TAP A332 near Sal on Aug 31st 2014, smoke indication

Last Update: June 22, 2016 / 13:25:52 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of TAP Air Portugal CS-TOJ, Airbus A330-200 — TAP Air Portugal CS-TOJ, Airbus A330-200 (Photo credit: Aero Icarus / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Aug 31, 2014

Classification
Incident

Airline
TAP Air Portugal

Flight number
TP-16

Departure
Recife, Brazil

Destination
Lisbon, Portugal

Aircraft Registration
CS-TOJ

Aircraft Type
Airbus A330-200

ICAO Type Designator
A332

A TAP Air Portugal Airbus A330-200, registration CS-TOJ performing flight TP-16 from Recife,PE (Brazil) to Lisbon (Portugal) with 262 people on board, was enroute over the Atlantic Ocean near Sal (Cabo Verde) when the crew received a smoke indication and decided to divert to Sal for a safe landing. Attending emergency services found no trace of fire, heat or smoke.

The airline reported the passengers were taken to hotels, technicians have been dispatched to Sal to examine the aircraft.

The occurrence aircraft was able to depart Sal after about 24 hours on the ground and reached Lisbon with a delay of 24 hours.

On Sep 8th 2014 Portugal's GPIAA reported that the crew received a smoke indication for the lower deck mobile crew rest area. Cabin crew reported observing a burning odour and smoke venting from the outlets of the lower deck crew rest area and discharged fire extinguishers into the area. After landing all electrical power was disconnected from the aircraft and an inspection performed which was unable to find any evidence of fire. Maintenance engineers subsequently released the aircraft to continue the flight to Portugal under restrictions and requirements to conduct further corrective and preventive maintenance in Portugal. The GPIAA have not dispatched investigators to Sal but opened an investigation into the occurrence.

The occurrence aircraft resumed service after about 5 hours on the ground in Lisbon on Sep 1st 2014.

On Jun 22nd 2016 the GPIAA released their summary final report releasing following findings and conclusions:

Findings

In the face of established and referenced facts can be concluded that:

- At 05:17 UTC, the aircraft was in cruise flight at flight lever FL390 when in the cockpit was triggered an ECAM warning Smoke – “Cabin Rest Smoke”;

2. The E2 and EX crew, alerted by the warning of the Smoke Detection System, first checked the toilet;

- The Captain of the flight contacted immediately, via intercom, E3 and E4 crew mem-bers who were in the Lower Deck Mobile Crew Rest (LDMCR) to take extra infor-mation;

- The cabin supervisor moves to LDMCR, after the indication in the AIP, establishing and maintaining communication with the Captain. It is reported the existence of light smoke, out of the ventilation grille, placed under the bed No. 5 and electric burning smell. The temperature felt in the LDMCR was high;

- The Captain of the flight initiated the checklist (SMOKE CAB REST SMOKE) and turned off the cabin fans, so that the cabin air was not contaminated

- Ten minutes after the alarm, and it is not possible to identify the source of the fire, or the source of the smoke, the Captain of the flight in coordination with the Cabin Supervisor decides that the fire door of LDMCR should be closed and activated the Fire Extinguishing System (FES) of LDMCR;

- In the absence of evidence as to the origin of the smoke, the flight crew chooses to diverge to the Salt Airport. The descent starts about 42 minutes after the alarm, and landing completed 69 minutes after the alarm.

Contributing Factors

- The location of the smoke must be determined via AIP, being the warning identical in any case. The most common type of alarm is the one referring to passengers smok-ing in the toilets witch led to two crew member reacting automatically and address-ing the same, without checking the AIP, inducing a delay in responding to the alarm.

- The preparation of the cabin for an emergency landing wasn’t performed as a result of communications between the Captain and the Cabin Supervisor after taking into account the apparent control of the situation after the activation of the Fire Extin-guishing System (FES).

- The cabin crew members during the interview considered the training reduced and limited on the LDMCR, such as location and / or operation of the components, dif-ferences between models and the actions when in emergency situation.

- The results of the investigation to the units removed by TAP maintenance and engi-neering, and sent to manufacturers for analysis, didn’t accuse any failure leading to the generation of smoke or temperature rise. All the maintenance and troubleshooting actions considered relevant and recom-mended were carried out in the investigation of the event. It was not possible based on the information available to conclude unequivocally what the origin of the smoke was. However given that the aircraft has continued to operate since then, without any registration of smoke alarms, it can be concluded that the occurrence will not hap-pen again because the conditions that led to it have been corrected by the actions taken.