United A319 at Houston on Feb 2nd 2025, rejected takeoff due to engine failure

Last Update: April 30, 2026 / 15:54:37 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 2, 2025

Classification
Accident

Cause
Rejected takeoff due to engine failure

Airline
United

Flight number
UA-1382

Departure
Houston Intercontinental, United States

Destination
New York La Guardia, United States

Aircraft Registration
N837UA

Aircraft Type
Airbus A319

ICAO Type Designator
A319

A United Airbus A319-100, registration N837UA performing flight UA-1382 from Houston Intercontinental,TX to New York La Guardia,NY (USA) with 107 passengers and 5 crew, was accelerating for takeoff from Houston's runway 15R when the crew rejected takeoff at high speed (about 115 knots over ground), slowed and stopped on the runway. The crew reported the failure of their right hand engine (V2522), about a minute later requested fire trucks to attend to the aircraft. Airport operations reported they had heard a pop-sound and requested a runway inspection, tower approved the vehicle to enter the runway for the inspection behind the aircraft. The crew subsequently reported they had some indications and were now evacuating the aircraft. The right hand engine was seen emitting smoke. The aircraft was evacuated via slides. There were no injuries.

The FAA reported: "The crew of United Airlines Flight 1382 safely aborted its takeoff from the George Bush Intercontinental/Houston Airport in Texas due to a reported engine issue around 8:35 a.m. local time on Sunday, Feb. 2. Passengers deplaned on the runway and were bused to the terminal. The Airbus A319 was flying to LaGuardia Airport in New York. The FAA will investigate."

On Apr 28th 2026 the NTSB reported they have opened a Class 3 investigation and released their preliminary information without any factual narrative.

On Apr 29th 2026 the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

The failure of the cabin crew to activate the evacuation alarm and to maintain coordinated communication with the flight crew following the cabin crew’s decision to command an evacuation, which resulted in an engine running during the initial evacuation. Contributing to evacuation difficulties were passenger noncompliance with cabin crew instructions, including retrieving carry-on baggage, ignoring instructions to remain seated and to return items to the overhead bins, and to wait for the L2 slide to fully deploy.

The NTSB report now also includes a summary of sequence of events:

The flight crew reported no operational or air traffic control (ATC) pressures during taxi and confirmed all checklists were completed. Takeoff commenced using reduced thrust and prior to reaching V1 (138 knots), a loud bang was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), followed by an “ENG 2 FAIL” indication, and a momentary yaw to the right. After initiating a rejected takeoff, the flight crew made a passenger announcement (PA) instructing passengers to remain seated, and they brought the airplane to a complete stop on runway 15R.

The flight crew initiated the rejected takeoff checklist. Shortly thereafter, the procedure was interrupted by a call from a flight attendant (FA), who relayed that several passengers had reported observing a fire in the right engine. In response, the flight crew transitioned to the Engine Fire Checklist. Subsequent coordination with cabin crew confirmed that no smoke was present within the passenger cabin. The flight crew contacted ATC to report the situation and requested airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) assistance.

Evacuation

There were three FAs assigned to the flight: the forward FA (FM1), acting as the purser, and two aft FAs—FA2 positioned at Door 2R and FA1 positioned at Door 2L. Following the flight crew’s PA announcement instructing passengers to remain seated, both the purser and FA2 repeatedly issued verbal commands reinforcing this directive. Despite these efforts, multiple individuals began shouting, “fire on the engine, let me get out!”—specifically referring to the right engine. This triggered widespread panic among the aft-cabin passengers, many of whom stood up and began retrieving personal belongings. FA2 and the purser attempted to calm the cabin, instructing passengers to stay seated and return items to the overhead bins.

Airbus’s Cabin Crew Operating Manual (CCOM) 14-030, Evacuation Guidelines – Assessing the Outside Conditions, requires crew members to evaluate exterior conditions, ensuring the slide deployment area is free of smoke, fire, a running engine, or obstacles. According to United Airlines, in a situation where FAs must take immediate action in the interest of safety, FAs should attempt to contact the pilots prior to initiating an evacuation. However, if conditions exist where danger is obvious and imminent, or contact is not possible, flight attendants should evacuate as quickly as possible by using the appropriate commands. They must also assess conditions (look for fire or other hazards inside and outside the aircraft) and shout: “STAND BACK!” while assessing exits. If the route is usable, proceed with evacuation and then continue to assess conditions throughout the evacuation.

For a FA to detect a running engine, an FA would need to utilize auditory cues or establish contact with the flight deck. According to statements from the cabin crew, FA1 conducted an external assessment using the 2L and 2R door viewing windows and observed no smoke, fire, obstructions, or other abnormalities. The statements did not indicate whether FA1 attempted to assess whether the left engine was still operating.

FA1 next attempted to assess the interior cabin; however, passenger behavior impeded this effort. Passengers began shouting “fire,” climbing over seats, and obstructing the aisle with carry-on baggage as they moved toward the aft galley. This congestion physically prevented FA1 from accessing the economy cabin area to conduct a more complete evaluation. Additionally, three tall and large male passengers moved toward Door 2L insisting that an evacuation occur.

FA1 was forced to step back until positioned against the aft lavatory adjacent to 2L. One passenger was described as aggressive and vocal, repeatedly stating, “Open this door now!” and “We need to get out—there is a fire!” FA1 continued issuing instructions: “Please stand back and stay clear of the galley and door area. The flight attendants and pilots are assessing conditions. I need to assess conditions and can only do that if everyone remains seated.” Despite this, the passengers were described as panicked, fearful, and acting irrationally.

FA1 attempted to contact the captain via interphone but received no response. FA1 then attempted to reach the purser, also without success. With passengers escalating their attempts to reach the doors, FA1 informed FA2 that a flight attendant-initiated evacuation was necessary, and FA2 agreed. FA2 asked which side to use, and FA1 indicated the left side. FA2 moved to block door 2R while FA1 proceeded to open door 2L.

The aft FAs did not activate the evacuation alarm before or after opening the door because the passengers in the aft were already moving towards an emergency exit. The evacuation alarm serves as an auditory signal not only to passengers, but it also alerts crew that an emergency evacuation is required. Because the evacuation alarm was not activated, there was a delay in the flight crew’s awareness of the cabin evacuation which contributed to the left engine running during slide deployment.

FA1 continued issuing “stand back” commands and attempted to verify full slide deployment. However, as soon as the door opened, the three male passengers pushed past FA1 and went down the 2L slide before it had fully deployed. Immediately following their descent, the slide began to deflate. Recognizing that the slide was no longer functional, FA1 blocked the 2L exit using “exit block—stand back” commands and instructed passengers to wait, as the exit was no longer usable.

This highlights the challenges faced by cabin crews when attempting to manage passenger behavior during emergencies or perceived emergency situations, particularly when passenger fear and urgency result in disregard for crewmember authority and standard evacuation procedures. Cabin crew training emphasizes assertive command presence and passenger control during evacuations; however, this event demonstrates how rapidly escalating passenger behavior can affect evacuation dynamics even in the absence of confirmed fire or smoke conditions.

Since passengers were now visible outside the airplane on the left side and firefighters were present near their vehicles, the captain instructed the FO to initiate the evacuation checklist. Five seconds later, the purser queried the flight crew regarding deployment of the forward left door (1L) evacuation slide, and the crew confirmed the deployment. The captain indicated that when the FA communicated with him about the evacuation at 1L, they immediately started to shut down the left engine. The captain also indicated that when the 2L and 2R doors opened, without his command, the left engine was still running.

Post-incident review of airport surveillance footage confirmed the sequence of door openings, passenger egress and the erratic behavior of the 2L slide while the left engine was still running.

Critical coordination challenges can exist between flight and cabin crew during emergency scenarios, particularly regarding communication, evacuation command authority, and procedural adherence. In this incident, the failure to activate the evacuation alarm and the premature opening of doors while an engine was running, contributed to evacuation complications and potential safety risks.

With respect to the engine the NTSB reported:

Post-incident borescope inspection of the right engine revealed significant damage to the highpressure compressor (HPC) 3rd stage rotor blades, including one blade that had fractured and separated below the platform. The engine was subsequently removed and transported to United Airlines’ maintenance facility in San Francisco, California for a detailed teardown examination. This examination confirmed the blade separation and identified additional downstream impact damage, consistent with liberated blade fragments entering the gas path.

Metallurgical analysis determined that the primary fracture originated on the concave side root pressure face, approximately 0.12 inch from the leading edge, and was caused by high cycle fatigue (HCF). A secondary HCF fracture was also observed near the balance hole, with evidence of shot peening. Wear on the mid-span shrouds of adjacent blades was noted, a condition known to reduce blade engagement and increase operational stresses, contributing to crack initiation and eventual failure.

The incident blade had accumulated over 40,000 hours and 19,536 cycles since installation and although the engine was equipped with redesigned HPC 3rd stage blades per International Aero Engines (IAE), Service Bulletin (SB) 72-0487 Revision 2, intended to mitigate such failures, the incident blade still fractured and seperated. The findings indicate that despite compliance with the SB and use of improved blade design, HCF-related failure mechanisms remain a persistent risk within the V2500 engine fleet.
Aircraft Registration Data
Registration mark
N837UA
Country of Registration
United States
Date of Registration
JmqjjAqbcfmhd Subscribe to unlock
TCDS Ident. No.
Jkg d Subscribe to unlock
Manufacturer
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE
Aircraft Model / Type
A319-131
Number of Seats
Gni Subscribe to unlock
ICAO Aircraft Type
A319
Year of Manufacture
Kffj Subscribe to unlock
Serial Number
Dnig Subscribe to unlock
Aircraft Address / Mode S Code (HEX)
nlffl Subscribe to unlock
Engine Count
H Subscribe to unlock
Engine Manufacturer
Lkf Subscribe to unlock
Engine Model
Gmikpkkcfbb Subscribe to unlock
Engine Type
igpq bee Subscribe to unlock
Pounds of Thrust
Ahjnk Subscribe to unlock
Main Owner
Nnddgiefg cbhkAjkgh gmkmjhjbjmhlAqdhpdbhdggjqdfbfhjpmjkpchimcpm d eepghdifgg bendkjkh gpe e gmAckcfAqpm Subscribe to unlock
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 2, 2025

Classification
Accident

Cause
Rejected takeoff due to engine failure

Airline
United

Flight number
UA-1382

Departure
Houston Intercontinental, United States

Destination
New York La Guardia, United States

Aircraft Registration
N837UA

Aircraft Type
Airbus A319

ICAO Type Designator
A319

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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