Virgin Australia B738 at Sydney on Mar 10th 2023, hard touch down at 3G

Last Update: December 8, 2023 / 11:39:34 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 10, 2023

Classification
Incident

Airline
Virgin Australia

Flight number
VA-916

Departure
Brisbane, Australia

Destination
Sydney, Australia

Aircraft Registration
VH-YQR

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800

ICAO Type Designator
B738

A Virgin Australia Boeing 737-800, registration VH-YQR performing flight VA-916 from Brisbane,QL to Sydney,NS (Australia) with 179 passengers and 6 crew, landed on Sydney's runway 34R but bounced resulting in a second touchdown at about +3G. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron.

The Australian TSB reported the aircraft did not sustain any damage despite the hard landing at about 3G. The ATSB opened an investigation into the hard landing.

The aircraft remained on the ground for about 75 minutes, then continued its flight schedule.

On Dec 8th 2023 the ATSB released their final report reporting a second landing at 2.2G on April 5th 2023 by a different first officer trained by a different type rating provider and concluding the probable causes of the incident were:

During the landing, the aircraft was flared at a lower altitude than they had been trained and was required by the flight crew training manual. In addition, the power was not reduced to idle. In combination, these resulted in the aircraft bouncing.

- During the subsequent touchdown, the speedbrakes and ground spoilers deployed, significantly reducing lift and resulting in a hard landing of 2.96 G.

- The training provider, contracted by the operator to conduct Boeing 737 conversion training, was training pilots to flare the aircraft at a higher altitude rather than the manufacturer’s requirement of approximately 20 ft. This increased the risk of unstable and/or hard landings. (Safety issue)

The ATSB stated: "During the landing, after a stabilised approach, the aircraft experienced a hard landing."

The ATSB analysed:

Both the occurrence landing and the 5 April 2023 landing showed very similar characteristics. In both cases, the initial bounced landing was the result of a combination of a late flare and a higher than idle thrust being maintained through initial touchdown. In addition, during the bounce, both the speedbrakes and ground spoilers deployed while the aircraft was still in the air, significantly reducing the amount of lift, which led to the hard landings during the second touchdown.

The training provider who trained the pilot of the occurrence landing stated that they used the Boeing 737 NG/MAX flight crew training manual (FCTM) when training pilots to land. However, they taught pilots to mentally prepare for the flare at 30 ft and to flare at 25 ft rather than 20 ft. The difference in heights during the training had the potential to create confusion. Additionally, during the later stages of an approach, the difference would have presented a different sight picture and reduced the pilot’s reaction time when they then changed to using the FCTM and the operator’s requirement to flare at approximately 20 ft.

The ATSB did not assess the procedures provided by the other training providers used by the operator.

The operator was unaware of the difference in flare height being taught at the third-party training provider. Although the international training provider did not comply with the flare height in the FCTM, the difference in flare height should have been captured in the operator conversion course (OCC). The OCC training required that the flare was commenced at 20 ft and during these 8 simulator sessions should have identified and worked with the FO to ensure they were comfortable with the flare height. There were no indications in the training reports that the FO had an issue with flare height.

When in the landing phase, there are many time-critical decisions which can increase the workload for a pilot (Lee, 2010). Changing an established habit at the last minute requires a higher level of cognitive effort. This increased cognitive load can lead to a slower response time, decreased efficiency, and a higher likelihood of errors or oversights. The intention of the first officer to flare at 20 ft rather than their normal 30 ft, while in line with the manufacturer’s flight crew training manual (FCTM), introduced an unfamiliarity and uncertainty, which most likely led to misjudgement resulting in the aircraft being flared late and the thrust not being reduced prior to the initial touchdown.