Alliance E190 at The Granites on Mar 8th 2025, landed with flaps 5 instead of full flaps

Last Update: September 2, 2025 / 11:54:36 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 8, 2025

Classification
Report

Airline
Alliance Air

Flight number
QQ-4801

Departure
Alice Springs, Australia

Destination
The Granites, Australia

Aircraft Registration
VH-A2V

Aircraft Type
Embraer ERJ-190

ICAO Type Designator
E190

An Alliance Airlines Embraer ERJ-190, registration VH-A2V performing flight QQ-4801 from Alice Springs,NT to The Granites,NT (Australia) with an unknown number of passengers and 4 crew, landed on The Granites' runway 11 with flaps 5 instead of briefed full flaps.

The ATSB released their final report into this well as into a second occurrence, see Report: Alliance E190 at Olympic Dam on Feb 4th 2025, landed with flaps 5 instead of full flaps concluding the probable causes of the incident were:

- Neither sets of flight crew recalled briefing for the less commonly used full flap configuration when actioning the before landing checklist, resulting in them landing with an incorrect flap setting.

- Alliance Airlines had no procedure for flight crews to crosscheck the briefed flap setting entered into the flight management system with the actual configuration selected during the before landing checklist. (Safety issue)

The ATSB summarized the sequence of events:

The captain was PF, and the first officer was PM.

On the previous day, the threshold of runway 117 at The Granites Airport had been repaired. While there was no NOTAM8 in place, the airport operator had requested that if an aircraft landed on runway 29, they try to stop by taxiway alpha (which led to the apron) if safe to do so. This was to avoid turning the aircraft on the newly repaired surface at the runway 11 threshold turning node. The captain had received an email from the operator the night prior to the flight requesting that they comply with the above request if possible.

Consistent with the operator’s procedures, prior to commencing their descent, the crew conducted their approach brief. The aerodrome weather information service (AWIS) indicated a 5 kt tailwind for runway 11, which was less than the maximum permitted of 10 kt. As the aircraft could not stop prior to taxiway alpha when landing on runway 29, and to avoid the repaired area, the flight crew elected to use runway 11 and full flap for the landing. The PM entered the performance figures and associated speeds for landing using full flap into the FMS Landing page and the PF crosschecked them.

During the approach, the PM was communicating with air traffic control via HF radio and making the required broadcasts on the common traffic advisory frequency. Additionally, they were regularly checking for updated AWIS information to ensure the tailwind remained within limits. The AWIS changed 3 times during the approach, with the tailwind component reaching 9 kt before dropping back to 8 kt.

The flight crew conducted a visual approach to runway 11 without incident. The operator’s flight data analysis program later detected that the aircraft had landed with flap 5, with full flap entered in the FMS. Both crewmembers later reported that they had forgotten that the use of full flap was briefed prior to top of descent.

The ATSB released this safety message:

These incidents highlight the importance in multi-crew operations of the role of the pilot monitoring in identifying if, and intervening when, the other flight crew member deviates from the briefed plan. It also illustrates the risk of reversion to routinely conducted actions, despite the intention to use a less-common configuration.