Jetairfly B738 and TuiFly B738 at Palma Mallorca on Jun 13th 2014, loss of separation on runway

Last Update: July 18, 2016 / 22:13:15 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jun 13, 2014

Classification
Incident

Airline
Jetairfly

Flight number
TB-5421

Departure
Brussels, Belgium

Destination
Palma Mallorca, Spain

Aircraft Registration
OO-JLO

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800

ICAO Type Designator
B738

A JetairFly Boeing 737-800, registration OO-JLO performing flight TB-5421 from Brussels (Belgium) to Palma Mallorca,SP (Spain), was on final approach to Palma's runway 24L.

A TuiFly Boeing 737-800, registration D-AHFH performing flight X3-2313 from Palma Mallorca,SP (Spain) to Dusseldorf (Germany), was taxiing for departure from runway 24L and was cleared to line up runway 24L and wait.

The ATC controller assessed a short time later that the separation between the arriving and departing aircraft had become too tight to permit the departure before the arriving aircraft and cancelled the line up clearance, however, not before the German TuiFly aircraft had already crossed the hold short line. The aircraft stopped.

Spain's CIAIAC reported that the controller subsequently advised the JetairFly crew to expect a go-around due to the position of the aircraft on the ground. The JetairFly crew advised they would accept a visual approach clearance and would continue landing in this case, the controller verified they had the German aircraft on the ground in sight and cleared the aircraft for a visual approach and cleared the aircraft to land.

OO-JLO touched down safely, D-AHFH departed a short time later and reached Dusseldorf without further incident.

The CIAIAC have opened an investigation into the occurrence stating that the meteorologic conditions were suitable for a visual landing clearance.

On Jul 18th 2016 the CIAIAC released their final report the probable cause of the incident was:

The likely cause of the runway incursion involving aircraft JAF7WJ and TUI1FX was the failure to coordinate an appropriate separation between arriving aircraft so as to allow TUI1FX to take off before the arrival of JAF7WJ.

Contributing to the incident were:

- the workload at the local controller’s position in the TWR resulting from the closing of runway 24R and the accumulated delays and waiting aircraft,

- the change in the traffic pattern minutes before the incident, with all aircraft being inbound with the exception of the sole departing aircraft, TUI1FX, and

- the decreased separation between arriving aircraft due to a late request to JAF7WJ to lower its speed.

With respect to decision making by the tower controller the CIAIAC analysed:

When the controller made the decision to insert the takeoff, there were four aircraft in the landing sequence, with a fifth about to join the sequence at the localizer. The separation between the aircraft between which he wanted to insert the takeoff was 4.6 NM, with the leading aircraft 1.4 NM away from the threshold.

By the time he gave the clearance to line up and wait, the separation between the aircraft had fallen to 4.5 NM and the leading aircraft was 0.8 NM out.

When the controller decided to cancel the clearance, the scenario was as follows: the aircraft had just landed, the next one was 4.2 NM out and approaching at 160 kt, and the waiting aircraft was still at H10, though it was moving.

At that time the controller did not know how long the aircraft that had just landed would remain on the runway, meaning the runway occupancy time did not influence his decision.

The decision to cancel the takeoff is believed to have been affected by the distance and speed of the approaching aircraft and by the fact that the taxiing aircraft, though it had already started moving, was still some distance away from the runway. In fact, this is the aspect that was mentioned by the controller, who thought the incident occurred because the taxiing aircraft was not fully ready to take off. Perhaps the controller expected the taxiing aircraft to start moving sooner, and for it to be almost entering the runway as the arriving aircraft landed. The radar records show, however, that the landing aircraft passed in front of the waiting aircraft almost five seconds before the latter started moving. This amount of time is considered fast and reasonable, and the crew do not seem to have been unprepared for takeoff. Instead, the controller’s assessment of the situation is thought to have resulted more from his desire to execute the takeoff as quickly as possible, in light of the proximity of the next aircraft in the sequence.

The subsequent evolution of the traffic showed that the controller’s decision to cancel the takeoff had been correct, since there would not have been enough time for the aircraft to take off. The time spent by the landing aircraft on the runway (1 min 17 sec) and the distance and approach speed of the next aircraft meant that by the time the runway was completely clear, the next aircraft was 0.9 NM out, leaving no time for an aircraft to depart under these conditions.

With respect to both Jetairfly crew and tower controller accepting the runway incursion the CIAIAC analysed:

After evaluating the position of the waiting aircraft, the three pilots on the approaching aircraft concluded that landing did not jeopardize the safety of either aircraft. For both the controller and the pilots, the fact that the aircraft on the ground was outside the runway and that weather conditions were perfect conditioned their initial decision. If the aircraft had been on the runway, if the weather conditions had been bad or if the aircraft’s position could not have been confirmed visually, this situation would not have arisen and neither party would have opted for this solution.

The communications between the crew and the controller showed that the situation that was going to occur was known and had been accepted by both parties. The fact that it was the crew that proposed to make a visual landing could have helped change the controller’s decision since, as he himself stated, he trusted the pilot’s judgment.

In light of these factors, it is understandable how both parties, the controller and the pilot, accepted to continue landing on a runway that was officially occupied.

Metars:
LEPA 130930Z 22007KT 190V280 CAVOK 28/17 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130900Z 22007KT 190V250 CAVOK 27/13 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130830Z 22004KT 170V260 CAVOK 27/16 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130800Z 22004KT 190V270 CAVOK 26/17 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130730Z 21003KT 170V250 CAVOK 25/17 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130700Z VRB01KT CAVOK 25/12 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130630Z 00000KT CAVOK 23/11 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130600Z 00000KT CAVOK 20/11 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130530Z 00000KT CAVOK 18/12 Q1018 NOSIG=
LEPA 130500Z 00000KT CAVOK 17/11 Q1018 NOSIG=
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jun 13, 2014

Classification
Incident

Airline
Jetairfly

Flight number
TB-5421

Departure
Brussels, Belgium

Destination
Palma Mallorca, Spain

Aircraft Registration
OO-JLO

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800

ICAO Type Designator
B738

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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