Vueling A320 at Barcelona on Jul 16th 2023, rejected takeoff due to bird strike

Last Update: March 12, 2025 / 17:03:06 GMT/Zulu time

Bookmark this article

Photo of Vueling EC-JTR, Airbus A320 — Vueling EC-JTR, Airbus A320 (Photo credit: Björn Strey / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jul 16, 2023

Classification
Accident

Cause
Rejected takeoff due to bird strike

Airline
Vueling

Flight number
VY-2212

Departure
Barcelona, Spain

Destination
Sevilla, Spain

Aircraft Registration
EC-JTR

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

A Vueling Airbus A320-200, registration EC-JTR performing flight VY-2212 from Barcelona,SP to Sevilla,SP (Spain) with 185 passengers and 6 crew, was accelerating for takeoff from Barcelona's runway 24L when one of the engines (CFM56) ingested a bird prompting the crew to reject takeoff at high speed (about 145 knots over ground). The aircraft slowed safely and came to a stop about 600 meters/2000 feet short of the runway end. The brakes overheated prompting the evacuation of the aircraft via slides while emergency services responded and cooled the brakes. At least 3 of the 4 main tyres deflated nonetheless. 15 passengers received minor injuries. The aircraft was towed off the runway about 2:15 hours after the rejected takeoff.

On Jul 27th 2023 Spain's CIAIAC reported the captain's airspeed indicator began to deviate from the other airspeed indicators prompting the captain to reject takeoff. All 4 main wheels were damaged and the aircraft was evacuated. The occurrence was rated an incident and is being investigated by the CIAIAC.

On Aug 17th 2023 Spain's CIAIAC reported the captain observed a bird strike, then his airspeed indication dropped by 30 KIAS suddenly. Considering the airspeed unreliable the captain rejected takeoff. The aircraft came to a stop about 600 meters/2000 feet short of the runway end, 3 of the 4 main tyres deflated due to hot brakes. As the aircraft was immobilized, the commander decided to perform an emergency evacuation.

On Mar 12th 2025 Spain's CIAIAC released their final report concluding the probable cause of the incident was:

The investigation has concluded that the incident was caused by a bird striking the captain's Pitot tube, which led to him rejecting the take-off after exceeding the decision speed.

The CIAIAC stated: "the intact lifeless body of a wild 900 g female ringed peregrine falcon was found."

The CIAIAC analysed:

Based on the information extracted from the CVR and FDR, it’s been determined that the engine thrust was as expected for the positions of the thrust levers set by the pilots. It can be concluded that at no time was there a lack of thrust that could have resulted in a decrease in acceleration or speed.

The sudden decrease in calibrated airspeed shown on the captain's anemometer resulted from the bird impacting the probes (or some of them, at least) that supply its air data. From the moment of impact, neither the calibrated airspeed data displayed on the captain's anemometer nor that recorded on the FDR based on air data captured by said probes were reliable.

The FDR of the EC-JTR aircraft does not record the calibrated airspeed data displayed on the co-pilot's anemometer, however, in his statement, he reported that his anemometer did not indicate any anomaly during the take-off run.

The FDR on board the EC-JTR aircraft does record the calibrated airspeed data displayed by the standby anemometer. However, this data was of no use to the investigation as it was not properly recorded, and therefore, the data that was downloaded and validated (both at the CIAIAC laboratory and at the laboratory of the aircraft manufacturer AIRBUS) on the calibrated airspeed registered by the standby anemometer was inconsistent and could not be used in this investigation.

The FDR data shows that the take-off (and its rejection) was performed with the automatic braking system set to the MAX position. During the rejected take-off, the thrust reversers were deployed and engaged in the MAX position.

The automatic braking system was set to MAX position until the end of the recording; it was not deactivated at any time. Under these conditions, the aircraft would be unable to move even if thrust was applied.

2.2. Bird strike, decision to reject take-off and relevant speeds
The following sequence of relevant events has been reconstructed based on an analysis of the data provided by the CVR and the FDR on the EC-JTR aircraft:

Time (UTC) CAS (kt) GS (kt) Comments
07:44:50 100 105 The anemometers of the two pilots show no discrepancy between them
07:44:52 110 115
07:44:54 120 125
07:44:56 129 134 The co-pilot calls “bird”
07:44:57 A thud is heard and the CAS on the captain's anemometer stops being reliable
07:44:58 -- 142 The aircraft continues to accelerate
07:44:59 -- 147
07:45:00 -- 151 The co-pilot calls "V1", the captain calls "stop", and the thrust levers are retarded

The difference between GS and CAS recorded during the 7 seconds prior to the bird strike was +5 kt in favour of GS. Three seconds elapsed between the impact and the retard of the thrust levers, during which time the engines continued to provide thrust correctly, and the take-off run continued on its normal course. It is reasonable to assume that the CAS was still 5 kt lower than the GS during those three seconds.

Thus, at 07:44:59, the GS was 147 kt and the CAS is estimated to have been 142 kt, i.e., coincident with the V1 decision speed. The co-pilot saw this number on his anemometer and then verbalised it18. This verbalisation occurred one second later, at 07:45:00, by which time the GS was 151 kt (the aircraft was still accelerating), and the estimated CAS was 146 kt. The captain decided to abort the take-off by calling "stop" just after this, at which time V1 had already been exceeded. As a result, it was a non-compliant operation.

The captain, who was acting as a pilot monitoring (PM) on take-off, was supposed to be monitoring the flight and engine parameters. When his anemometer displayed an anomalous reading, he should have looked for alternative information on the standby instrument. However, the captain did not look at either the standby anemometer or the co-pilot's anemometer (although the latter was further away) to compare the unexpected data that his anemometer began to display with the other two instruments available before making the decision to reject the take-off. In addition, the engine parameters did not change in any way that would indicate that the engines were no longer working properly. Three seconds elapsed between the bird strike and the thrust levers being retarded.

Deceleration and emergency evacuation

The aircraft performed a strong deceleration and came to a stop about 600 m short of the end of the runway at 07:45:19.

The brake temperatures rose considerably, as was to be expected: at 07:46:01, the brake temperature of wheel 3 was 568ºC, and the lowest temperature (wheel 1) was already at 475ºC. The conditions were met for the protective deflation of the wheels.

A smell of burning rubber was perceived in the cockpit.

The pilots applied thrust to leave the runway, but the aircraft did not move. This was because the automatic braking system was still set to the MAX position. The pilots were not aware of this fact.

The smell of burning rubber, the high temperature of the wheels and the fact that the aircraft could not move prompted the captain to make the decision to evacuate.

...