Amapola F50 at Malmo on Jan 10th 2014, runway excursion on landing

Last Update: February 12, 2015 / 18:57:00 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 10, 2014

Classification
Incident

Cause
Runway excursion

Airline
Amapola Flyg

Departure
Sundsvall, Sweden

Destination
Malmo, Sweden

Aircraft Registration
SE-LIS

Aircraft Type
Fokker 50

ICAO Type Designator
F50

Airport
Malmö Sturup Airport, Malmö

Airport ICAO Code
ESMS

An Amapola Flyg Fokker 50, registration SE-LIS performing freight/mail flight APF-9121 (dep Jan 9th) from Sundsvall to Malmo (Sweden) with 2 crew, landed on Malmo's runway 35 in strong crosswinds at about 02:15L (01:15Z) but veered off the runway and came to a stop off the runway. No injuries occurred.

The airport was closed for about 6 hours as result until the aircraft was moved off the runway.

Sweden's Haverikommission opened an investigation into the occurrence.

Sweden's Haverikommission (SHK) released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

Factors as to Cause and Contributing Factors

The incident was caused by the aircraft being suddenly subjected to a severe gust of wind during roll-out while maintaining thrust reversal.

Contributing factors were probably the crew's lack of sleep, which probably affected decision-making and attention, which in turn led to the landing being performed under conditions that exceeded the operator's crosswind limitations for the aircraft.

Factors as to Risk

Civil flight personnel in night work who are not offered a medical examination that has in view the medical suitability for working at night may constitute a potential aviation safety risk.

The SHK reported that the aircraft was enroute at FL250 about abeam Jonkoping when the crew received a cabin pressure altitude warning, donned their oxygen masks and initiated an emergency descent to FL080.

About 30 minutes later the crew checked ATIS receiving information, that runway 17 was in use with winds from 280 degrees at 21 knots gusting to 33 knots, visibility of 9km in light rain and mist, the runway was wet. The crew consulted with each other and the commander (45, ATPL, 6,583 hours total, 5,332 hours on type), pilot flying, decided to use runway 35 explaining in post flight interviews, he had not understood the information about the wet runway due to a transmission on another frequency. Pilot monitoring was the first officer (34, MPL, 1,720 hours total, 1,153 hours on type).

The aircraft positioned for an approach to runway 35 and received landing clearance, winds were reported at 280 degrees at 26 knots gusting 34 knots.

The aircraft touched down safely, the engines were selected into reverse. As the aircraft slowed down it began to veer left and departed the paved surface of the runway with both nose and left main gear, the right main gear remained just on the paved surface.

The SHK analysed that the crew most likely was not under the influence of hypoxia, they donned their oxygen masks quickly enough. However, the "SHK has found that the crew had been subjected to an acute lack of sleep and probably also a cumulative lack of sleep during the last flight period. Besides this, the point in time of the incident falls next to the time window in which the body's biological clock is programmed for the lowest level of activity, when it is known that the level of human performance is reduced."

The SHK further analysed: "Throughout the flight, the crew sought continuous information on weather conditions at the destination airport. Some parts of that information caused the crew to assume that the wind strength would abate, while other parts indicated that the wind situation could exceed the aircraft's operational limitations. The detail that the runway was wet was never understood. This can be explained partly by the crew's attention being reduced as a result of a lack of sleep and partly by simultaneous communication on another frequency having impaired the audibility of that information."

The SHK further analysed: "The yaw to the left was probably caused by a combination of a wind gust in connection with the fact that thrust reversal was still activated at a speed far below what was recommended. The thrust reversal was asymmetric with a higher TRQ value on the left engine, which may have further contributed to the left yaw."

Metars:
ESMS 100250Z 28019G30KT 7000 BR SCT010 BKN013 OVC019 05/04 Q0992 R17/29//95
ESMS 100220Z 28023G41KT 9999 -DZ OVC014 05/03 Q0992 R17/29//95
ESMS 100150Z 28022G34KT 9999 -RA OVC013 05/04 Q0991 RERA R17/29//95
ESMS 100120Z 28024G35KT 9999 OVC012 05/03 Q0990 R17/29//95
ESMS 100050Z 28024KT 9999 -RA BKN011 05/03 Q0990 R17/29//95
ESMS 100020Z 28023G33KT 9000 -RA BR BKN010 04/03 Q0989 R17/29//95
ESMS 092350Z 27025G39KT 5000 RA BR BKN010 04/03 Q0988 R17/29//95
ESMS 092320Z 27029G41KT 9999 -RA BKN009 04/02 Q0987 R17/29//95
ESMS 092250Z 26029G42KT 6000 BR BKN008 05/03 Q0986 RERA R17/29//95