Swiss A321 at Geneva on Mar 9th 2014, tail strike on landing

Last Update: December 28, 2016 / 23:07:29 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 9, 2014

Classification
Accident

Cause
Tail strike on landing

Airline
Swiss International Airlines

Flight number
LX-2806

Departure
Zurich, Switzerland

Destination
Geneva, Switzerland

Aircraft Registration
HB-IOC

Aircraft Type
Airbus A321

ICAO Type Designator
A321

A Swiss International Airlines Airbus A321-100, registration HB-IOC performing flight LX-2806 from Zurich to Geneva (Switzerland) with 72 passengers and 6 crew, landed on Geneva's runway 05 at 13:57L (12:57Z) when the crew initiated and reported a go-around. The next aircraft waiting for departure was cleared for takeoff and departed. ATC subsequently queried whether their tail had contacted the runway surface, the pilot replied "not that I know". The aircraft positioned for another approach to runway 05 and landed without further incident about 20 minutes after the go-around.

A post flight examination showed substantial damage to the underside of the aircraft's tail.

The airline confirmed the aircraft contacted ground during landing but asked for understanding, that further details can not be revealed due to the ongoing investigation.

On Mar 18th 2014 Switzerland's SUST announced that an investigation has been opened into the accident of HB-IOC, which occurred on Mar 9th 2014 in Geneva. The aircraft suffered a tailstrike after a balked landing.

On Dec 28th 2016 the SUST released their final report in German concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The tail of the aircraft contacted the runway surface because the pilot flying pulled the side stick abruptly to the aft stop while initiating a go around.

The following factors contributed to the occurrence:

- due to limited experience the pilot flying rated the landing as a bounced landing

- as the two side sticks are not coupled the pilot monitoring had no tactile feedback to detect the brusque sied stick movement in time.

- the crew did not detect the high pitch angle

The following factor did not have a direct bearing into the occurrence, however posed a risk to safety:

- ATC did not inform the crew sufficiently concrete that a tail strike was observed during the go around

The SUST reported the first officer (31, CPL, 341 hours total, 201 hour on type) was pilot flying, the captain (49, ATPL, 11,334 hours total, 1,160 hours on type but 4,261 hours on A320 family aircraft) was pilot monitoring.

On final approach, expecting late landing clearing due to preceding arriving traffic, the first officer disconnected autopilot and autothrust. The crew subsequently received landing clearance at 500 feet AGL due to the preceding arriving aircraft vacating the runway not sooner. The aircraft touched down 245 meters past the runway threshold, the first officer perceived the touchdown as unusually hard (FDR revealed +1.4G within the normal range) and perceived the aircraft bounced (FDR revealed no bounce) hence decided to go around and pulled the side stick abruptly/brusque to the aft stop. The spoilers had already deployed. A second after the side stick input the first officer called "go around", and pushed both thrust levers into the TOGA detent. Immediately afterwards the tail contacted the runway surface, before the aircraft became airborne again about 580 meters past the runway threshold. Following gear up and reducing flaps the captain informed ATC, they were going around and received instructions to climb to 7000 feet. After being handed off to Geneva Approach the captain commented, that in his opinion the go around was not necessary, however, he does support the decision to go around.

A member of the apron control had observed the tail strike and reported the observation to ground control, who in turn instructed a runway inspection and informed Geneva Approach control. Approach control queried the crew whether they had experienced a tail strike during the go-around, the captain radioed that he didn't know about a tail strike. Both crew shared the view that no tail strike had occurred, however asked the cabin crew member located in the aft galley about any observation, the flight attendant reported she had heard a bang which probably was caused by a trolley moving in the galley. The flight crew checked the cabin pressurization without finding any anomaly, the crew remained uncertain about whether a tail strike had occurred or not, the relevant checklist was not consulted.

While preparing for the second approach the first officer stated she was startled by the hard touch down, she had never done such a hard touch down before. The captain mentioned that he erroneously had placed the flap lever into position 2 instead of 3.

The aircraft landed on runway 05 without further incident. Ground control subsequently informed the crew that one of their staff had observed the tail strike.

A subsequent inspection revealed damage to the underside of the tail section of the aircraft including structural damage (editorial note: which would qualify for an accident rating). The aircraft manufacturer suggested however to rate the damage as "minor" and put it into the category "permanent repair with inspection required".

The runway inspection did not find anything out of the ordinary.

The SUST analysed that there was no technical anomaly.

The SUST analysed that the first officer had mentioned all relevant and necessary details of her approach and landing in the approach briefing, including the mention of landing with autopilot and autothrust disengaged. Such an approach was permitted but requires additional capacity.

The SUST analysed that the late landing clearance created additional tension on the flight deck and the focus was clearly on the preceding traffic. Following landing clearance the tension noticeably reduced, there was no indication that the late landing clearance had any impact on the later event.

It is obvious that the reason for the go around and tail strike was the landing, that the first officer perceived as hard and bounced. It can only be explained with her little experience with the Airbus aircraft, that she perceived a landing with a maximum vertical acceleration of +1.4G as hard and bounced.

In the startle moment she pulled the side stick fully to the aft stop. During landing the elevators are directly controlled by the side stick, the deflection of the elevator is thus directly proportional to the stick deflection. The spoilers had already deployed, the thrust levers were not in the TOGA detent yet, when the first officer pulled the stick to the aft stop. The aircraft was not yet capable of flight in this configuration, therefore the brusque stick control input caused the tail strike.

Monitoring the pitch angle is of decisive importance during a go around.

The captain could not detect the stick movement in time, the only indication available to him were visual cues and the subsequent response of the aircraft when the pitch angle increased, however, the captain could no longer intervene and correct the stick input.

Following the go around call the first officer commanded thrust, flaps one step, the captain moved the flaps lever from 3 to 2. The SUST stated however, that in case of a bounced landing recovery the flaps reduction should be delayed. In this particular case the flaps retraction to step 2 had no consequences.

The SUST annotated in the analysis that the crew was not sure whether a tail strike had occurred or not. The non-consultation of the relevant checklists did not have any consequences in the particular event.

Metars:
SGG 091420Z VRB02KT CAVOK 15/03 Q1027 NOSIG
LSGG 091350Z VRB02KT CAVOK 15/03 Q1027 NOSIG
LSGG 091320Z 06003KT 030V110 CAVOK 14/03 Q1027 NOSIG
LSGG 091250Z 09004KT 350V120 CAVOK 13/03 Q1028 NOSIG
LSGG 091220Z VRB03KT CAVOK 13/03 Q1028 NOSIG
LSGG 091150Z 08004KT 050V110 CAVOK 12/03 Q1028 NOSIG
LSGG 091120Z VRB03KT CAVOK 12/03 Q1029 NOSIG
LSGG 091050Z VRB01KT CAVOK 12/03 Q1029 NOSIG
LSGG 091020Z VRB01KT CAVOK 11/02 Q1030 NOSIG
LSGG 090950Z VRB01KT CAVOK 10/02 Q1030 NOSIG
Aircraft Registration Data
Registration mark
HB-IOC
Country of Registration
Switzerland
Date of Registration
Bn gfei knfAi Subscribe to unlock
Certification Basis
Cnq Ag Subscribe to unlock
Airworthyness Category
Qlhhepllqhnglflf Subscribe to unlock
Legal Basis
Fpjb Subscribe to unlock
TCDS Ident. No.
ckcdknhbf Subscribe to unlock
Manufacturer
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE
Aircraft Model / Type
A321-111
ICAO Aircraft Type
A321
Year of Manufacture
Ekin Subscribe to unlock
Serial Number
Mpd Subscribe to unlock
Aircraft Address / Mode S Code (HEX)
JjA ej Subscribe to unlock
Max. Operational Passenger Seating Capacity (MOPSC), indicative
nc Subscribe to unlock
Minimum Crew
C Subscribe to unlock
Maximum Take off Mass (MTOM) [kg]
A bim Subscribe to unlock
Engine Count
J Subscribe to unlock
Engine
LmlkiAmhbjhiibglc Subscribe to unlock
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 9, 2014

Classification
Accident

Cause
Tail strike on landing

Airline
Swiss International Airlines

Flight number
LX-2806

Departure
Zurich, Switzerland

Destination
Geneva, Switzerland

Aircraft Registration
HB-IOC

Aircraft Type
Airbus A321

ICAO Type Designator
A321

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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