Sata A320 near Toulouse on Apr 25th 2014, engine shut down in flight

Last Update: June 22, 2016 / 15:03:02 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Sata International CS-TKP, Airbus A320 — Sata International CS-TKP, Airbus A320 (Photo credit: HawkeyeUK / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Apr 25, 2014

Classification
Incident

Cause
Engine shut down in flight

Airline
Sata International

Flight number
FQ-5842

Departure
Brussels, Belgium

Destination
Tenerife Sur Sofia Reina, Spain

Aircraft Registration
CS-TKP

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

A Sata International Airbus A320-200 on behalf of Thomas Cook Belgium, registration CS-TKP performing flight FQ-5842 from Brussels (Belgium) to Tenerife Sur Sofia Reina,CI (Spain), was enroute at FL350 about 120nm northwest of Bordeaux and about 230nm northwest of Toulouse (France) when the crew decided to divert to Bordeaux due to some engine (CFM56) problem. Descending through FL180 the crew decided to divert to Toulouse, where the aircraft landed safely on runway 32L about 66 minutes after leaving FL350. The aircraft was unable to vacate the runway and needed to be towed to the apron about 30 minutes after landing.

A replacement Privilege Style Boeing 757-200 registration EC-HDS reached Tenerife with a delay of 7:45 hours.

On Apr 29th 2014 the French BEA reported in their weekly bulletin that the crew noticed a low engine oil pressure for the left hand engine and shut the engine down according to checklists. This also shut down the green hydraulic system. While diverting to Toulouse a leak in the yellow hydraulic system caused the failure of the yellow hydraulic system, too. The crew performed the landing with the only remaining blue hydraulic system available. The BEA have opened an investigation into the occurrence rated a serious incident.

On Jun 22nd 2016 the BEA released their final report in French concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The investigation found no common cause of the engine #1 shut down and the yellow hydraulic leak, the failure of the yellow hydraulic system was the result of incorrect maintenace action. The #1 engine oil leak can be attributed to an incorrect maintenance action or deterioration of a magnetic seal.

By applying the full FCOM procedure for low yellow hydraulic quantity the crew could have prevented the loss of the green hydraulic system. However, as the procedure was not completed, the aircraft continued with a failed yellow hydraulic system and a green hydraulic system supplied via the windmilling engine, which however could not fully supply the consumers in that configuration and was bound to fail any time, in this case during the most critical phase of flight. The dual hydraulic failure however was anticipated by the captain, who had instructed the first officer to prepare the associated procedures.

The BEA reported that following the detection of the engine oil leak and the shut down of the engine the crew decided to divert to Bordeaux. While preparing a single engine approach to Bordeaux the crew was alerted to a low hydraulic fluid quantity indication of the yellow hydraulic system. The crew started working the associated ECAM procedures. While working the procedure the crew received an ACARS message suggesting they should divert to Toulouse and interrupted the ECAM procedure to request the diversion to Toulouse. After being cleared to Toulouse the crew observed all three hydraulic systems were showing normal values of 3000 psi. While deploying the slats and flaps the hydraulic pressure of both yellow and green system reduced to 2200 psi however soon followed by a master warning associated with the green hydraulic pressure being low. The crew performed a 360 on final approach course, the combined low pressures of yellow and green hydraulic systems caused a longer than normal gear extension time. The aircraft landed safely and stopped on the runway with both the green and hydraulic as well as the associated systems including nose gear steering failed. Hydraulic fluid is seen exiting the aircraft and dripping onto the runway.

The BEA reported the hydraulic leak was attributed to a loose fitting at the engine pylon of engine #2, where a seal had been squeezed and came out of its proper seat, probably because of incorrect tightening of the connector. Maintenance work had been done on the #2 engine hydraulic system on April 22nd 2014, when the yellow hydraulic fluid had been replaced.

On April 25th 2014, just prior to departure from Brussels the #1 egine driven pump had been replaced. It is possible that during this maintenance action a seal was damaged or misplaced, however, it was also possible a magnetic seal had suffered long term damage. The investigation was unable to determine the exact cause.

Following the master warning associated with the low yellow hydraulic quantity the PTU had been automatically disabled. The crew interrupted working the associated checklists just before the instructions to turn the engine driven and electric pump of the yellow hydraulic system off and to monitor the brakes accumulator's pressure. Instead, the flight data recorder revealed the PTU was re-engaged. Anticipating a dual hydraulic failure of both yellow and green hydraulic system the captain however instructed the first officer to prepare the associated procedures.

The BEA reported the crew was surprised to see near nominal values on all three hydraulic systems following the #1 engine shut down. The BEA explained, that the windmilling engine, after shut down, is capable to supply sufficient hydraulic pressure provided the aircraft is flying above a certain speed. The PTU is able to supply hydraulic pressure in both directions between the green and yellow hydraulic system.