Gazpromavia SU95 near Moscow on Jul 12th 2024, lost height coming out of maintenance
Last Update: July 25, 2025 / 19:49:22 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jul 12, 2024
Classification
Crash
Airline
Gazpromavia
Departure
Lukhovitsy Airfield, Russia
Destination
Moscow Vnukovo, Russia
Aircraft Registration
RA-89049
Aircraft Type
SUKHOI Superjet 100-95
ICAO Type Designator
SU95
The aircraft had been in maintenance in Lukhovitsy and was on its first flight following maintenance. The crew transmitted a distress signal.
Ground observers reported the aircraft took off and fell followed by an explosion on the ground.
Russia's Press Agency TASS reported that preliminary information by emergency services suggests the aircraft had suffered engine (SaM146) failure.
Moscow's Transport Prosecution Office have opened an investigation into the crash.
Russia's Civil Aviation Authority Rosaviatsia confirmed a SU95 crashed near Moscow, the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC aka MAK) is investigating the occurrence. In the late evening Rosaviatsia added, that both black boxes have been found.
Russia's Ministry of Transport (Rosaviatransnador) stated, that the crashed aircraft had no permission to fly.
The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC/MAK) reported they have formed a commission to investigate the crash, the commission has already started working.
The aircraft had undergone major maintenance and had positioned to Lukhovitsy on May 3rd 2024 and had not flown since.
On Jul 13th 2024 Gazpromavia reported the aircraft had been in a C-Check, additional periodical checks and additional works were to be carried out as well and was on a test flight.
On Jul 13th 2024 an official of Rosaviatsia stated, that the aircraft was flying in accordance with the filed flight plan, in accordance with received application and approved by operational bodies of the United Air Traffic Management System along the route Lukhovitsy to Vnukovo.
On Jul 13th 2024 the MAK reported that the blackboxes had been delivered to the MAK. The recorders had been exposed to temperature, suffered signficant mechanical damage and needed repairs. After the repair the data have successfully been read out and are now being prepared for decoding and analysis.
On Jul 16th 2024 it became known, that on Jul 14th 2024 the aircraft manufacturer had released a letter (see below) reminding operators of the "the need to strictly comply with the requirements of the manual when replacing angle of attack sensors (25-T341,26-T341,23-T341,24-T341)." further reiterating: "During dismantling and installation of the angle of attack sensor pay special attention to aligning the holes and marks on the overlay with the mark on the fuselage skin and re-install the overlay only on the place of the fuselage skin from which it came from during removal." and urges operators to double check installations as well as avoid situations where one mechanics would replace more than one angle of attack sensor on the same aircraft.
On Jul 22nd 2024 the MAK reported:
The crew, consisting of the aircraft commander, second pilot and flight attendant, was flying from Lukhovitsy airfield (Tretyakovo) to the base airfield Vnukovo (Moscow) after performing periodic maintenance by the PAO UAC branch – LAZ named after P.A. Voronin.
The autothrottle was engaged before takeoff. The autopilot was engaged after takeoff at a true altitude of 550 feet. In the fifth minute of the flight, from a virtually level flight at a QNH altitude of 5160 feet (pitch angle values were 5-6 degrees to pitch up, recorded angles of attack were 10-11 degrees), the aircraft began to descend with a pitch angle of up to 4 degrees to dive. At the moment of transition to descent, the indicated airspeed was 200 knots and increasing, synchronous retraction of the flaps and slats to the fully retracted position occurred.
During the descent, the autopilot and autothrottle were disconnected. The crew switched to manual control of the side stick and engines. The descent continued to an altitude of 4,500 feet, with a subsequent climb to 4,750 feet.
In the sixth minute of the flight at a speed of 320 knots (the OVERSPEED sound signal was on), the aircraft began to descend with an increase in the pitch angle to a dive. The descent could not be stopped by the crew despite full backwards (up) deflection of the side stick.
Flight parameters recording ceased at 14:59:15, last recorded parameter values: indicated airspeed – 365 knots, vertical descent rate – 17,000 ft/min, pitch angle – 25 degrees to nose-down, bank angle – 25 degrees to the right. Power plants operated until parameters recording ceased.
On Jul 29th 2024 it became known, that Rosaviatsia had asked Gazpromavia to stop using one of their SU95s, tail number RA-89029, after inspections of the maintenance facilities at Lukhovitsy. The facility had won contracts to provide C-Checks to two Gazpromavia SU95s, one of which was the crashed one. The work on that second aircraft began on Mar 20th 2024 and ended on May 6th 2024, however, measurements on play of rudders and elevators had not been fully performed and the test results were not recorded. Besides several more such violations of maintenance procedures it was also found, that the works were supervised by an unqualified employee.
The crash site is about 16nm past the runway 28 end at Lukhovitsy in approximate runway direction.
On Aug 30th 2024 the MAK released their preliminary report in Russian reporting the flight was approved, pre-flight preparations were normal and showed no deficiency. The aircraft departed normally. During climb, after flaps were retracted from position 2 to position 1, the crew received a "NAV ADS DISAGREE" and "SPEED DISAGREE" message and a chime, verified their speed indications to be the same (190 KIAS) and decided to continue the flight. The NAV ADS DISAGREE and SPEED DISAGREE messages cleared and reoccurred about 20 times - if the speed between the three ADS sources differs beyond a threshold, the message is signalled and removed when the difference reduces below the threshold again. The aircraft levelled off at 5000 feet in accordance with ATC clearances.
While maintaining level at 5000 feet with a pitch angle between 5 and 6 degrees nose up, the Air Data Computer 1 (ADC1) indicated an angle of attack (AoA) of 10-11.5 degrees and ADC2 of 11-13.5 degrees.
The target speed was set to 230 KIAS, the flaps were set to 0, the crew received clearance to climb to 10,000 feet and set the autopilot to CLB mode. The thrust was set and stable. The aircraft initially reacted, a vertical acceleration of +1.15G occurred, however, did not climb. The stabilizer changed at a constant speed from 3.2 degrees to 0.5 degrees and remained between 0 and 0.8 degrees until impact with terrain.
While the aircraft was descending, the first officer, pilot flying, puzzled about the descent when the aircraft should be climbing, deflected the controls nose up at 13.7 degrees, which disconnected the autopilot. The captain took control of the aircraft. Having accelerated to 270 KIAS the available angle of attack permitted the captain to temporarily arrest the descent after reaching 4500 feet and initiated a slow climb. Autothrust was switched off which had maintained 270 KIAS. The crew adjusted thrust manually, the aircraft accelerated to 308 KIAS prompting an overspeed warning, the overspeed warning continued until impact. At 4600 feet and 280 KIAS the captain announced "unreliable speed" acknowledged and confirmed by the first officer. The captain instructed the first officer to radio unreliable airspeed to ATC, however, the first officer had not switched the radios so that neither ATC (Domodedovo or Lukhovitsy) could hear that transmission.
According to the logic, due to the speed increase beyond limit, the system initiated a nose up and automatic deployment of speed brakes, however, the speed did not reduce due to the engine thrust. The speed brakes caused the climb to stop, the aircraft approximately maintained altitude at about 4800 feet, the speed brakes however also required an increase in angle of attack. Although the controls were manually deflected to command a nose up attitude, the elevator deflected nose down due to an active defense against excessive AoA. The speed brakes were fully retracted and remained in that position until impact. The throttles were moved to TOGA and later to idle where they remained until impact.
Descending through 3000 feet GPWS alerts sounded including "Terrain! Terrain!" and "Pull up! Pull up!". The pilots commanded a maximum nose up, however, the elevators did not follow their command. The FDR last recorded values of 365 KIAS, -25 degrees pitch, and 25 degrees bank to the right.
The MAK reports that the SU95 has a number of protections including a defense against excessive angle of attack.
During earlier maintenance between March and May 2024 two AoA sensors were replaced. Before the maintenance the AoA sensors were showing around 0 degrees during the takeoff run until about 60 KIAS when AoA1 suddenly jumped to 7.2 degrees, while AoA2 and AoA3 remained around 0. The crew at that flight selected ADC3 and safely completed their flight. That maintenance is being looked into by the investigation, too.
Immediate Safety actions have been taken including ensuring proper mounting of the AoA sensors. A bulletin is being prepared for pilots to handle a situation where the stall protection activates based on incorrect AoA data from two or more channels.
On Jul 25th 2025 the MAK released their final report in Russian only (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Russian only release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe). The report concludes the probable causes of the crash were:
The accident with the RRJ-95LR-100 RA-89049 aircraft occurred during the day, in visual meteorological conditions, during the flight to the home airfield after its maintenance, as a result of the aircraft going into a descent and subsequent collision with the ground surface.
The aircraft's descent was caused by the activation and simultaneous operation of the remote control system protection functions for maximum flight speed and angle of attack.
Activation of the speed protection function became possible as a result of exceeding the indicated airspeed limitation by the crew due to the uncertainty of the special situation that had arisen in flight, which was expressed in the absence of the expected aircraft response to the crew's control actions, inflated angles of attack values that did not correspond to the indicated speed values, and in the absence of recommendations to the flight crew on actions to take in the event of a ROV failure (not provided for in the Consolidated List of Special Situations of the RRJ-95 aircraft).
The angle of attack limitation function was activated due to the consolidated angle of attack value reaching the limit of its operation due to unreliable (inflated) readings of the angles of attack of the two main air data systems.
Inaccurate readings of the aircraft angles of attack were the result of mixing up the linings of the angle-of-attack sensors of the left and right sides of the aircraft during their dismantling/installation as a result of violating the requirements of the RRJ-95 Technical Operation Manual during aircraft maintenance at an aircraft repair facility.
Aircraft Registration Data
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jul 12, 2024
Classification
Crash
Airline
Gazpromavia
Departure
Lukhovitsy Airfield, Russia
Destination
Moscow Vnukovo, Russia
Aircraft Registration
RA-89049
Aircraft Type
SUKHOI Superjet 100-95
ICAO Type Designator
SU95
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