TUI B788 at Birmingham on Dec 21st 2023, landed below minimum fuel

Last Update: February 13, 2025 / 18:56:20 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of TUI Airways G-TUIB, Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner — TUI Airways G-TUIB, Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner (Photo credit: Björn Strey / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Dec 21, 2023

Classification
Report

Airline
TUI Airways

Flight number
BY-173

Departure
Cancun, Mexico

Destination
Manchester, United Kingdom

Aircraft Registration
G-TUIB

Aircraft Type
Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner

ICAO Type Designator
B788

A TUI Airways Boeing 787-8, registration G-TUIB performing flight BY-173 from Cancun (Mexico) to Manchester,EN (UK) with 291 passengers and 10 crew, was on approach to Manchester when the crew entered a holding due to weather (high winds). The crew subsequently decided to divert to East Midlands,EN (UK) however was denied due to capacity problems at the airport. The crew thus decided to divert to Birmingham,EN (UK) and was on final approach to Birmingham's runway 33 when the crew needed to go around due to windshear. The crew declared Mayday due to low fuel, positioned for another approach and landed safely with 1250 kg of fuel (minimum fuel 1911 kg).

On Feb 13th 2025 the AAIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The serious incident was the result of strong winds generating difficult conditions at the time of the arrival of the flight into the UK. The aircraft had departed Cancun with 15 minutes of additional fuel, although significant extra capacity was available. Having diverted from MAN to BHX the aircraft made a missed approach due to a windshear warning on final approach. This was followed by an extended track flown for a further approach because an opportunity to prioritise G-TUIB for an expeditious landing was missed. Safety action has been taken to clarify the process for determining and communicating airport capacity for diversions, and for the prioritisation of aircraft that have declared an emergency.

The AAIB analysed:

G-TUIB had crossed the Atlantic to make an approach into MAN but diverted to BHX owing to the high wind conditions. The aircraft had previously been denied the option to divert to its nominated airport of EMA. The serious incident was the result of the aircraft declaring a fuel emergency on executing a missed approach in response to windshear on final approach to BHX.

There were strong crosswinds at MAN and, for Runway 23, the wind was 50° off the runway centreline. One aircraft had experienced windshear on the approach while G-TUIB was holding. EMA would have afforded the opportunity to make an approach to Runway 27, substantially more into wind. The approach to Runway 33 at BHX was within crosswind limits for the aircraft but with a wind 40° off the runway centreline. It would have been reasonable to conclude that windshear was a likely threat, in view of what was being experienced at MAN for similar conditions.

Weather Assessment and fuel management

While allowing for the contingencies required by the regulations, operators seek to minimise the carriage of fuel necessary for the flight, owing to the fuel burn penalty from carrying excess fuel. Nevertheless, the crew identified a threat of high winds and the potential for delays on arrival at MAN. Incorrectly believing that the winds would dissipate from 0600 hrs, the commander requested some extra fuel, equivalent to about an additional 15 minutes of fuel. Given the aircraft weights, the crew had the option to load significantly more fuel.

Alternate selection and acceptance

Destination alternate airports are required to be nominated and accounted for in the fuel planning by the regulations. The destination alternate options were listed on the OFP with the additional fuel required above that for the planned alternate and included EMA and BHX. The nomination of an alternate does not guarantee that an aircraft will be accepted except in the case of a declared emergency. Instead, this will be dependent upon the airport’s capacity to accept the diversion. On receiving a request for a diversion, ATSU would contact the relevant airport ATC who in turn will speak with the airport’s ground agencies to determine stand and ground handling capacity.

EMA identified that the internal communication channels used had not clearly established the capability of the airport to accept an aircraft of the size of G-TUIB, a Boeing 787. This was as a result of ATC speaking directly to the airport Airfield Operations unit instead of the CCR. The consequence of the refusal of East Midlands to accept the requested diversion, meant that G-TUIB made an approach to an airport with significant crosswind and a possibility of windshear on final approach.

Decision-making and emergency handling

On arrival in the Manchester area, the crew ascertained from ATC that there were seven aircraft ahead and it was not possible to be given an EAT. ATC also advised the crew that MAN was also experiencing strong crosswinds and that an aircraft had executed a missed approach owing to windshear. Recognising that continuing to hold would not assure a landing at MAN, the crew made a decision to divert early, thereby helping to protect the extra fuel that remained.

The crew fulfilled the appropriate steps to protect minimum fuel and declared the minimum fuel on transfer to Scottish Control. Throughout, the relevant ATC agencies and crew had the necessary awareness of the situation.

Following the missed approach at BHX, the crew declared a fuel emergency on Birmingham Radar in accordance with the escalation process for ‘Protecting Final Reserve Fuel.’

However, they did not subsequently use the mayday callsign prefix on transfer to Birmingham Director, nor at any stage thereafter, but CAP 413 indicates it is permissible for crews to do so where it is judged that this would have a beneficial effect on the outcome.

Birmingham Director was aware that G-TUIB had declared a fuel emergency, as this had been relayed from the Radar controller, sitting beside him. Consequently, the absence of the use of the callsign prefix by the crew had little material effect with regards to their interactions with ATC. However, it did mean that crews of other aircraft on frequency would have been unaware of G-TUIB’s low fuel status.

Extended track following the missed approach

Following the missed approach and declaration of the fuel emergency by the crew, the Birmingham Radar controller advised the crew to expect an estimated track of 25 nm to landing. While the Birmingham Director controller was fully aware of the situation, an internal investigation determined that the controller was faced with a complex and high workload scenario which resulted in the opportunity to prioritise G-TUIB ahead of HA-LZY being missed. The consequence was that G-TUIB used more fuel than anticipated by flying an extended track even though the crew had declared a fuel emergency. The consequential reduction in fuel remaining had the effect of reducing the options available to achieve a safe landing, if the aircraft had encountered windshear on the second approach.