PIA A320 at Lahore on Jan 17th 2025, landed on wrong runway

Last Update: November 8, 2025 / 14:37:13 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 17, 2025

Classification
Incident

Airline
PIA Pakistan International Airlines

Flight number
PK-150

Departure
Dammam, Saudi Arabia

Destination
Multan, Pakistan

Aircraft Registration
AP-BON

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

A PIA Pakistan International Airlines Airbus A320-200, registration AP-BON performing flight PK-150 from Dammam (Saudi Arabia) to Multan (Pakistan) with 174 passengers and 8 crew, diverted to Lahore due to weather conditions in Multan. The aircraft subsequently was cleared to land on Lahore's runway 36R but at 07:34L (02:34z) touched down on runway 36L, the lights of which were turned off, and rolled out without further incident.

The airline reported both captain and first officer were grounded pending investigation. The runway lights for runway 36L had been turned off at the time of the occurrence.

Pakistan's Bureau of Aircraft Safety Investigation Pakistan (BASIP) released their final report concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

The cause of occurrence is attributed to wrong selection of ILS frequency as both flight crew failed to monitor wrong runway selection despite number of cues available in cockpit during various stages of flight.

Contributory Factors

- Poor exhibit of PF & PM task sharing procedures by both aircrews reflecting a breakdown in CRM.

- PM failed to register ILS 36R-Z on the FMS arrival page and incorrectly selected ILS 36L-Z while preparing the diversion flight plan. Moreover, PF exhibited lack of attention while cross checking diversionary route on FMS. Additionally, PM training folder showed persistent performance issues in simulator sessions, poor understanding of the FMA and reliance on rote learning.

- Despite misalignment, both ATCOs hesitant to give “Go-Around” due to fear of punitive actions from their supervisors, reflecting a toxic safety culture.

- Supervisory deficiencies both at PIA and PAA, characterized by insufficient oversight and overreliance on subordinates, undermined safety monitoring contributed to weakened safety culture.

The BASIP analysed:

On 17 January, 2025, PK-150 stumbled upon a safety incident of landing at wrong runway at AIIAP, Lahore. PK-150 a scheduled commercial flight which operated between OEDF Dammam, Saudi Arabia, and MIAP, Multan. Due to the adverse weather conditions (heavy fog with poor visibility) at its intended destination i.e. MIAP, Multan, PK-150 diverted to AIIAP, Lahore.

Upon approach, ATC cleared the aircraft to land on RW 36R at AIIAP. However, at time 023600, the aircraft landed on RW 36L instead of RW 36R due to misalignment and landed safely without further incident.

The occurrence was analysed based on Flight Data Recorder (FDR),
Cockpit Voice recorder (CVR), Radar & Radio data, interview with aircrew, ATCOs, PIA supervisors (Director Operations, Chief of Safety, Chief Pilot Training, Sim instructor), PAA supervisors (Director Operations, COO, RFC, CNS, and DD Training CATI) and pilot training record.

Ground operations were all normal and aircraft departed Damam at 2327Z. No abnormality was reported in the aircraft. During departure at Damam, the reported visibility at Multan was 1,200 m well above ILS CAT-1 minima for landing, however while enroute at 0100Z (17 Jan, 25) the visibility at Multan rapidly dropped to 50 m due Fog. After, assessment of latest weather conditions for Multan, Karachi and Lahore and with sufficient fuel available, the Captain decided to divert to Lahore. The reported visibility for Lahore at 0100Z was 300 m RVR 400 m.

Both flight crew were medical fit to undertake subject flight. They were adequately rest with no fatigue factor and were operating with in Flight Duty Timeline (FDTL). Captain was Pilot Flying (PF) and First Officer was Pilot Monitoring (PM) for the subject flight.

Both aircrew are qualified on Crew Resource Management (CRM) training and have undergone LVP in Nov 24. However, PF had landed twice in life in actual LVP conditions besides practices simulated conditions.

Flight Operations

During planning phase, the diversion airfield were Islamabad and Karachi. However, PF decided to divert to Lahore as being close to plan landing field to facilitate passenger comfort. Moreover, PF being the captain of aircraft can change the alternate during flight as per policy. The decision seems correct while facilitating passenger comfort and company management, however, no consideration was kept in mind, that diversion increases the stress level. Selecting an alternate airfield with tougher landing conditions is contrary to safe recommended procedures. Moreover, as there was no technical anomaly reported on aircraft which require immediate or as soon as practical landing, the decision making and situation awareness of PF needs re-evaluation as it had comprised the overall safety environment.

After deciding to divert and LVP enforced at Lahore, data in FMS was fed by PM instead of PF. A clear violation of procedure by PF as it is mandatory to feed in data in FMS by PF and cross check by PM. Moreover, both pilots individually carried out FMS cross checked data but failed to recognize and could not identify the mistake (36L instead of 36R) while cues available on Navigational Display (ND).

During CVR analysis it has been observed that the handing taking over controls and radio between PF & PM was without announcing standard communication. Moreover, after offering Fajr (morning prayers) by PF till landing, it was difficult to identify who is PF or PM. A clear violation of standard communication and PF & PM task sharing procedures due relaxed cockpit environment.

Moreover, while interviewing PIA supervisors at various level, it was
analysed PIA possess various tracking system. However, PIA flight crews exhibit nonstandard communication and briefings during routine operations. Supervisors need to re-evaluate training effectiveness and ensure strict compliance with standard procedures through regular monitoring.

Wrong selection of runway by PM during FMS data feeding – It is pertinent to highlight that while carrying out HAT checks in A320 aircraft on Flight Plan Page once destination is selected OPLA and on its arrival page the 1st page indicates ILS36L-Y (109.7), ILS36L-Z (109.7) & ILS36R-Y (109.9) and on 2nd page ILS36R-Z (109.9), LOC36L-Y & LOC36L-Z

During interview with PM accepted his mistake by wrong selection of ILS frequency. The PM selected ILS36L-Z (109.7) displayed on 1st arrival page instead of ILS36R-Z (109.9) on 2nd arrival page.

PF commenced pre-descend briefing while going through FMS where number of times he announced OPLA 36R, ILS 36R Z and at one time announced ILS frequency as 109.7 which was also cross check by PM. Here there is contradiction that PF announcing ILS 36R Z whereas frequency of ILS 36L Z was selected on FMS. During interview with PF & PM, both aircrews accepted their mistake as both PF & PM failed to cross check ILS frequency during descend, approach and landing checks and could not identify from various cues available on FMS, Primary Flight Display (PFD) & ND. Failure to conduct proper checks as both pilots clearly suffered a severe loss of situational awareness. Despite correctly communicating the intended runway with ATC & among themselves, they failed to maintain awareness of their cockpit setting and the correct runway environment. Moreover, PF have been influenced (Anchoring Bias) announcing ILS frequency wrong 109.7 as he has conducted a greater number of landings on RW 25L (JIAP, Karachi) having same frequency.

Moreover, PF & PM were so engrossed in LVP brief and took considerable time to revise LVP. During LVP briefing by PF, PM was lagging and was not attentive as number of times, PF had to guide and assist him to view at right place and correct data feeding. This speaks of poor knowledge level of PM. Furthermore, they did not revise Failures and Associated actions & Airport Lighting System and Runway markings section during LVP briefing.

As there is huge difference in Airfield Lighting System (AFLS) between CAT-I & CAT-III. The CAT-III AFLS includes undershoot, Center line & Touch down zone well illuminated with high intensity lights. Both pilots failed to recognize the AFLS in RVR 700 m.

ATC Analysis – Early changed over by Approach controller assuming PK-150 fully established on Glide Slope at 10 NM as announced by PM, however, the aircraft was still turning and remained towards left of track. The changeover to Tower could have been delayed till stabilization of approach, however, as in routine, he shifted his responsibility to tower controller and continued to monitor.

Tower controller gave landing clearance to PK-150 for RW 36R at 5.6 NM which was acknowledged by PM. However, tower controller being not visual with the aircraft due poor visibility failed to monitor aircraft on Radar Screen displayed in tower until prompted by Approach controller on landline that aircraft is left of track. At this moment, the aircraft was at approx. 1.7 NM from touchdown point. Same was communicated (observed left of track) to PK-150 by tower controller. Seeing the aircraft left of track by tower controller rather than giving Go-round, the tower controller switched ON RW 36L approach light to facilitate landing. During Radio readout of approach and tower controller, it was revealed that both the Approach & tower controller were hesitant (feared) to give “Go-round” to aircraft and they were conversing in fear whether to give Go-round or not, hence, to facilitate, the tower controller switched ON the approach lights, this could have led to disastrous situation during landing roll. Seeing aircraft clearly aligned with RW 36L either of Approach or tower controller) should have given call for “Go-round”. Moreover, during such situation if Tower controller had included RW 36L in his call (“observed left of track in line with RW 36 left”) that might have alerted the flight crew to initiate “Go Around”.

During interview with both Controllers, it has been learnt that both Air Traffic Controllers were hesitating to give “Go-Round” as it has been drilled in mind that its pilot responsibility. ATCs hesitate to issue Go-Around instructions due to pressure from higher authorities, with instances of license or rating cancellations creating a culture of fear. This hesitancy to intervene during critical phases reflects systemic cultural issues and training deficiencies.

Landing Analysis – From establishing on Glide slope at 8.6 DME, till landing, both PF & PM were more focus for alignment and flight path on PFD (Glide slope). Despite ATC call “Observe left of track” did not prompted flight crew to verify with other cues available on PFD, ND and FMS, however, just kept reliance on ILS cross bar and diamonds on PFD and continued approach for landing on RW 36L.

Moreover, PM announced field insight at distance of 0.5 NM (3,000 ft) from threshold, whereas, PF did not announce anything. It’s a clear violation by PM as it is mandatory to be heads down during CAT-III landing and keep rechecking all parameters.

Both aircrew realized that they landed on wrong R/W at end of landing roll. The aircraft touchdown left half of R/W 36L (Nose wheel approximate 47 ft from centreline whereas the left wheel touchdown approximately 59.5 ft), thus leaving margin error of approximate 15 ft from R/W edge. Moreover, the aircraft carried out CAT-III B ILS Approach in Auto Land Mode on CAT-I ILS capability, any deviation could have been catastrophic (182 souls on board).

During review of pilot training folders, all entries are made in blue ink pen and it was difficult to find out weak areas. Moreover, some grade slips are not filled properly by sim instructors as they have marked SB (satisfactory with Brief) against specific exercises, however, failed to describe in writing exact weak area.

Metars Multan:
OPMT 180400Z 00000KT 0150 FG BKN100 11/10 Q1020 BECMG 0250=
OPMT 180330Z 00000KT 0100 FG VV/// 10/09 Q1019 NOSIG=
OPMT 180300Z 00000KT 0100 FG VV/// 10/09 Q1019 NOSIG=
OPMT 180200Z 00000KT 0050 FG VV/// 10/10 Q1018 TEMPO 0100=
OPMT 180100Z 00000KT 0010 FG VV/// 10/09 Q1018 NOSIG=
OPMT 172355Z 00000KT 0010 FG VV/// 10/09 Q1018 NOSIG=
OPMT 172300Z 00000KT 0150 FG VV/// 10/09 Q1018 BECMG 0100=
OPMT 172200Z 00000KT 0800 FG BKN100 10/09 Q1019 TEMPO 0600=

Metars Lahore:
OPLA 180425Z 00000KT 0600 R36/1100U R18/1400U BR SCT040 SCT100 11/09 Q1020 BECMG 0800 BR RMK RMID/1400U QFE995 A30.14=
OPLA 180355Z 00000KT 0500 R36/1000N R18/1100D FG SCT040 SCT100 10/09 Q1019 BECMG 0600 FG RMK RMID/1200D QFE994 A30.11=
OPLA 180325Z 00000KT 0500 R36/1000D R18/1700U FG SCT040 SCT100 09/08 Q1019 BECMG 0600 FG RMK RMID/1700U QFE993 A30.10=
OPLA 180310Z 23003KT 0350 R36/1100U R18/1300U FG SCT050 SCT100 08/07 Q1020 BECMG 0500 FG RMK RMID/1400U QFE994 A30.12=
OPLA 180255Z 29004KT 0500 R36/0750U R18/1300N FG SCT050 SCT100 08/07 Q1020 NOSIG RMK RMID/0800D QFE994 A30.12=
OPLA 180225Z 27003KT 0600 R36/065D R18/1300D FG SCT050 SCT100 08/06 Q1019 NOSIG RMK RMID/0900D QFE993 A30.10=
OPLA 180155Z 36004KT 0800 R36/1300U R18/1600D FG FEW050 BKN100 07/06 Q1019 BECMG 0500 FG RMK RMID/P2000 QFE993 A30.09=
OPLA 180125Z 24005KT 1000 R36/1000D R18/1900D BR FEW050 BKN100 07/06 Q1019 BECMG 0600 FG RMK RMID/1200D QFE993 A30.09=
OPLA 180055Z 26004KT 1500 R36/1300D R18/P2000 BR FEW050 BKN100 08/06 Q1018 BECMG 0800 FG RMK RMID/1400D QFE992 A30.07=
OPLA 180025Z 30004KT 1500 R36/1900D R18/P2000 BR FEW050 BKN100 08/06 Q1018 BECMG 0800 FG RMK RMID/P2000 QFE992 A30.06=
OPLA 172355Z 24004KT 2000 BR FEW050 BKN100 08/06 Q1018 BECMG 1000 BR RMK QFE992 A30.06=
OPLA 172325Z 25003KT 2500 BR FEW050 BKN100 08/06 Q1018 BECMG 1500 BR RMK QFE992 A30.06=
OPLA 172255Z 29003KT 3000 BR FEW050 BKN100 09/06 Q1018 BECMG 1500 BR RMK QFE992 A30.06=
OPLA 172225Z 21003KT 3500 BR FEW050 SCT100 09/06 Q1018 BECMG 3000 BR RMK QFE992 A30.07=
OPLA 172155Z 18004KT 4000 FU SCT100 09/06 Q1018 NOSIG RMK QFE992 A30.06=