Korean B739 at Niigata on Aug 5th 2013, overrun runway on landing
Last Update: January 30, 2015 / 15:41:00 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Aug 5, 2013
Classification
Incident
Aircraft Registration
HL7599
Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-900
ICAO Type Designator
B739
Airport
Niigata Airport, Niigata
Airport ICAO Code
RJSN
It is highly probable that this serious incident occurred when the Aircraft landed on RWY 10 in Niigata Airport, the Captain did not let the Aircraft reduce enough lower speed to approach the runway threshold lights that the Captain understood as the stop bar lights for the intersecting RWY 04/22, which the Captain was holding a doubt, and when the Captain realized there was no runway beyond the red lights, the Aircraft could not stop within the runway anymore, resulting in overrunning.
It is highly probable that the reasons why the Captain understood the runway threshold lights as the stop bar lights for the intersecting RWY 04/22, and why the Captain did not let the Aircraft reduce enough lower speed to approach the lights, are as follows:
- Both the Captain and the F/O presumed that the ATC instruction “cross runway 04/22” from the Niigata Tower was “the clearance to cross the intersecting runway during landing roll” rather than “the taxi clearance including crossing the intersecting runway after vacating the runway,” unable to understand the intention of the instruction, and both of them believed the Aircraft was short of the intersecting runway.
- The Captain was going to roll to the end of the runway; therefore, he disarmed the autobrakes as fast as about 70 kt. After that the Captain could not take appropriate control of reducing speed with manual braking, even though he should have reduced speed in a careful manner.
It is also somewhat likely that the following reasons contributed to the occurrence of this serious incident:
- The Captain and the F/O were not familiar with Niigata Airport which had a intersecting runway, and they had difficulty to identify the intersecting position with RWY 04/22 because ground objects and others which pilots could observe during night landing were limited.
In such circumstances, it was difficult for them to judge the speed of the Aircraft in the low speed area in which they did not count on the airspeed indicator.
The JTSB reported the captain (44, ATPL, 7,105 hours total, 2,629 hours on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (45, ATPL, 4,641 hours total, 1,860 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.
The aircraft was on final approach to runway 10, when tower advised winds were from 040 degrees at 4 knots and issued landing clearance. The aircraft crossed the threshold of runway 10 at 50 feet AGL and 150 KIAS (Vref 146 KIAS, Vapp 151 KIAS), subsequently touched down at 143 KIAS and +1.34G about 600 meters down the runway (about 1900 meters of runway remaining), speed brakes extended and autobrakes engaged, the engines were selected into reverse and maximum reverse thrust applied.
During the roll out the captain indicated that they would roll to the end of the runway, the first officer agreed.
Slowing through 80 knots the thrust reversers were stowed and the speed brakes retracted at 70 knots, at the same time tower instructed "Korean Air seven-six-three (KAL763), turn right end of runway Bravo One (B1) and taxi to spot cross runway zero-four/two-two(04/22)". The crew acknowledged "Cross runway 04/22, end of
runway right turn" at 64 knots.
The JTSB stated that about 5 seconds after taxi instructions were issued: "The Captain noted “Cross runway 04/22,” and the F/O wondered “Cross runway?”"
One second later the brakes pressure suddenly rose at 56 knots, 5 seconds later the vertical and lateral accelerations began to fluctuate and the pitch angle began to gradually decrease. 14 seconds after the taxi instruction the aircraft stopped at 4 degrees nose down attitude and a heading of 100 degrees.
The JTSB summarized the discussion amongst the crew based on cockpit voice recorder:
According to the records of the CVR after shutdown of the engines, the dialogue between the Captain and the F/O (by Korean language mixed with English) included the following contents.
- Because the Captain and the F/O assumed that the red lights might be the stop bar lights for the intersecting runway 04/22 (hereinafter referred to as “RWY 04/22”), they tried to continue to proceed beyond those lights.
- The Captain and the F/O could not accurately recognize where the taxiways and intersecting RWY 04/22 were located.
- The Captain and the F/O did not see the runway distance marker lights.
- The Captain thought that he should have reduced speed earlier.
- The Captain disarmed the Auto Brake by stowing the speed brake (spoiler) lever.
- Since the Captain intended to continue rolling to the end of the runway, the Captain were going to reduce speed slowly after the autobrakes were disarmed."
There was no damage to the aircraft, three approach lights and one overrun light were damaged.
The JTSB analysed that weather most likely had no role in the serious incident.
The JTSB analysed: "the Captain stowed the speed brake lever at 19:41:17, which triggered the spoilers to be stowed and concurrently the autobrakes to be disarmed as described in 2.10.4(1), with the airspeed of 69 kt at the moment. Subsequently, since the brake pressure in lower range had been maintained for about eight seconds, the deceleration rate was getting reduced, it is highly probable that the Captain did not apply the manual brake or the brake control by the Captain did not function well enough."
The JTSB analysed: "According to the statements in 2.1.2, it is highly probable that the Captain and the F/O confirmed the landing distance of about 7,000 ft (about 2,130 m) and understood that they had the margin of 1,000 ft (about 300 m) or more in consideration with the RWY 10 runway length of 8,200 ft (2,500 m). As described in 2.10.3(5), the landing distance with the landing configuration, using autobrake-2 and Flap-30, was about 2,300 m;"
The JTSB continued: "At the time of the serious incident, the landing distance had been grown longer by some factors such as, not strong but light head wind, higher temperature in summer, down slope of the landing runway and heavy landing weight with a lot of fuel loaded, and others. The Captain should have considered the landing configuration of the Aircraft, while being aware of the operation of the speed brake lever which caused disarming the autobrakes and the following manual braking, and should have reduced speed in a proper manner corresponding to the available remaining distance of the runway."
The JTSB analysed with respect to the taxi instructions: "As described in 2.1.1, the Niigata Tower instructed the Aircraft of the exit taxiway “turn right end of runway B1,” and jointly made the taxi clearance including crossing the intersecting runway after vacating the runway “taxi to spot cross runway 04/22.” According to the statements in 2.1.2(4), it is highly probable that Air Traffic Controller in the Niigata Tower instruct the exit taxiway accompanied with the phrase of “end of runway” on a regular basis in order that the Aircraft which landed on RWY 10 would not wrongly enter the intersecting RWY 04/22. It is highly probable that the Controller gave this same instruction phrase because the Controller thought that it was difficult for the Aircraft to vacate from TWY-P3, while the Aircraft was rolling around TWY-P3. It is also highly probable that the Controller gave consideration in order for the Aircraft on TWY-C1 not to get the clearance of crossing RWY 04/22 after vacating the runway and to let the Aircraft continue smooth taxiing."
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Aug 5, 2013
Classification
Incident
Aircraft Registration
HL7599
Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-900
ICAO Type Designator
B739
Airport
Niigata Airport, Niigata
Airport ICAO Code
RJSN
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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