Jet2.com B738 at Funchal on Feb 17th 2014, tail strike on landing

Last Update: February 3, 2017 / 15:57:14 GMT/Zulu time

Bookmark this article

Photo of Jet2.com G-GDFC, Boeing 737-800 — Jet2.com G-GDFC, Boeing 737-800 (Photo credit: Luccio.errera / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 17, 2014

Classification
Incident

Cause
Tail strike on landing

Airline
Jet2.com

Flight number
LS-389

Departure
Leeds, United Kingdom

Destination
Funchal, Portugal

Aircraft Registration
G-GDFC

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800

ICAO Type Designator
B738

Airport
Madeira Airport, Funchal

Airport ICAO Code
LPMA

A Jet2.com Boeing 737-800, registration G-GDFC performing flight LS-389 from Leeds,EN (UK) to Funchal (Portugal) with 176 passengers and 6 crew, landed on Funchal's runway 05 in gusting crosswind conditions, however the tail of the aircraft contacted the runway surface producing visible sparks. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron. The aircraft received substantial damage.

The airport reported that after arrival at the apron minor damage was discovered to the tail of the aircraft. The aircraft is being examined. 6 other flights had diverted due to the wind conditions at Funchal.

On Feb 25th 2014 Portugal's GPIAA reported the aircraft was on a visual approach to runway 05 with the captain being pilot flying. The approach was smooth until about 50 feet AGL when the commander experienced effects consistent with a windshear developing a high rate of descent. The aircraft landed hard on its main gear, bounced becoming airborne for another 300 meters/1000 feet, the captain did not initiate a go-around, the aircraft touched down a second time at 140 KIAS with the tail hitting the runway leaving a mark of about 13 meters length. The aircraft subsequently rolled out without further incident.

A preliminary visual inspection revealed deformation of the skin of the lower fuselage and significant tail skid wear. Maintenance subsequently determined in a detailed inspection, that there were a number of struts bent inside the tail structure, two stringers were cracked and a diagonal strut had fractured. In addition the skin was chafed and there was deformation of the tube as result of the contact with the runway surface.

The occurrence was rated an accident, the GPIAA concluded their preliminary information.

On Jul 11th 2014 photos became available from the GPIAA within their updated investigation map.

On Feb 3rd 2017 the GPIAA released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

The accident was due to an excessive nose up input after the first contact with the runway and at a time in which the aircraft was airborne at around 8 feet (RA) which, associated to the manual deployment of the speedbrakes and consequent loss of lift, resulted in a sharp nose up attitude (9.15⁰) to a point of causing the tail strike with the runway surface.

Contributing causes were:

- The Normal Checklist (Landing) was not executed (737-800 FCOM Chapter NP);

- The aircraft approach was conducted under turbulence conditions in the last 150 feet;

- Aircraft deviation from the “stabilized approach” profile which implied the execution of a go-around (737 NG FCTM Chapter 5);

- The judgement not to execute a go-around after the bounce on the runway (737 NG FCTM Chapter 6);

- Speedbrakes manual deployment during the bounce resulting in a loss of lift and nose up pitching moment;

The GPIAA analysed:

The Commander, as PF, switched off the A/T and A/P around 12:21:55 at approximately 1200 feet (RA); the remaining of the flight was flown manually.

Around 12:22:25 the aircraft was above the path indicated by the PAPI (3 WHITES 1 RED and 5 seconds after 4 WHITES). LS389 managed to maintain the ideal profile for brief instants, around 12:22:40, but 9 seconds after was now below it (3 REDS).

In the final approach, the aircraft encountered a tailwind component of 10 knots and a crosswind component (from the left side) of 5 knots. As soon as the wings were levelled (around 12:22:49), the tailwind component decreased and the crosswind component (from the left side) increased to values between 20 to 30 knots. At the same time as the wind change a thrust increase was commanded which, along with the decrease of the tailwind, caused an exceedance of the airspeed selected on the MCP (Figure 8) initially in 9 knots and later by 12 knots. The thrust and speed increase caused a reduction in the descent rate to 300 feet per minute. The aircraft, at this point, initiated a series of oscillations as a result of the control wheel inputs varying between 50 degrees to the right and 65 degrees to the left. These inputs persisted until the moment of flare and touchdown.

A nose down column input of about 3 degrees caused the descent rate to increase to 1000 feet per minute. Then a nose up column input of 1-2 degrees and a slight increase in thrust caused a reduction in the descent rate to nearly 150 feet per minute (approximately at 12:22:57). The speed also exceeded the MCP selected speed in 13 knots as a result of the thrust increase. A nose down column input, lasting nearly 4 seconds, and a reduction in thrust combined with a downdraft of 10 feet per second (600 feet per minute) resulted in a descent rate increasing to 1500 feet per minute at approximately 220 feet radio altitude. With a nose up column input of about 2 degrees the sink rate was arrested to 750 feet per minute.

An increase in the headwind to 5 knots assisted in decreasing the descent rate. However, a nose down column input and the loss of the headwind component increased the descent rate to 1100 feet per minute at approximately 35 feet (RA). The flare was initiated at 12:23:04 with an increasing column pull to 10 degrees. At flare initiation, pitch attitude was approximately 0 degrees and airspeed nearly 10 knots above the selected speed (18 knots above VREF). Thrust was reduced to idle during the flare. The nose up column input resulted in a pitch attitude increasing to approximately 6 degrees. Touchdown of the left main gear occurred around 12:23:06, at a sink rate of 350 feet per minute, with an IAS of 154 knots and about 750 feet beyond runway 05 threshold. The recorded load factor was 1.86g. The contact of the right main landing gear occurred one second after the left.

Speedbrakes were not armed during the approach as required by the Operator Normal Checklist (Landing) and, consequently, were not deployed after the initial contact. After the initial contact of the main landing gear on the runway, the aircraft bounced and became airborne due to the combination of lack of speedbrake deployment and nose up column command. Once in the air, speedbrakes were manually deployed and the nose up column input increased. The second contact on the runway occurred around 12:23:11 and at that time the pitch attitude of the aircraft was 9.15 degrees and the IAS 142 knots. This high pitch attitude resulted in a tail strike on the runway, being the recorded load factor of 2.15 g. After the tail strike, the nose up column input reached maximum deflection immediately before the contact of the nose landing gear on the runway, approximately at 12:23:17. The landing rollout evolved uneventfully.

Metars:
LPMA 171400Z 34012G26KT 240V040 9999 SCT016 18/08 Q1016 RS34016KT 0534012G28KT 2335016G28KT
LPMA 171330Z 34014G27KT 270V030 9999 SCT016 18/08 Q1016 RS32010G26KT 0535019KT 2334017G28KT
LPMA 171300Z 33013G24KT 280V010 9999 SCT016 18/10 Q1016 RS32013G24KT 0534017KT 2333014KT
LPMA 171230Z 33013G24KT 270V020 9999 SCT016 19/10 Q1016 RS16003KT 0534017G30KT 2334015G26KT
LPMA 171200Z VRB11G22KT 9999 SCT016 17/12 Q1016 RS18005KT 0525004KT 2333013KT
LPMA 171130Z VRB03KT 9999 BKN016 17/11 Q1017 RS08003KT 0510003KT 2308005KT
LPMA 171100Z VRB02KT 9999 SCT016 18/11 Q1017 RS09002KT 0511002KT 2325003KT
LPMA 171030Z VRB01KT 9999 SCT016 18/11 Q1017 RS03002KT 0534001KT 2324002KT
LPMA 171000Z VRB01KT 9999 SCT016 17/10 Q1017 RS33003KT 0501002KT 2324002KT