMK QFE727=
UHMM 022000Z 03006MPS 9999 FEW040 OVC100 M08/M17 Q0989 RMK QFE727=
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jan 3, 2015
Classification
Accident
Cause
Runway excursion
Departure
Magadan, Russia
Destination
Mirny, Russia
Aircraft Registration
RA-26082
Aircraft Type
Antonov An-26
ICAO Type Designator
AN26
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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