ANA A320 at Sendai on Feb 5th 2012, tail strike on go-around

Last Update: October 9, 2013 / 15:38:47 GMT/Zulu time

Bookmark this article
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 5, 2012

Classification
Accident

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

Japan's TSB have released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

In this accident, it is highly probable that when the Aircraft rejected the landing after touching Runway 27, its nose was raised sharply, causing the lower part of the rear fuselage to contact with the runway and be damaged.

It is highly probable that the substantial pitch-up moment caused the quick Aircraft nose-up with the following reasons: The captain decided to reject the landing under the circumstance where he could not recognize the touchdown of main landing gears due to the soft landing;
Balanced pitching moment was disrupted by the captain’s nose-up elevator input as his go-around was initiated from the full-aft sidestick position.

The captain (46, ATPL, 10,211 hours total, 8,042 hours on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (31, CPL, 2,642 hours total, 573 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. The captain requested and was approved a visual approach to runway 27.

The aircraft had been slightly high on the approach to runway 27 but was fully aligned and on glidepath while descending through 500 feet, the captain announced "stabilized". The aircraft subsequently descended below glidepath of 3 degrees to a minimum of 2.5 degrees, corrected and became slightly high below 200 feet AGL.

The aircraft descended through 20 feet AGL, the "RETARD" call occurred, the thrust levers were placed into the IDLE detent, the right main gear touched down at 130 KIAS followed by the left main gear, the vertical accelerations remained between 0.98 and 1.04G, the touchdown was hardly noticeable on the cockpit voice recorders due to the softness of the landing. After both main gears touched down, the ground spoilers began to fully deploy, the captain commented "Oh, no good" and applied full backward stick pressure for about 2 seconds, the spoilers had fully deployed. The thrust levers were momentarily placed into reverse almost simultaneously with the captain announcing "go-around", then moved to the TO/GA detent, the spoilers began to retract, the pitch angle increased to 12.7 degrees nose up before the main gear departed the runway surface again. During climb out, gear and flaps up sequence a flight attendant informed the cockpit a strange sound had been heard in the back of the cabin and the possibility of a tail strike existed, the first officer radioed the tower reporting the possible tail strike and requested a runway inspection, tower confirmed a white contact mark was found on the runway.

About 24 minutes after the go around the aircraft landed safely on runway 27.

The captain said in post flight testimony that he did not feel the touchdown, but based on surrounding circumstances he concluded they had touched down and pulled the thrust levers into reverse. At that time he felt some vibration of the aircraft like stall buffeting and believed the landing had not been normal, thus determined that the aircraft was still in the air and called the go-around.

The captain explained that he is used to feel a natural nose up tendency of the aircraft after ground spoilers deploy, however, he did not sense that feeling during the first landing and concluded they were still floating.

The first officer said, he was expecting the main gear to touch ground soon when he heard the captain call the go-around.

Neither pilot had the impression the nose was raised sharply.

The JTSB reported that the aircraft received substantial damage including deformation damage to the pressure bulkhead.

The JTSB analysed that weather conditions were not serious enough to affect the landing.

Although the aircraft was fully stabilized at 500 feet AGL, it was low between 400 and 200 feet AGL, it was probable that all four PAPI lights turned red during that phase of the approach.

More than 7 seconds passed between the first "Retard" call out and the right main gear touching the runway, the JTSB said: "it is highly probable that the Aircraft slightly deferred its touchdown while flying at an altitude of less than 10 ft above the runway." and subsequently continued: "According to the CVR records, immediately after the main landing gears touched the
ground, the captain said, “Oh, no good.” It is highly probable that this meant that the main landing gears had not touched the ground. It is probable that this supports the assumption that at that time, the captain was not aware that the main landing gears had touched the ground."

With respect to the decision to go around the JTSB analysed: "it is highly probable that this was because the captain, determining that the main landing gears had already touched the ground if the circumstances in his field of vision were taken into account, shifted the thrust lever to the REVERSE position for some time, but because he reconsidered, believing that the Aircraft was still in the air as he felt vibrations like buffeting immediately after that operation and decided to go around. According to the DFDR records, which indicated that both main landing gears had already touched the ground, it is also highly probable that what the captain felt was buffeting was in fact vibrations from ground run."

Following the decision to go-around and the full aft deflection of the stick the elevators reached their maximum deflection and the aircraft pitched up at an average of 4.4 degrees/second peaking momentarily at 8.4 degrees/second, changing from 1.8 to 12.7 degrees in 2.25 seconds.

With respect to the thrust reversers the JTSB stated: "It is highly probable that this was because the thrust levers were advanced to the TO/GA positions before the reverse doors started to be opened, preventing the thrust reversers from functioning. In other words, it is highly probable that this temporary reverses operation did not generate reverse thrust, and that therefore, this operation had no direct effect on the accident." The JTSB added however, that after selection of reverse thrust a go-around should be avoided due to unsafe conditions like unequal reverser retraction, delayed engine response and other unfavourable factors.

The JTSB pointed out that after the initiation of the go-around following factors came together:
1) The elevators reached their maximum nose up position creating a substantial pitch up moment
2) the stab trim, which had been frozen during the flare, was released and the trim moved to counter the nose up movement but still generated a significant nose up moment
3) the automatic brakes had already triggered, the TOGA selection suddenly cancelled the brakes pressure, the pitch down moment of brakes disappeared
4) The ground spoilers had fully deployed, the flight controls had applied some counter pitch down moment temporarily, which disappeared upon spoiler retraction, the deploying spoilers such created less pitch down effect
5) the thrust reverser doors had not opened, the pitch moments were not influenced
6) The engines began to accelerate however needed several seconds so that they did not influence the pitch moments

The JTSB concluded that analysis stating: "Up until the moment before the TO/GA initiation after the touchdown of the main gears, gradual nose-down deflection indicates almost balanced pitching moment with general tendency of nose-down. The TO/GA operation disrupted the balance of the pitching moments, consequently leading to an abrupt nose-up attitude mainly caused by a large deflection of the elevator."

The JTSB analysed that a landing must be immediately rejected if there is concern about the subsequent safety of the aircraft. On the other hand a landing should not be rejected once the thrust reversers had been selected. It is likely that the crew believed it was safer to go around due to the vibrations that the crew believed was due to buffeting. The JTSB concluded: "In fact, as mentioned earlier, it was not necessary to go around because both main landin
gears had touched the ground, and the Aircraft could have landed if it had proceeded as planned. Since both the captain and the first officer failed to recognize the touchdown of the Aircraft, however, it is highly probable that the captain’s decision to go around was inevitable."

As immediate safety action the airline required the pilot monitoring to call out "SPOILERS" as soon as the spoilers deployed in order to ensure proper recognition of touch down.
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 5, 2012

Classification
Accident

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
Article source

You can read 2 more free articles without a subscription.

Subscribe now and continue reading without any limits!

Subscribe now
Are you a subscriber? Login
Subscribe

Read unlimited articles and receive our daily update briefing. Gain better insights into what is happening in commercial aviation safety.

Compare our plans

Send tip

Support AeroInside by sending a small tip amount.

Send tip

Related articles

Newest articles

Subscribe today

Are you researching aviation incidents? Get access to AeroInside Insights, unlimited read access and receive the daily newsletter.

Pick your plan and subscribe

Partner

Blockaviation logo

A new way to document and demonstrate airworthiness compliance and aircraft value. Find out more.

ELITE Logo

ELITE Simulation Solutions is a leading global provider of Flight Simulation Training Devices, IFR training software as well as flight controls and related services. Find out more.

Blue Altitude Logo

Your regulation partner, specialists in aviation safety and compliance; providing training, auditing, and consultancy services. Find out more.

AeroInside Blog
Popular aircraft
Airbus A320
Boeing 737-800
Boeing 737-800 MAX
Popular airlines
American Airlines
United
Delta
Air Canada
Lufthansa
British Airways