Jetblue A320 at Long Beach on Sep 18th 2014, engine fire

Last Update: January 21, 2016 / 16:06:02 GMT/Zulu time

Bookmark this article
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Sep 18, 2014

Classification
Incident

Cause
Engine fire

Airline
Jetblue

Flight number
B6-1416

Departure
Long Beach, United States

Destination
Austin, United States

Aircraft Registration
N656JB

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

A Jetblue Airbus A320-200, registration N656JB performing flight B6-1416 from Long Beach,CA to Austin,TX (USA) with 142 passengers and 5 crew, was climbing out of Long Beach's runway 30 when the crew reported a fire indication for the right hand engine (V2527), stopped the climb at 9000 feet and returned to Long Beach for a safe landing on runway 30. After the aircraft came to a stop the crew advised they were initiating an evacuation asking whether there was any smoke from the right hand engine, tower replied in the negative (no smoke), the crew then advised they were cancelling the evacuation but instructed tower to immediately report any smoke. The slides were deployed on all doors and overwing exits nonetheless and passengers evacuated.

Passengers reported the right hand engine emitted a loud bang, smoke entered the cabin afterwards. The passenger oxygen masks were manually released by the cabin crew.

The airline reported the crew received an overheat indication for the right hand engine.

On Nov 19th 2014 the NTSB reported the right hand engine failed and developed an undercowl fire during the initial climb out of Long Beach. Just prior to reaching 10,000 feet the crew received a number of ECAM warnings related to the right hand engine including "ENG 2 FIRE WARNING" and was informed about smoke in the cabin. The crew shut the right hand engine down, discharged both fire bottles and returned to Long Beach for a safe single engine landing.

On Jan 21st 2016 the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the incident was:

The probable cause of the engine failure and subsequent undercowl engine fire was due to the fatigue fracture of a high pressure turbine stage 2 disk blade retaining lug that released two blades which impacted the low pressure turbine case causing a fuel line to fracture spraying fuel on the hot engine cases where it ignited. During a machining operation of the disk lug, a tool mark was introduced that set up the area for fatigue cracks to initiate.

The NTSB described the engine damage: "On-site examination of the airplane revealed that the No. 2 engine (right) thrust reverser had considerable heat distress and some delamination, and small impact marks (no skin penetrations) on the right hand side aft fuselage near the rear cargo door and to the right hand horizontal stabilizer. Examination of the No. 2 engine revealed considerable low pressure turbine (LPT) blade damage and a fractured fuel pressure line to the station 2.5 low pressure compressor bleed valve slave actuator. The engine was removed from the airplane and shipped to MTU in Germany for detailed examination. Examination of the outside of the engine revealed evidence of thermal distress such as consumed, partially-consumed or oxidized insulation blankets, loop clamps cushions, wiring harness sheathing, and sooting of various components and cases. No case breaches or penetrations were noted although the LPT case did exhibited a localized outward bulge. Disassembly of the engine revealed that all high pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 blades were present except for two that were full length releases which included the root. A single fir tree blade retaining lug from the HPT stage 2 disk had fractured between the inner and middle attachment teeth of the fir tree slot and released two HPT stage 2 blades on either side of that fractured disk lug. Turbine hardware upstream of the HPT stage 2 disk did not exhibit any damage as a result of the HPT stage 2 blade releases; however, the remaining HPT stage 2 blades, along with downstream turbine hardware, all exhibited varying degrees of heavy secondary impact damage, tears, and material loss. "

The NTSB reported that IAE, the engine manufacturer, identified tool marks as origin of the fracture cracks of the lug. The tool marks, called divots, were identified to be associated with the broaching process of the blades during manufacture, the related tool is capable to work three engines before being needed to be reconditioned (sharpened), the tool can be reconditioned 12 times before being discarded. Therefore the engine manufacturer prior to the occurrence engine as well as the next engine were removed from service and dispatched for examination.

On the prior engine the first 52 blades were found without marks, then tool marks appeared and continued throughout the remainder of the prior, occurrence and past engine.

The NTSB concluded their report:

Reconditioning of the broaching tool did not correct the 'divot' problem, so an audit team made up of IAE, Avio Aero (performed the finished machining/broaching operation), and General Electric (owner of Avio Aero) evaluated the entire manufacturing process with an emphasis on the broaching operation. The evaluation of the Avio disk machining process revealed the following primary contributing factors: 1) cutter tool draft angle design leading to scuffing/sliding along the relief surfaces with associated side loading/deflection and rapid tool wear, 2) a non-optimized tool redressing process resulting in uneven material removal and non-uniform cutter tool profiles, and 3) procedural issues with inspection of tooling, set-up and final parts. Based on these findings, the best practices from GE and IAE have been implemented to address these manufacturing deficiencies.

Based on the findings from disk 7.3 and 8.1, IAE proposed a fleet management plan that would include the issuance of a Non-Modification Service Bulletin (NMSB), anticipated in the first quarter of 2016, for a once-through the fleet inspection of all HPT stage 1 and 2 disks manufactured by Avio at the next engine HPT overhaul. According to IAE, Avio manufactured over 4,000 HPT stage 1 and 2 disks. Discussions with the Federal Aviation Administration indicated that they intend to issue an Airworthiness Directive (AD) mandating the inspection of Avio manufactured V2500 HPT stage 1 and 2 disk based on the IAE NMSB.
Aircraft Registration Data
Registration mark
N656JB
Country of Registration
United States
Date of Registration
Lcdhdqifgimce Subscribe to unlock
TCDS Ident. No.
Afjld Subscribe to unlock
Manufacturer
AIRBUS
Aircraft Model / Type
A320-232
Number of Seats
Hqd Subscribe to unlock
ICAO Aircraft Type
A320
Year of Manufacture
ehA Subscribe to unlock
Serial Number
Jfqn Subscribe to unlock
Aircraft Address / Mode S Code (HEX)
Dmgcel Subscribe to unlock
Engine Count
C Subscribe to unlock
Engine Manufacturer
Enj Subscribe to unlock
Engine Model
jqpqeihg Subscribe to unlock
Engine Type
JbidmhAbg Subscribe to unlock
Pounds of Thrust
Aki l Subscribe to unlock
Main Owner
Qf bkbbkpgnpqilmk egbjpq peAAdgcn dndAbmcddpAegjebj j hlhklmdqdhcjhnmlqgfhlfffimefmdmij Subscribe to unlock
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Sep 18, 2014

Classification
Incident

Cause
Engine fire

Airline
Jetblue

Flight number
B6-1416

Departure
Long Beach, United States

Destination
Austin, United States

Aircraft Registration
N656JB

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
Article source

You can read 2 more free articles without a subscription.

Subscribe now and continue reading without any limits!

Subscribe now
Are you a subscriber? Login
Subscribe

Read unlimited articles and receive our daily update briefing. Gain better insights into what is happening in commercial aviation safety.

Compare our plans

Send tip

Support AeroInside by sending a small tip amount.

Send tip

Related articles

Newest articles

Subscribe today

Are you researching aviation incidents? Get access to AeroInside Insights, unlimited read access and receive the daily newsletter.

Pick your plan and subscribe

Partner

ELITE Logo

ELITE Simulation Solutions is a leading global provider of Flight Simulation Training Devices, IFR training software as well as flight controls and related services. Find out more.

SafetyScan Pro

SafetyScan Pro provides streamlined access to thousands of aviation accident reports. Tailored for your safety management efforts. Book your demo today

AeroInside Blog
Popular aircraft
Airbus A320
Boeing 737-800
Boeing 737-800 MAX
Popular airlines
American Airlines
United
Delta
Air Canada
Lufthansa
British Airways