JAL A359 at Tokyo on Jan 2nd 2024, collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames

Last Update: January 24, 2024 / 11:50:15 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of JAL Japan Airlines JA13XJ, Airbus A350-900 — JAL Japan Airlines JA13XJ, Airbus A350-900 (Photo credit: SJByles / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 2, 2024

Classification
Accident

Airline
JAL Japan Airlines

Flight number
JL-516

Departure
Sapporo, Japan

Destination
Tokyo Haneda, Japan

Aircraft Registration
JA13XJ

Aircraft Type
Airbus A350-900

ICAO Type Designator
A359

Airport
Tokyo International Airport, Tokyo

Airport ICAO Code
RJTT

A JAL Japan Airlines Airbus A350-900, registration JA13XJ performing flight JL-516 from Sapporo to Tokyo Haneda (Japan) with 367 passengers and 12 crew, landed on Haneda's runway 34R at 17:47L (08:47Z) in night time conditions but collided with a Japanese Coast Guard Dash 8-300 registration JA722A (Coast Guard code MA722) on the runway shortly after touchdown and burst into flames. The A350 came to a stop off the right hand edge of the runway about 1680 meters/5510 feet down the runway and was evacuated. All occupants were able to evacuate. The other aircraft carrying 6 people also burst into flames, 5 of the six occupants are confirmed dead. Both aircraft burned down. 15 passengers of the A359 received injuries, the captain of the Dash 8 received serious injuries. The aircraft fires were extinguished about 8 hours after the collision.

The airline reported their A350 was carrying 367 passengers (including 8 children) and 12 crew, all of them evacuated from the aircraft. In a second press release the airline reported there had been no anomaly with the aircraft prior to departure. The crew had received and read back landing clearance. After the collision and coming to a stand still three emergency slides were used to evacuate the occupants of the aircraft. The details of the accident are under investigation by the JTSB.

Japan's Coast Guard reported their Dash 8-300 registration JA722A (Code MA722) was carrying 6 people, the captain was able to evacuate, the other 5 are currently missing. The aircraft was carrying supplies to their Niigata base where the New Year's Earthquake struck.

Tokyo's Metropolitan Police reported 5 of the occupants of the Dash 8 are confirmed dead.

Tokyo's fire department reported, the captain of the DH8C received serious injuries, 17 occupants of the A359 received injuries. Later the Fire Department corrected the number to 14 injuries amongst the occupants of the A359.

Passengers of the A359 reported the landing appeared normal at first, after touchdown there was a thud and the outside lit up in orange. A first announcement was made "please calm down" followed by "do not take your luggage and do not stand up". There was no clear announcement to evacuate, however, when other passengers stood up they also stood up and thus escaped.

Japan's Ministry of Transport stated Haneda Airport was closed, the flights cancelled, there is no prediction when the airport will open again.

In a press conference the Ministry of Transport stated that it is under investigation whether JL-516 had been cleared to land. There was a Coast Guard aircraft on the runway causing a collision, the details of the collision are under investigation. In a graphics the Ministry showed the approximate positions of both aircraft (see below).

In the afternoon of Jan 2nd 2024 (European Time) the French BEA reported they have dispatched 4 investigators and 5 technical advisors to Tokyo to join Japan's JTSB, who are investigating the accident. The team is expected to be on site by Jan 3rd 2024.

A number of arriving flights are being diverted to Narita Airport where the flights are being accepted one by one.

According to ATC recordings the A359 as well as a number of other aircraft departing runway 34R were handed off to Tower Frequency 118.725MHz, however, the Coast Guard DH8C was handed off to tower at 124.350MHz. JL-516, upon being handed off to tower by approach, was told by tower to "continue approach", about 90 seconds later tower cleared the aircraft to land.

Haneda Airport resumed operations on their runways 16R/34L, 04/22 and 05/23 at about 21:30L (12:30Z) about 3:45 hours after the accident while runway 16L/34R remains closed.

On Jan 3rd 2024 Japan's Ministry of Transport said, that the DH8C had received instructions to proceed as far as he could, the coast guard captain by his own testimony however understood this instruction as takeoff clearance, lined up runway 34R instead leading to the collision. The JTSB is investigating the occurrence.

In the evening of Jan 3rd 2024 Japan's Ministry of Transport released a transcript of the ATC communication (see below, the Ministry also released a version that translates the communication to Japanese) that states, that JL516 was cleared to land on runway 34R, winds 310 at 8. About 10 seconds later and about 2:16 minutes prior to collision the DH8C reported on tower and was cleared to taxi to holding point C5 (Runway 34R), which was correctly read back by the crew. There is no record of any further clearance to the DH8C (other than the captain of the DH8C stated that he had takeoff clearance).

On Jan 3rd 2024 the JTSB reported one of the black boxes of the DH8C have already been recovered, the blackboxes of the A359 are yet to be recovered.

On Jan 3rd 2024 Tokyo's Metropolitan Police reported they too have opened an investigation for professional negligence into the accident.

On Jan 3rd 2024 the airline reported the aircraft skidded for about 1000 meters after the collision. The last person got off the A359 at 18:05L, 18 minutes after the collision.

In the evening of Jan 3rd 2024 the British AAIB announced they also have sent a team of investigators to Japan to assist the JTSB in their investigation.

On Jan 4th 2024 the JAL reported that actually 15 passengers needed medical attention. There were three pilots in the cockpit, none of them was able to see the DH8C, therefore a go around was never considered. After the aircraft came to a stop the cockpit crew was not aware of any fire, however, flight attendants reported fire from the aircraft. The purser went to the cockpit and reported the fire and received instruction to evacuate. Evacuation thus began with the two front exits (left and right) closest to the cockpit. Of the other 6 emergency exits 5 were already in fire, only the left aft exit was still usable. The Intercom malfunctioned, communication from the aft aircraft with the cockpit was thus impossible. As result the aft flight attendants gave up receiving instructions from the cockpit and opened the emergency exit on their own initiative.

On Jan 4th 2024 Japan's Ministry of Transport stated that it appears the tower controller was not aware of the Coast Guard DH8C on the runway. The pilots of the A359 did not see the DH8C and are currently being interviewed by the JTSB.

On Jan 4th 2024 Tokyo's Metropolitan Police reported in an interview with them the captain of the DH8C stated that suddenly a fire started in the back of or behind the aircraft. The Police is investigating whether the captain was aware there had been a collision with the passenger aircraft.

On Jan 5th 2024 works to clear the runway are under way. The flight data recorder of the A359 was recovered, the CVR has not yet been found.

On Jan 5th 2024 the Ministry of Transport reported that the tower controller in charge stated in an interview, that after giving the taxi instructions to the DH8C he turned his attention towards other aircraft and did not notice the DH8C had taxied onto the runway. The runway monitoring system has been working properly. The DH8C stopped on the runway for about 40 seconds, it is possible that the controller missed the alert display, there is no rule requiring the controller to stare onto the screen all times, the screen would turn red and runway be flashing yellow (operative on all runways since 2011). Runway 34R is estimated to return to service on Jan 8th 2024.

According to a Japanese Media report by a reporter on board of the A359 as passenger the evacuation was mainly completed about 7 minutes after the collision, the captain subsequently walked through the aircraft and found a number of passengers who had not yet evacuated and prompted them to leave the aircraft. The captain was the last to leave the aircraft 18 minutes after coming to a stop.

In the evening of Jan 5th 2024 the Ministry added, that the aircraft had been evacuated within 7 minutes after the collision, however, it took another 11 minutes until the captain managed to convince several petrified passengers still in the cabin to leave the aircraft.

On Jan 6th 2024 Japans Ministry of Transport said, that so far there had been no rule requiring air traffic control to permanently monitor the positions of aircraft to prevent incorrect approaches to the runways. Starting Jan 6th 2024 a new position in the ATC center was created to permanently monitor the monitors showing aircraft positions in order to prevent aircraft incorrectly entering the runways. The number of ATC staff will not be increased, however. The Cockpit Voice Recorder of the A359 was recovered on Jan 6th and is being analysed. Interviews with the air traffic controllers in charge of runway 34R are to be conducted.

On Jan 7th 2024 (UTC) runway 34R was returned to service at midnight Jan 8th 2024 Japan Time, after the wreckages of both aircraft had been removed and the runway had been repaired. More than 1200 (domestic) flights had to be cancelled during the closure of the runway due to the non-availability of the runway.

On Jan 9th 2024 Japan's Ministry of Transport stated that the departure sequencing is no longer to be told to the flight crews, "number one" etc. is abandoned for departures. There is a possibility that the flight crew of the DH8C mistook that information as clearance for takeoff.

In a press conference on Jan 23rd 2024 the JTSB reported that the data have been successfully downloaded from the flight data recorders and voice recorders of both aircraft and are now being analysed.

Related NOTAMs:
J0019/24 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021538 C) 2401031500 EST
E) RWY 16L/34R-CLSD DUE TO DISABLED ACFT

E5877/23 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021530 C) 2401302130
D) 02 05 09 12 16 19 23 26 30 1530/2130
E) TWY C1 THRU C14-CLSD DUE TO MAINT

E0023/24 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401020930 C) 2401021500 EST
E) TWY C1 THRU C14-CLSD DUE TO TRBL

J0011/24 NOTAMR J0010/24
Q) RJJJ/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021136 C) 2401021300 EST
E) ALL RWY-CLSD DUE TO DISABLED ACFT

E0025/24 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021144 C) 2401021300 EST
E) TWY C(FM C1 TO C14)-CLSD DUE TO TRBL

E0026/24 NOTAMR E0024/24
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401021154 C) 2401031200
E) TWY G(BTN C AND H2),G(INT OF H2)-CLSD DUE TO RESCUE OPR

E0024/24 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QMXLC/IV/M/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2401020953 C) 2401021200
E) TWY G(BTN C AND H2),G(INT OF H2)-CLSD DUE TO RESCUE OPR

J2253/23 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QLRAS/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2312271500 C) 2402211500
E) REF AIP SUP 225/23 ITEM TWY:2,3,4,5,6,7,10,11,12,13,33,38,44,54
TWY-CL-LGT FOR M1,R1,W11(BTN W AND R1)-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR E10(BEHIND SPOT 53)-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR D5-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR A(BTN W AND A2),A(INT OF W1),A1,A2(INT OF A),W1
-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR A16-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR K(BTN SPOT 304 AND C),R(INT OF K)-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR R(BTN K AND Y),R(INT OF Y)-PARTLY U/S
STOP-BAR-LGT FOR C1 THRU C14-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR T12,T14,Q,Q1,Q2-U/S
TAXIING-GUIDANCE-SIGN FOR T12,T14,Q,Q1,Q2-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR C(INT OF C3),C(INT OF C5)-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR T(BTN T2 AND SPOT 909),T(INT OF T4),T(INT OF T6)
-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR C3(INT OF RWY 16L/34R)-PARTLY U/S
RAPID EXIT TWY INDICATOR LGT FOR D5-U/S

Metars:
RJTT 021000Z 32003KT 9999 R34L/P2000N R22/P2000N R34R/P2000N R05/P2000N FU BKN015 08/04 Q1016 NOSIG RMK 7SC015 A3002 1000E FU ON RWYC-MID=
RJTT 020930Z 31007KT 9999 R34L/P2000N R22/P2000N R34R/0900VP2000U R05/P2000N FU BKN015 08/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020900Z 33008KT 9999 FEW020 07/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020830Z VRB03KT 9999 FEW020 SCT090 08/04 Q1016 BECMG TL0900 30006KT=
RJTT 020800Z 13003KT 090V150 9999 FEW020 BKN090 09/05 Q1016 BECMG TL0930 30006KT RMK 1CU020 6AC090 A3000=
RJTT 020730Z 16007KT 130V190 9999 FEW020 BKN100 08/05 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020700Z 12007KT 9999 FEW030 BKN100 09/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020630Z 13010KT 9999 -RA FEW030 BKN070 09/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020600Z 14005KT 120V180 9999 -RA FEW030 SCT060 BKN080 08/03 Q1017 NOSIG=
RJTT 020530Z 12005KT 9999 -RA FEW025 SCT060 BKN080 08/02 Q1017 NOSIG=
RJTT 020500Z 09003KT 050V120 9999 -RA FEW040 BKN060 08/02 Q1017 NOSIG=
RJTT 020430Z VRB01KT 9999 -RA FEW030 BKN050 09/01 Q1018 NOSIG=
RJTT 020400Z 01003KT 310V060 9999 -RA FEW030 BKN045 09/00 Q1018 NOSIG=