Trans States E145 at Ottawa on Jun 16th 2010, runway overrun
Last Update: June 13, 2013 / 16:32:30 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jun 16, 2010
Classification
Accident
Airline
Trans States Airlines
Aircraft Type
Embraer ERJ-145
ICAO Type Designator
E145
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
- The crew calculated an inaccurate VAPP (i.e., target approach speed), and flew the approach faster than recommended.
- The aircraft crossed the threshold 8 knots above VREF (i.e., threshold crossing speed), resulting in an extended flare to a touchdown of 2270 feet, which was 770 feet beyond the Trans States Airlines (TSA) desired touchdown point of 800 to 1500 feet, but within the first third of the available landing distance as per TSAstandard operating procedures.
- The smooth landing on a wet runway led to viscous hydroplaning, which resulted in poor braking action and reduced aircraft deceleration, contributing to the runway overrun.
- Rainwater accumulated on Runway 07/25 due to the crosswind and the design of its transverse slope, resulting in a further decline in the coefficient of friction for the occurrence flight.
- The crew did not select flaps 45, as encouraged by Trans States Airlines standard operating procedures for landing on a wet, ungrooved runway, which resulted in a higher landing speed and a longer landing distance.
- The crew did not initiate a go-around when VREF was exceeded by more than 5 knots indicated airspeed.
- The antiskid brake system operated as designed, by keeping the brake pressures from rising to commanded values after brake application in order to prevent the wheels from locking. With little braking action during the landing roll, the aircraft overran the runway.
- The aircraft overran the runway threshold and the runway strip, and subsequently encountered a significant dip, where the nose landing gear folded rearward, resulting in substantial damage to the nose of the aircraft.
Findings as to Risk
- In the absence of information and training about ungrooved runways, there is a risk that crews will not carry out the appropriate landing techniques when these runways are wet.
- Fatigue creates a risk of performance decrements in aircraft operations, and work-rest rules did not necessarily prevent flight crews from being fatigued.
- There is no specific guidance in Transport Canada Aerodromes Standards and Recommended Practices TP312E or the Ottawa/MacDonald-Cartier International Airport operations manual on how to assess and report runway surface conditions during nonwinter months. As a result, crews may not be able to make a proper assessment of landing conditions.
- Without prompt reporting of an increase in rainfall intensity, crews cannot take into account decline in braking performance, and there is an increased risk of hydroplaning.
- The published minimum friction values of Transport Canada are lower than, and its testing methodology is different from, the minimum friction values and testing methodology of the International Civil Aviation Organization / Federal Aviation Administration. These differences may result in reduced runway friction levels at Canadian airports.
- The lack of standards or recommended practices in Canada requiring friction enhancement, such as runway grooving, increases the risk of runway overruns on wet runways.
- Lack of thrust reversers increases the risk of runway overruns when landing on wet runways.
- The coefficient of friction values included in United States Federal Aviation Regulations Section 25.109(c)(1) give a significantly shorter landing distance than that of the occurrence aircraft and in other occurrences investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board. This discrepancy increases the risk of runway overruns on wet runways.
Other Findings
- Due to the absence of a device that continuously measures and reports the amount of rainfall, the rain intensity at Ottawa/MacDonald-Cartier International Airport is determined by subjective means. Therefore, the reported amount or intensity of rain may be different from what crews actually encounter on landing.
- Advisory material produced by Embraer in General Publication GP145/1650 was not included in Embraer-approved manuals or Trans States Airlines manuals. The material was contradictory in nature, resulting in the potential for operators to develop policies or procedures using incorrect techniques for operation of the EMB-145.
- The flight data recorder data from the occurrence aircraft and other EMB-145 aircraft exhibited the same discrepancy between wheel speed and ground speed. The reason for the anomalous wheel-speed data could not be determined.
- Some passengers took their carry-on baggage with them during the evacuation, contrary to the flight attendant’s direction.
The first officer (ATPL, 3,000 hours total, 2,691 hours on type) was pilot flying, the captain (ATPL, 11,400 hours total, 3,645 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. The crew briefed for an ILS approach to runway 07, Vref was determined at 131 KIAS and Vapp was computed at 146 knots due to gusting wind conditions. After intercepting the localizer ATC informed the crew that the active runway had just been switched to runway 14 and offered the option to continue the approach to runway 07 and reposition for an approach to runway 14. Considering the time and fuel needed to reposition as well as the fact, that they were already established on the localizer, the crew elected to continue the approach. The crew selected the gear down, extended the flaps to 22 degrees and began final approach about 4.7nm from touchdown intercepting the glideslope. Tower provided reported the winds from 160 degrees magnetic at 10 knots gusting 16 knots. Descending through 1000 feet the airspeed was stable at 150 KIAS, soon after the windscreen wipers were turned on and the crew reported the runway in sight.
The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 49 feet AGL and 139 KIAS and touched down very smoothly afterwards, with the weight on wheel sensors briefly activating 1740 feet down the runway, the aircraft continued to float until the weight on wheel sensors activated a second time, this time permanently, 2240 feet down the runway. At the time of second touchdown the first officer was already applying pressure to the brakes pedals, the nose gear touched down and spoilers extended automatically. The first officer continued to apply increasing brakes pressure until maximum brakes pressure was commanded, however, the first officer sensed no deceleration and advised the captain, who took control of the aircraft and applied maximum braking too, again without sensing any deceleration.
The aircraft remained along the runway center line until about 200 feet short of the runway end, then started to veer left due to better friction at the left side than the right side of the runway, exited paved surface at about 62 knots over ground and continued on grass over a sharp downward elevation change of 2 feet, the nose gear collapsed backwards. The aircraft came to a stop about 550 feet past the runway end and 220 feet to the left of the extended runway center line. The flight attendant initiated the evacuation of passengers.
The aircraft received substantial damage especially to the nose section which received deformation of sections of the cockit area and structural damage to the nose section as result of the nose gear collapse.
The flight data recorder revealed that the speed over ground and wheel rotation speed differed by about 25 knots, which the TSB annotated was excessive.
An examination identified no technical anomalies prior to the runway excursion.
The TSB analysed that the aircraft was encountering viscous hydroplaning resulting in lack of braking force. The antiskid system was working properly preventing the wheels from locking up.
The TSB further analysed that the performance calculations by the aircraft manufacturer showed a substantially shorter landing distance on friction values encountered during the accident than the accident aircraft encountered, according to the performance calculation the aircraft should have been able to stop 1800 feet short of the runway end despite the late touchdown 2270 feet past the runway threshold. The NTSB had made similiar observations in other occurrence investigations.
The TSB stated: "The smooth touchdown, combined with a wet runway, increased the risk of hydroplaning. The technique for landing on a wet or contaminated runway is to touch down firmly, at the slowest possible speed, in the touchdown area. The slowest possible speed would have been accomplished with the use of flaps 45." and continued with regards to thrust reverser: "In this particular occurrence, the aircraft’s braking coefficient of friction was very low throughout the landing roll, and did not start to increase until the aircraft had slowed to approximately 90 KIAS. Had the aircraft been equipped with thrust reversers, the application of reverse thrust as soon as possible after touchdown would have permitted the aircraft to slow down below hydroplaning speed much sooner, and possibly prevented an overrun."
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jun 16, 2010
Classification
Accident
Airline
Trans States Airlines
Aircraft Type
Embraer ERJ-145
ICAO Type Designator
E145
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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