Delta B763 at Milan and Rome on Jul 24th 2023, turbulence, hail strike

Last Update: October 2, 2025 / 17:14:30 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jul 24, 2023

Classification
Accident

Airline
Delta Airlines

Flight number
DL-185

Departure
Milan Malpensa, Italy

Destination
New York JFK, United States

Aircraft Registration
N189DN

Aircraft Type
Boeing 767-300

ICAO Type Designator
B763

A Delta Airlines Boeing 767-300, registration N189DN performing flight DL-185 from Milan Malpensa (Italy) to New York JFK,NY (USA) with 214 passengers and 12 crew, was climbing out of Malpensa's runway 35R when the aircraft encountered severe turbulence and hail prompting the crew to declare emergency reporting severe turbulence, hail and a cracked windshield. The crew stopped the climb at FL230 and diverted to Rome Fiumicino (Italy) where the aircraft landed on runway 16R without further incident about 65 minutes after departure. There were no injuries, the aircraft sustained substantial damage including punctures of the right hand wing, punctures of both engine spinners, damage to both engines' fan blades, punctured radome, and dents along the leading edges of the wings.

A listener on frequency reported the crew reported they suffered severe turbulence, hail and a cracked windshield, the aircraft subsequently diverted to Fiumicino.

Italy's ANSV opened an investigation into the occurrence rated an accident stating: "che l’aeromobile in questione, decollato il 24 luglio scorso dall’aeroporto di Milano Malpensa alla volta del “JFK” di New York, poco dopo la partenza era stato investito da una violenta grandinata, a seguito della quale l’equipaggio decideva di dirigersi, in emergenza, verso l’aeroporto di Roma Fiumicino, dove atterrava senza ulteriori problemi." (translation: shortly after departure the aircraft in question, which took off on July 24th from Milan Malpensa airport towards New York JFK, was hit by a violent hailstorm prompting the crew to divert in emergency to Rome Fiumicino airport, where they landed without further problems.)

On Aug 7th 2023 the aircraft departed Rome positioning to Atlanta,GA (USA) and is currently enroute at FL360 over the Atlantic Ocean.

On Oct 2nd 2025 Italy's ANSV released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

The aircraft damage was caused by the hail encounter, occurred due to the delayed decision of the crew to deviate from the planned flight path. The lack of CVR recordings hampered the depth of the human factor analysis. However, the inadequate usage of all the information about the weather phenomena along the flight route, possibly available to the dispatcher and to the crew, contributed the event to occur.

The ANSV analysed:

Conduct of the flight The meteorological situation available from METAR, TAF and SIGMET was showing instability but nothing that would have precluded the take-off, especially considering that several different aircraft took off and landed prior the DAL 185 and after. However, none of them flown to West or SouthWest after take-off; they all directed toward North, North-East. On the other hand, satellite radar images would have showed a high probability of the encounter of an intense weather phenomenon along the SID.

The Crew properly briefed the flight, also considering the mission and weather briefing coordinated by the operator’s Dispatch office. This did not contain satellite radar images, although these may have been available on EFB before the boarding door was closed, in addition to the possibility to request such information to the ARO. The take-off occurred at 10.52’ implying both the crew and the Dispatch agreed the flight was safe as planned. No ATC communication warned the DL185 of possible hail encounters. However, the aircraft had already completed the climb-out and based on the ATS provider MO, it was not requested to provide such information. The operator meteorology department did sense the weather situation and issued a warning at 11.00’. Nonetheless, they also could possibly forecast in advance the meteorologic phenomenon along the planned flight path by use of the satellite radar images. This did not occur.

The weather radar on board has some limitations in the hail detection. However, according to the FO statement, this showed significant returns when the aircraft turned South-West along the SID DOGUB 6T. At that moment, estimated at about 10.55’, the aircraft was about 14.5 NM far from the hail encounter. At 10.58’, the crew requested to immediately deviate from the planned route. The main effective deviation would have been toward North. However, the presence of the Alps did not make possible this manoeuvre and forced the crew to deviate further left, entering anyway in the hail area. This occurred between 10.58’ and about 11.01’ from 13000 ft to 22500 ft.

The windscreen cracked and the crew processed the relevant checklist. This would have required to land at the nearest airport descending to 10000 ft in order to minimize the forces on the window.

The crew, after consulting with Delta Dispatch and Maintenance by satellite communications decided to divert to Fiumicino due to the better weather along the route together with possible logistic considerations related to the subsequent maintenance and reprotection of the passengers. Being a not negligible flight time to Rome and considering no pressurization issues arose, the crew elected to stop the descent at 20000 ft in order to minimize bird-strike risk as the windshield damage checklist suggests. During the remaining part of the flight no significant inconveniences arose.

Environmental factor

The weather information for of the day of the accident was indicated some forecasted to present instabilities. The LIMC METAR from 10.50’ reported TSRA but several aircraft took-off and landed in the applicable time range, meaning the meteorological phenomena on-going at the LIMC airport were not considered as limiting the operations in that area. Nonetheless, LIMC is about 30 km far from the hail encounter area: this highlights that the local situation, in some instances, for some meteorological phenomena, cannot reflect the real weather in areas even only few tens of km away. Indeed, except for satellite radar information, none of information available would have warned the crew of the possible meteorological phenomenon along the route before the take-off and shortly after. The hail encounter occurred during the execution of the SID DOGUB 6T.

Technical factor

No direct contribution to the event. All the damage was consequence of the hail encounter.

Human factor

The decision of the crew to take off was in line with the meteorological information directly provided to them in the briefing pack. However, the radar satellite images available through the ARO and EFB (WidgetWeather app) would have presented a high possibility of an encounter with a severe weather phenomenon along the SID. Meanwhile, the traffic from/to Malpensa appeared to be regular with several take off before the DL185 and this was also a considered factor. The DL185 took off at 10.52’.

When in climb, executing the SID DOGUB 6T, the crew realized, at the completion of the left turn to S-W, the certainty of entering in a meteorological phenomenon. This was at about 10.55’, about 14.5 NM before the hail encounter, occurred at about 10.58’. Only at that time, the crew requested to deviate immediately. However, it was too late: they were already entering in the meteorological phenomenon area. The operator MO provisions state that weather phenomena should be basically avoided.

The hail caused the FO windshield to break. The crew in coordination to the operator’s Dispatch Office and Maintenance Office, contacted by satellite communication, decided to divert to Fiumicino Airport. This was in apparent contradiction of the relevant checklist that requires to land at the nearest suitable airport. Beside the windshield, from the cockpit the crew could not have a precise idea of the hail damage all over the external aircraft.
However, considering the meteorological situation on-going in the North of Italy, in addition to the necessity of having available a suitable runaway for the heavyweight landing, the decision to land in Fiumicino is considered understandable. This also considering that the FDR data do not show the arising of any specific warning.

Further analysis of the human factor is limited by the unavailability of the CVR recordings.

Organizational factor

As per OM, the responsibility of the dispatch of the flight is shared between the Captain and the Dispatcher Office. While it is surely expected the tactical management of the flight being performed by the crew including relevant decisions by the Captain, the strategic planning should be allocated to the Dispatcher. The operator provisions in this respect are:

“Captains and dispatchers have joint responsibility and must agree that the planned flight is safe and can be operated in accordance with FARs and Company policy. Either party may delay flight departure, but only Dispatch may cancel a flight. If enroute conditions change such that the flight cannot or should not continue as planned, the first party aware of these conditions must notify the other.”

In this view the mission and weather briefing were indeed provided by the operator’s Dispatcher Office. However, the weather information consisted mainly in METAR, TAF and PIREPS along the route, also considering possible alternate airports. Therefore, the information actively made available to the crew would have not presented any situation requiring cancelling or delaying the take-off. In this framework it is important to highlight both the crew and the operator’s Dispatcher could have available more detailed information by means of the WidgetWeather app that would have allowed to forecast the encounter along the SID of significant weather phenomena. However, delayed departure was not put in place neither different flight planning: the DL185 flight took off at 10.52’. The operator meteorology department did actually sense a TP at 11.00’. In any case the Alert of the operator meteorology department was relevant such a large area that it would been of not practical use for the crew. In addition, Operators Dispatchers utilize a flight following tool that can plot the satellite imagery along the routes of their flight.

The overall scenario of the event has to be considered in comparison with weather phenomena, apparently becoming more frequent and more extreme. EASA itself is aware of the issue, several initiatives are on-going to improve safety in this area.

Nonetheless, many of the recommended safety measures were already in place within the operator, meaning that methods to forecast the flight path encountering an area of severe weather were available both to the Dispatcher and to the crew. Furthermore, the Dispatchers also may have provided a warning to the crew considering the availability a flight following tool that can plot the satellite imagery along the routes of their flight.

Based on the above the investigation considers that some form of operative pressure influenced the actions decisions of both the dispatcher and the crew during in the planning phase as well as in flight. The lack of the CVR recordings hampered the possibility to verify this hypothesis.

It is worth noting that the operator put in place safety actions in the aftermath of the event aimed to minimize the risk of future similar events: it was published a newsletter highlighting the importance of thunderstorms and hail avoidance. In addition, the operator’s B757/767 fleet is receiving an advanced 3D weather radar systems that provides higher sensitivity.



Metars Milan:
LIMC 241250Z 02004KT 330V050 9999 -RA BKN030 20/19 Q1010 NOSIG=
LIMC 241220Z 11010KT 9999 -RA BKN015 20/19 Q1012 RETS NOSIG=
LIMC 241150Z VRB04KT 4000 -TSRA FEW010CB OVC030 19/18 Q1012 RETSRA NOSIG=
LIMC 241120Z 02011KT 7000 TSRA SCT025CB OVC060 21/19 Q1010 NOSIG=
LIMC 241050Z 01010KT 9999 FEW025CB SCT030 BKN065 22/20 Q1012 TEMPO TSRA=
LIMC 241020Z 03011KT 9999 FEW025CB BKN065 24/21 Q1012 NOSIG=
LIMC 240950Z 36009KT 320V040 9999 FEW020 BKN065 22/20 Q1014 NOSIG=
LIMC 240920Z 02005KT 340V050 9999 BKN080 22/20 Q1013 NOSIG=
LIMC 240850Z 10004KT 060V200 9999 BKN060 21/20 Q1013 NOSIG=
LIMC 240820Z 11008KT 060V150 9999 -RA FEW030TCU BKN040 19/19 Q1013 RETSRA NOSIG=
LIMC 240750Z 04012KT 8000 -TSRA FEW030CB BKN040 22/20 Q1012 RETSRA NOSIG=
LIMC 240720Z VRB07KT 4000 TSRA FEW040CB BKN050 23/20 Q1013 NOSIG=
LIMC 240650Z 02005KT 350V070 9999 FEW050TCU BKN080 23/20 Q1013 NOSIG=
LIMC 240620Z 01005KT 310V050 9999 FEW050TCU SCT055 BKN080 23/19 Q1013 NOSIG=

Metars Rome:
LIRF 241350Z 15017KT CAVOK 33/23 Q1010 NOSIG=
LIRF 241320Z 15017G27KT CAVOK 34/22 Q1010 NOSIG=
LIRF 241250Z 16016KT CAVOK 33/23 Q1010 NOSIG=
LIRF 241220Z 16020G30KT CAVOK 33/24 Q1010 NOSIG=
LIRF 241150Z 16018KT CAVOK 34/23 Q1011 NOSIG=
LIRF 241120Z 16017G27KT CAVOK 35/23 Q1011 NOSIG=
LIRF 241050Z 15018KT CAVOK 34/23 Q1011 NOSIG=
LIRF 241020Z 16012G23KT CAVOK 35/22 Q1012 NOSIG=
LIRF 240950Z 16013KT CAVOK 35/21 Q1012 NOSIG=
LIRF 240920Z 16011G21KT 140V200 CAVOK 35/21 Q1012 NOSIG=
LIRF 240850Z 14015KT 120V180 CAVOK 35/19 Q1012 NOSIG=
LIRF 240820Z 13014KT 110V170 CAVOK 34/20 Q1012 NOSIG=
LIRF 240750Z 13015KT CAVOK 33/22 Q1012 NOSIG=
LIRF 240720Z 11009KT 080V150 CAVOK 31/22 Q1013 NOSIG=
Aircraft Registration Data
Registration mark
N189DN
Country of Registration
United States
Date of Registration
Im mfndjhdekmhpgg Subscribe to unlock
Manufacturer
BOEING
Aircraft Model / Type
767-332
Number of Seats
Iff Subscribe to unlock
ICAO Aircraft Type
B763
Year of Manufacture
Jceg Subscribe to unlock
Serial Number
Eijlc Subscribe to unlock
Aircraft Address / Mode S Code (HEX)
Kpnmbl Subscribe to unlock
Engine Count
P Subscribe to unlock
Engine Manufacturer
NAil id Subscribe to unlock
Engine Model
MAkhjdbfAe Subscribe to unlock
Engine Type
BbAc pbcp Subscribe to unlock
Pounds of Thrust
Glnkn Subscribe to unlock
Main Owner
GggkbpgefbdkAqnAqAAij efl fjghdhghcblpdmmhm kghimqAbggenbqhl fdmpcjelfebndlkikkkqjjAlflqn qAf Ann lglmhnpnlhh cm ndk Subscribe to unlock
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jul 24, 2023

Classification
Accident

Airline
Delta Airlines

Flight number
DL-185

Departure
Milan Malpensa, Italy

Destination
New York JFK, United States

Aircraft Registration
N189DN

Aircraft Type
Boeing 767-300

ICAO Type Designator
B763

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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