Scoot B789 at Singapore on Feb 5th 2024, landed on occupied runway

Last Update: December 17, 2024 / 16:47:25 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Scoot Airlines 9V-OJH, Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner — Scoot Airlines 9V-OJH, Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner (Photo credit: 湯小沅 / Flickr / License: Public Domain Dedication (CC0))

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Feb 5, 2024

Classification
Report

Airline
Scoot Airlines

Flight number
TR-189

Departure
Hangzhou, China

Destination
Singapore, Singapore

Aircraft Registration
9V-OJH

Aircraft Type
Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner

ICAO Type Designator
B789

A Scoot Boeing 787-9, registration 9V-OJH performing flight TR-189 (dep Feb 4th) from Hangzhou (China) to Singapore (Singapore) with 354 people on board, was cleared to land on runway 02C and continued for a landing without further incident.

A Korean Airlines Boeing 787-9, registration HL7209 performing flight KE-647 from Seoul (South Korea) to Singapore (Singapore) with 106 people on board, had landed on runway 02C just prior to 9V-OJH and was vacating the runway via high speed turnoff T6. The aircraft was still not clear of the runway and beyond the hold short line when 9V-OJH crossed the runway threshold.

Singapore's AIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were:

- The RWC’s (Runway Controller's) issuance of landing clearance to Aircraft B (9V-OJH) was in line with the ATSP’s procedures.

- The RWC did not cancel the landing clearance for Aircraft B despite the runway incursion. This was not in line with the ATSM procedures.

The AIB summarized the decisive sequence of events:

At 0435:47 hrs, after observing that Aircraft A had taxied onto RET T6 and was in contact with the GMC, the RWC issued clearance for another Boeing 787-9 (Aircraft B), which was about 2nm away from the runway threshold, to land on Runway 02C. At this point, Aircraft A was still in motion, taxiing on RET T6 and had yet to cross the runway holding position marking on RET T6 Exit A. The RWC issued the landing clearance to Aircraft B in anticipation that Aircraft A would soon have vacated from RET T6 onto Taxiway T (please see para 1.9.1.1 for the procedures of the air traffic services provider (ATSP))

At 0436:37 hrs, the RWC and GMC verbally mentioned that Aircraft A appeared to have stopped on RET T6 close to the runway holding position marking on RET T6 Exit B. According to the RWC, at that instant, Aircraft B was over the threshold of Runway 02C. According to the PF of Aircraft A, as the aircraft arrived at the Exit A and Exit B bifurcation, the PF heard the PM calling out for the aircraft to be stopped. The PM made the call after assessing that there was insufficient clearance (i.e. manoeuvre space) for the aircraft to turn into Exit A. The PF stopped the aircraft as per the PM’s callout, in accordance with the operator’s crew resource management policy.

Even though the RWC was aware that Aircraft A had come to a stop and was unable to vacate RET T6, the RWC did not cancel Aircraft B’s landing clearance and instruct Aircraft B to go around. The RWC’s considerations were as follows:

- The tail of Aircraft A was clear of the runway and there was no immediate obstruction that would interfere with Aircraft B's landing; and

- Aircraft B was already over the threshold of Runway 02C and the RWC believed that it would be safer to allow Aircraft B to continue landing instead of instructing it to go around as it was in a critical operating phase for Aircraft B’s flight crew which was documented as a note in the ATSM.

After Aircraft B had landed, the RWC instructed Aircraft B to vacate the runway via RET T4.