Batik B738 at Canberra on Jun 14th 2024, descended below minimum safe altitude
Last Update: June 17, 2025 / 09:01:25 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jun 14, 2024
Classification
Incident
Airline
Batik Air
Flight number
ID-6015
Departure
Denpasar, Indonesia
Destination
Canberra, Australia
Aircraft Registration
PK-LDK
Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800
ICAO Type Designator
B738
Australia's ATSB rated the occurrence a serious incident and opened an investigation stating:
The ATSB is investigating a flight below minimum altitude involving a Boeing 737-800, registered PK-LDK, about 19 km south of Canberra Airport, Australian Capital Territory, on 14 June 2024. The aircraft was operated by Batik Air as flight ID 6015, scheduled from Denpasar, Indonesia to Canberra.
During an instrument landing system approach into Canberra, the crew elected to hold at the waypoint MOMBI. During the holding, the aircraft was operated below the minimum holding altitude.
On Sep 4th 2024 the ATSB released their preliminary report summarizing the sequence of events:
On the evening of 13 June 2024, a Batik Air Boeing 737-800, registered PK-LDK, departed Denpasar International Airport, Indonesia for the inaugural passenger transport flight of a new service to Canberra, Australian Capital Territory. The captain was acting as pilot flying, and the first officer was acting as pilot monitoring. A second captain was also on board, acting as a relief crewmember, occupying the flight deck jump seat located behind the flight crew during the arrival and approach.
As the aircraft climbed to the cruising level of flight level 350 the crew input forecast winds, which included strong tailwinds, into the aircraft’s flight management computer. The crew noted that the estimated time of arrival into Canberra was prior to 0600 local time on 14 June, when Canberra Tower and Approach air traffic control began providing services for the day (see the section titled Canberra Tower and Approach). The crew elected to continue to Canberra without any en route delays and prepared for an arrival without those air traffic control services, using the Canberra Airport common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF).
As the aircraft descended towards Canberra in darkness, the flight was cleared by air traffic control (ATC) to track via the waypoint AVBEG direct to Canberra Airport and to descend to FL120. During the descent, the flight crew prepared to conduct the AVBEG 5A standard arrival route (STAR) but did not make a request to track via the STAR to the Melbourne Centre air traffic controller managing the airspace.
At 0541 local time, as the aircraft approached AVBEG, ATC cleared the crew to leave controlled airspace descending. The aircraft crossed AVBEG while descending below FL205 and commenced tracking via the AVBEG 5A STAR. The Melbourne Centre air traffic controller identified that the Batik flight was deviating from the cleared track (direct to Canberra) and noted that the aircraft was descending toward a restricted area.
The controller did not query the flight crew’s deviation, but asked the crew if they were going to remain clear of the restricted area. The crew advised the controller that they were tracking via the AVBEG 5A STAR (see the section titled AVBEG 5A standard arrival route and restricted areas). The controller acknowledged the tracking advice and instructed the crew to maintain 10,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) to remain above the restricted area. After receiving this instruction, the flight crew became uncertain as to whether the aircraft would be operating within, or outside of, controlled airspace during the STAR and approach.
The crew levelled the aircraft at 10,000 ft AMSL with the autopilot engaged and the aircraft passed over the restricted airspace. As was required by ATC procedures, the controller waited until the aircraft was observed to be more than 2.5 NM past the restricted area before instructing the crew to continue the descent to leave controlled airspace. The crew responded by advising that they would descend and continue tracking via the STAR. At about this time, the crew noted that the aircraft was about 1,300 ft above the desired descent profile for the arrival.
At 0551, the crew requested ATC clearance to conduct the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 35 at Canberra. The controller responded by advising that the Canberra control tower was closed and that CTAF procedures applied for that airspace. At 0551:38, the aircraft descended below 8,500 ft AMSL, outside controlled airspace (class G).
As the aircraft was higher than the desired flightpath, the captain decided to conduct a holding pattern at the approach waypoint of MOMBI to reduce altitude and the first officer requested ATC clearance to hold at MOMBI. The controller responded by providing traffic information for the MOMBI holding pattern. The crew then again requested clearance for the ILS approach and the controller responded by advising that clearance was not required and that the crew must broadcast their intentions on the Canberra CTAF.
At 0553:10, the aircraft passed the arrival waypoint MENZI (Figure 2) while descending below 6,720 ft AMSL and soon after made another request to hold at MOMBI. The controller provided traffic information for the hold and requested that the crew make a right-hand orbit to remain clear of the restricted airspace, now to the west of the aircraft.
As the aircraft approached MOMBI, the captain entered 5,400 ft AMSL (the approach’s minimum safe altitude before intercepting the ILS glideslope) into the autopilot mode control panel (MCP) and at 0554:15, the aircraft descended below the minimum holding altitude of 5,600 ft AMSL (see the section titled Instrument landing system approach) before levelling at 5,400 ft AMSL.
The captain then used the heading select function to make a right turn to a heading of 170°3 and the aircraft commenced turning prior to crossing MOMBI. At 0554:30, the aircraft passed MOMBI at a speed of 172 kt (2 kt above the maximum speed for the 5,600 ft AMSL minimum holding altitude).
The captain then asked the first officer to enter a holding pattern into the aircraft’s flight management system (FMS) at MOMBI. As the aircraft had already passed MOMBI, the waypoint had dropped off the FMS track and the first officer was required to manually re-enter the waypoint into the FMS planned track. As the turn continued, the speed reduced below 170 kt, the captain selected 4,700 ft AMSL (the crew’s intended MOMBI crossing altitude) on the autopilot MCP and the aircraft commenced descending to that altitude. During this time, the Melbourne Centre controller did not identify that the aircraft was operating below the minimum holding altitude of 5,600 ft AMSL.
The aircraft turned to a heading of 170° and continued descending until levelling at 4,700 ft AMSL at 0555:59. As the aircraft tracked south, the incoming Canberra Approach air traffic controller prepared to take control of the Approach airspace (see the section titled Canberra airspace) and commenced a handover with the Melbourne Centre controller.
The aircraft continued south and at 0556:25, proceeded beyond the 14 distance measuring equipment (DME) limit for the 5,600 ft AMSL minimum holding altitude. At or before that DME limit, an inbound turn back to MOMBI needed to be commenced, or the minimum holding altitude increased to 6,000 ft AMSL. By that time, the first officer had completed re-entering MOMBI into the FMS and the captain then used the lateral navigation autopilot mode to commence a right turn toward the waypoint.
As the aircraft was turning back toward MOMBI, at 0556:58, the incoming Canberra Approach controller completed their handover with the Melbourne Centre controller and took over the airspace and the Melbourne Centre radio frequency that the aircraft was using (this frequency then became a Canberra Approach frequency).
At the same time, the Canberra Tower air traffic controller preparing to commence the tower service observed that the aircraft was operating below the minimum holding altitude and made multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact the crew on the Canberra CTAF frequency. As the Canberra Tower controller did not have a direct means of communication with the Melbourne Centre controller, the Tower controller contacted a Melbourne Approach controller to relay their concerns to the Melbourne Centre controller.
The aircraft continued turning toward MOMBI (Figure 3) and as it crossed over the eastern slopes of Mount Campbell at 0557:46, the recorded radio height reduced to a minimum of 924 ft above ground level. At 0558:21, the aircraft rejoined the ILS approach.
The Melbourne Approach controller contacted the Melbourne Centre controller to relay the Tower controller’s concerns about the aircraft’s altitude and the Melbourne Centre controller responded by advising that the airspace was now being controlled by Canberra Approach.
At about the same time, the Canberra Approach controller also identified that the aircraft was operating below the minimum altitude. The controller contacted the crew to provide a safety alert and asked the crew if they were ‘visual’. The crew responded advising that they were ‘visual with the runway’ and continued the approach. The aircraft landed at 0602 without further incident.
The ATSB reported the captain was an instructor pilot (ATPL, 10508 hours total, 7,772 on type) by the airline, the first officer (CPL, 6,843 hours total, 6,688 hours on type), and the relief captain in the observer's seat (ATPL, 11,295 hours total, 11,108 hours on type) and added: "From 1998 to 2010, the captain was a pilot in the Indonesian military and, in that role, had conducted operations in uncontrolled airspace. In 2010, the captain commenced employment with Batik Air’s parent company Lion Air and moved to Batik Air in 2013. From 2010, the captain had not undertaken any flights within uncontrolled airspace. The first officer and relief captain reported having no experience operating in uncontrolled airspace. All crewmembers had previously operated flights to Australian destinations."
The ATSB reported the airline implemented a number of safety actions already:
Following the occurrence, Batik Air implemented several safety actions:
- The Canberra Airport flight crew briefing document was revised to include more detailed information on Canberra air traffic control hours, common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) procedures, holding requirements and guidance for adherence to lowest safe altitude requirements.
- Internal flight crew notices were also issued to highlight the importance of a comprehensive approach briefing, adherence to air traffic control instructions and altitude awareness. These notices also provided information on CTAF and traffic information by aircraft (TIBA) procedures and highlighted the additional risks and absent protections when operating in non-controlled airspace. Details of this incident were also disseminated to all flight crew and Batik Air conducted a special flight crew briefing with event details and lessons.
- Batik Air also adjusted the flight schedule for the Denpasar to Canberra flight (ID6015) to ensure that arrivals occur during Canberra Tower and Approach air traffic control operating hours.
On Jun 17th 2025 the ATSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
Contributing factors
- While descending and tracking direct toward Canberra in controlled airspace, the flight crew were provided with a clearance to leave the controlled airspace by continuing to descend on that track. The flight crew then deviated from the cleared track by commencing the AVBEG 5A standard arrival route (STAR).
- The air traffic controller did not advise the flight crew of the track deviation or provide a safety alert but provided altitude instructions to maintain separation from a restricted area (a separation built into the AVBEG 5A STAR). This intervention resulted in the aircraft becoming higher than the desired descent profile and the crew becoming confused regarding the airspace classification for the arrival and approach.
- The aircraft passed the initial approach fix for the instrument landing system approach about 680 ft higher than the glideslope and the flight crew intended to use the holding pattern at the approach waypoint of MOMBI to reduce altitude. However, the holding pattern was not correctly flown, and the aircraft was manoeuvred significantly below the minimum safe altitude. The approach was then recommenced from an altitude about 700 ft below the minimum altitude.
- The Canberra common traffic advisory frequency was not selected by the flight crew, and the appropriate radio broadcasts were not made. This prevented the crew from receiving the oncoming Canberra tower air traffic controller's safety alerts, being able to illuminate the runway lights and increased the risk of conflict with other traffic.
- Batik Air's change management processes were not effective at fully identifying and mitigating the risks associated with the commencement of the Denpasar to Canberra route. (Safety issue)
Other factors that increased risk
- Batik Air did not ensure that flight crew completed all common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) training prior to them operating flights into Australia where the use of these procedures could be required. (Safety issue)
- During a 2022 review of Canberra runway 35 instrument landing system approaches, an obstacle evaluation error led to Airservices Australia increasing the MOMBI holding pattern minimum altitude from 5,100 ft to 5,600 ft. This increase resulted in a transition from the holding pattern to the approach glideslope that increased risk of unstable approaches and sudden pitch ups.
- After conducting a revalidation test flight of the holding pattern minimum altitude increase, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority advised Airservices Australia that the increased minimum altitude did not provide an appropriate transition to the approach glideslope and recommended modifications to the holding pattern design. Despite Airservices Australia receiving this advice, no changes were made and the increased minimum holding altitude was maintained.
- The Melbourne Centre air traffic controller providing the flight information service for the aircraft was not, and was not required to be, aware of the holding pattern minimum altitudes. Therefore, the controller did not issue a safety alert when the aircraft descended below the minimum safe altitude.
The ATSB analysed:
Deviation from clearance and controller response
While en route to Canberra, the flight crew were provided with a tracking clearance from the waypoint AVBEG direct to Canberra Airport and instructed to leave controlled airspace by descending below the 8,500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) controlled airspace base along that track.
The crew’s normal practice for arrivals was to use a standard arrival route (STAR), and they prepared for the arrival at Canberra using the AVBEG 5A STAR. However, the crew did not request or receive a clearance to descend via the STAR and with Canberra Approach air traffic control (ATC) services not yet active, this clearance could not have been provided. Therefore, when the aircraft crossed AVBEG and commenced tracking via the STAR, it deviated from the provided clearance.
From AVBEG, this STAR deviated from the aircraft’s cleared track by turning south and crossed restricted areas R430A, B and C. The AVBEG 5A STAR included a 10,000 ft AMSL descent limitation until past the waypoint LANYO to ensure that crew using the STAR did not enter the uppermost of these restricted areas. The descent clearance for the direct track provided to the crew did not have a descent restriction and the controller was unaware that the AVBEG 5A STAR included a descent restriction to prevent the aircraft entering the restricted areas. Therefore, the controller was required to issue a safety alert as it appeared to them that the aircraft’s deviation would take the aircraft into the active restricted areas. However, at that time, the controller had only recently taken over management of the airspace and was unsure if the crew were deviating from the cleared route, or if a clearance had been provided which hadn’t been correctly entered in the air traffic control system and was therefore not visible to the controller. Additionally, the controller noted that the aircraft was still 17 NM from the restricted area and therefore, instead of advising the crew of the clearance deviation and issuing a safety alert, the controller intervened by issuing a descent altitude restriction.
The crew believed that they were correctly following the AVBEG 5A STAR into non-controlled airspace and when they received the descent restriction from the controller, they became confused as to whether the approach would be conducted within, or outside of, controlled airspace. Despite the controller stating that the approach would take place outside of controlled airspace and that clearances were not required for the manoeuvring associated with the approach, the crew remained confused and made several clearance requests when operating in non-controlled airspace. This confusion was only resolved when Canberra Approach and Tower services commenced, and the approach continued using those services.
A ‘safety alert’ is designed to alert crews to safety critical information to ensure a response is prioritised. The controller’s decision not to issue the safety alert and not to alert the crew to the deviation were missed opportunities to draw the crew’s attention to the situation and may have helped avoid the later confusion about the airspace classification.
Furthermore, the controller needed to wait until the aircraft was observed to be 2.5 NM beyond the restricted area before further descent clearances could be provided and by the time this clearance was issued, the aircraft was about 1,300 ft above the desired STAR profile.
Descent below minimum altitude
Incorrectly flown holding pattern
Following the controller’s descent clearance after crossing the restricted area, the crew did not re-establish the desired descent profile prior to commencing the approach.
Consequently, the aircraft passed the instrument landing system approach’s initial approach fix waypoint MENZI about 680 ft higher than the glideslope and the captain decided to use the approach holding pattern at MOMBI to descend to the desired descent profile. This decision was made late during the arrival and the crew did not identify that the holding pattern minimum altitude (5,600 ft) was unusual in being significantly higher than the waypoint glideslope crossing altitude (4,760 ft). As a result, the captain referenced the 4,760 ft AMSL glideslope crossing altitude for MOMBI and selected 4,700 ft for the holding altitude.
The crew also did not begin to enter the pattern into the flight management system until after MOMBI had already dropped from the programmed track. As a result, the first officer had to manually enter the holding waypoint. When entering the holding waypoint, the first officer did not enter minimum altitude constraints associated with the holding pattern.
While the first officer entered the holding waypoint, the captain used the heading select function and altitude window to enter the holding pattern. In doing so, the captain did not adhere to several holding pattern requirements. The turn to enter the pattern commenced prior to the aircraft crossing MOMBI resulting in less distance being available to complete the outbound leg of the holding pattern. The maximum speed for the 5,600 ft minimum altitude was marginally exceeded and the aircraft then descended below the 5,600 ft minimum altitude to the commanded altitude of 4,700 ft. As the pattern continued, the inbound turn to MOMBI then did not commence until after the aircraft had proceeded beyond the 14 DME limit. As the aircraft was operating below both the 6,000 ft minimum altitude of the non-distance restricted holding pattern and the 7,500 ft 25 NM minimum safe altitude, obstacle and terrain clearance was not assured.
As the aircraft turned toward back toward MOMBI at an altitude 900 ft below the minimum safe altitude, it crossed over terrain at a height of 924 ft above ground level. The aircraft did not penetrate the enhanced ground proximity warning system envelope and no alert was generated. Furthermore, as the aircraft then turned to rejoin the approach, it was now positioned about 700 ft below the minimum altitude for that segment of the approach, which also reduced obstacle clearance assurance during this part of the flight.
Low altitude safety alerts
Unlike approach controllers, area radar controllers providing the flight information service for the non-controlled airspace were not required to know the details of instrument flight procedures for airports in that airspace. Therefore, the controller providing the flight information service was not aware of the minimum holding altitudes associated with the MOMBI holding pattern.
Air traffic control procedures required the controller to issue a safety alert as soon as they became aware that the aircraft was in unsafe proximity to terrain. However, the controller was unaware of the minimum holding altitudes and descending below the broader lowest safe altitudes was inherent to the progress of a flight following an instrument approach. Therefore, the controller did not become aware that the aircraft was operating below the minimum safe altitudes and did not issue a safety alert. Had an alert been provided when the aircraft first descended below the minimum altitude, this would have occurred prior to the aircraft turning toward the high terrain, reducing the risk of collision with terrain.
The Canberra Tower and Approach controllers both recognised that the aircraft was operating below the minimum safe altitude. The Tower controller attempted to contact the crew however, as the crew had not selected the CTAF, these broadcasts were not received. After the aircraft rejoined the approach, the Approach controller took over the airspace and immediately provided a safety alert to the crew, but by this time the aircraft was re-established on the approach and within the associated protected area.
Common traffic advisory frequency use and training
Non-use of Canberra common traffic advisory frequency
During the arrival and approach, the crew were confused about the airspace classification and despite attempts by the controller to clarify this, the confusion was not resolved. As the aircraft approached Canberra Airport the crew did not select the Canberra common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) but remained on the Melbourne Centre frequency.
As a result, the crew could not have activated the runway lights, nor could they make the required radio broadcasts to ensure separation with other traffic using the airspace. However, at the time the aircraft approached Canberra, another CTAF user had illuminated the runway lights and there was no conflicting traffic using the CTAF.
More importantly however, as the crew had not selected the CTAF, they did not receive the oncoming Canberra Tower controller’s broadcasts attempting to alert them to their low altitude.
Batik Air common traffic advisory frequency training
Batik Air’s operations manual included guidance on CTAF operations. While this guidance was focused on a Kalgoorlie diversion scenario, this guidance was also suitable for an early morning Canberra arrival.
Australian flights are the only flights in Batik Air’s route network where CTAF operations may have been required and Batik Air required that crew complete online CTAF training before operating to Australia. A simulator training session had also been developed that included CTAF operations, but this had last been incorporated into Batik Air’s recurrent training program 4 years prior to the incident, in 2020. The captain and deadheading captain had completed this session over 4 years before the incident, but the first officer had joined Batik Air after this date and had not undergone the training. None of the crew had previously operated into a non-controlled airport as an operating crew of an air transport flight.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) guidance recommended that a pilot acting as pilot-in-command undergo training and demonstrate the required knowledge relevant to an intended operation within 12 months of undertaking that operation. Furthermore, this guidance stated that it was commonplace to ensure that all flight crew (not just the pilot-in-command) were trained and demonstrated similar operation knowledge.
Operating to a non-controlled airport in an air transport aircraft while using CTAF procedures is a complex task. The crews of these aircraft may be faced with managing separation with smaller commercial and private aircraft as well as agricultural, military or sport and recreational aircraft. In addition, these aircraft may be operating to either the visual or instrument flight rules and many of these aircraft are not required to be fitted with the equipment required to enable effective alerting using airborne collision avoidance systems. Furthermore, these crews may be required to manage additional tasks like activating the runway lighting when arriving at night.
Effective training in the use of CTAF procedures is vital to ensure crews can effectively and safely operate using these procedures, in particular for crews who may not have previously used them or seldom used them. Batik Air had identified this risk for its Australian operations and developed training to mitigate the risk. However, this training was not conducted regularly, and Batik Air processes did not ensure that all flight crew members had completed the training before undertaking operations to Australia. This was inconsistent with the standards set out by ICAO guidance and increased the risk that crews would be inadequately prepared to manage this task.
After the crew deviated from the airways clearance, the controller’s intervention resulted in the crew becoming confused as to the classification of the airspace for the arrival and approach. This may have contributed to the crew’s non-use of the CTAF. However, as the non-use of CTAF procedures did not lead to the descent below minimum altitude, the inadequate CTAF training was not considered contributory to the incident.
Route commencement process
Prior to commencing the Denpasar to Canberra route, Batik Air completed the required process to receive approval to commence flights on the route. This included a risk management review for the intended operation which identified a number of risks and associated mitigation actions that were relevant to the operation. However, a number of mitigations were not implemented such as the absence of CTAF guidance and a one engine inoperative standard instrument departure in the company airport briefing document. Other mitigations that were implemented, such as the inclusion of an instructor pilot on the flight and the publication of an (incomplete) company airport briefing document were ineffective at mitigating the risk of operating to an unfamiliar airport. Furthermore, the risk presented by airport fire and firefighting services being unavailable at times was not identified and therefore, no mitigating action was implemented.
ICAO guidance stated that an operator should not utilise a pilot as pilot-in-command of an aeroplane on a route for which that pilot was not qualified until the pilot had demonstrated adequate knowledge of relevant operational details. This could be conducted in a number of ways including self-briefing, operator briefing, undertaking a route proving flight or by using an adequate training device.
Batik Air assessed that a proving flight or simulator training for the route were not required as the new destination did not involve any significant operational complexities and the aircraft type had demonstrated the required performance capabilities when operating similar routes. Instead, the crew were briefed on the operation by the Chief Pilot on the day of the flight.
However, the route did involve several significant operation complexities. The scheduled arrival time for the flight was during night hours; Canberra is surrounded by mountainous terrain and may have required the use of CTAF procedures. Furthermore, the runway 35 instrument landing system approach included significant and unusual complexities as demonstrated by the MOMBI holding pattern glideslope transition.
Recognising that a briefing was provided by the Chief Pilot to the crew prior to the flight, it did not achieve its aim of adequately preparing them for the route. A route proving flight, or the use of a suitable training device, would likely have provided more effective crew preparation in accordance with ICAO guidance, giving them greater awareness of the terrain, airspace and instrument flight procedure complexities of Canberra and may have avoided the descent below the minimum safe altitude.
Holding pattern to glideslope transition design
During a required, periodic review of the Canberra runway 35 ILS approach procedure by Airservices Australia, a new procedure template was imported to assess the approach including the MOMBI holding pattern as the existing design could not be uploaded to the procedure design software. The lower of the existing holding pattern’s 2 minimum altitudes (5,100 ft AMSL) required a crew to turn inbound from the outbound course before reaching 14 DME from Canberra. This distance limitation reduced the size of the pattern’s terrain and obstacle consideration area. When conducting the review, this 14 DME distance limitation was not included when determining the assessment area and therefore an area larger than required was assessed. This larger area included higher terrain and obstacles that required a 500 ft increase to the minimum altitude, raising it to 5,600 ft AMSL. The error in this assessment was not identified during internal reviews by Airservices Australia and the increased holding altitude was then published via NOTAM.
The approach glideslope crossed MOMBI at 4,760 ft AMSL, 840 ft below the minimum holding altitude. Consequently, to rejoin the approach from the holding pattern, crews could be required to intercept the glideslope from significantly above it, increasing the risk of sudden pitch ups. To achieve this could also require significant descent rates, increasing the risk of unstable approaches.
This was identified when the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) conducted a revalidation flight of the holding pattern and determined that the transition from the pattern to the glideslope was not appropriate and the design was unsatisfactory. This feedback was provided to Airservices Australia and despite Airservices Australia’s internal processes requiring this feedback to be addressed, the approach procedure with the increased altitude was published without any further modification.
The erroneous minimum altitude remained in place for over 2 years until a review following the Batik Air incident. This review identified the assessment area error and resulted in the minimum altitude being lowered back to 5,100 ft AMSL. While this minimum altitude remains above the MOMBI glideslope crossing altitude, the 500 ft reduction allows crews to appropriately transition to the glideslope while on the inbound leg of the holding pattern.
While the transition increased the risk of unstable and sudden pitch ups approaches, it did not contribute to the incident as the captain had manually selected a holding altitude of 4,700 ft AMSL on the flight management system, which in turn descended the aircraft below the lower and more appropriate 5,100 ft AMSL minimum altitude.
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jun 14, 2024
Classification
Incident
Airline
Batik Air
Flight number
ID-6015
Departure
Denpasar, Indonesia
Destination
Canberra, Australia
Aircraft Registration
PK-LDK
Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800
ICAO Type Designator
B738
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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