India A20N at Goa on Dec 5th 2024, rejected takeoff from taxiway

Last Update: April 28, 2025 / 17:03:12 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Dec 5, 2024

Classification
Incident

Airline
Air India

Flight number
AI-2592

Departure
Goa Manohar, India

Destination
Hyderabad, India

Aircraft Registration
VT-EXT

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320-200N

ICAO Type Designator
A20N

An Air India Airbus A320-200N, registration VT-EXT performing flight AI-2592 from Goa Manohar to Hyderabad (India), was taxiing for an intersection departure from runway 28 at A5 via taxiway E when the crew turned onto taxiway A instead of the runway and initiated takeoff. The aircraft had accelerated to about 108 knots over ground when the crew rejected takeoff upon ATC instruction. After slowing to taxi speed the aircraft turned onto runway 10 via taxiway A2 and vacated the runway via A4 to return to the apron.

The flight was cancelled.

India's DGCA have opened an investigation into the serious incident.

The occurrence aircraft returned to service the following morning after about 8.5 hours on the ground in Goa.

India's AIB reported the aircraft received takeoff clearance from an intersection, however, began the takeoff run on a taxiway. Tower cancelled the takeoff clearance, the crew rejected takeoff at 124 KIAS. The occurrence was rated a serious incident.

On Apr 28th 2025 India's AIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

- Situational Awareness Deficit: The issuance of “Take-off clearance” by ATC likely caused the crew’s cognitive focus to shift entirely toward executing the Take-off. This shift may have diminished their situational awareness, resulting in expectation bias or cognitive overload, which prevented them from recognizing the visual cues indicating they were at the TWY intersection instead of RWY intersection.

- Both Take-off clearance was issued by ATC and TAKEOFF checks completed by crew on TWY ‘E’ near TWY intersection.

Note: If Take-off clearance had been issued by ATC on TWY ‘A5’ leading to RWY28, and the crew had initiated the Take-off checks upon reaching the designated holding point, it might have provided an additional layer of defence against this incident.

- The flight crew did not fully adhere to the ATC taxi instructions and failed to enter TWY ‘A5’ before lining up. If the crew had completed the taxi instructions and properly entered TWY ‘A5’ before turning for LINEUP, the incident could have been avoided.

Contributory factors:

- The airport is not equipped with an Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) which might have improved situational awareness for ATC with this topography.

- The PM was busy with head down as he was trying to login on EFB to bring the display back to ON mode to initiate the LINEUP checklist and did not check the departure RWY when PIC was incorrectly lining up on Taxiway A.

The AIB analysed (quoted in its entirety):

The analysis was carried out based on the available evidence such as Crew & Controllers Statements, ATC Tape Transcript, DFDR and CVR data of AIC2592.

- The incident occurred during the night with visibility 3000m.

- The airport navigation signage, markings and lighting were serviceable as per standard.

- There was no miscommunication or readback error.

- It was an intersection departure.

- The Crew had rest as per the FDTL scheme.

- The PIC was PF whereas FO was PM

- There was no Miscommunication in cockpit.

- There was no flight delay.

- As per CVR the crew were not in hurry or pressure.

- It was not a training flight.

- Crew coordination and CRM were found to be highly effective.

- No aircraft or vehicle was reported on TWY ‘A’ during the Take-off roll.

- Any time during Taxi the Ground speed did not exceed 15 Kts as per FDR.

- CM1 is P1 with ~23,000hrs total experience and ~16,000hrs PIC on Airbus 320 family. CM2 is a First Officer with total experience of ~140:08 hrs on Airbus 320 family.

- The PM was distracted by the EFB login issue and pre-Take-off tasks and therefore was head down. It leads to critical oversight in identifying the correct RWY.

- On receiving Take-off clearance by ATC there was rushing through pre-Take-off checks by the flight crew.

- The crew did not cross-check visual aids to identify RWY28 before initiating Take-off roll on TWY ‘A’ as per procedure.

- Take-off clearance was issued and confirmed by the crew when the aircraft