Delta A333 at Amsterdam on Jan 12th 2023, touched down short of runway

Last Update: July 18, 2024 / 19:00:30 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 12, 2023

Classification
Incident

Flight number
DL-134

Aircraft Registration
N802NW

Aircraft Type
Airbus A330-300

ICAO Type Designator
A333

Airport ICAO Code
EHAM

A Delta Airlines Airbus A330-300, registration N802NW performing flight DL-134 from Detroit,MI (USA) to Amsterdam (Netherlands), was on final approach to Amsterdam's runway 22 when the main landing gear touched down ahead of the paved surface of the runway and damaged two runway threshold lights at 07:52L (06:52Z). The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron.

Netherland's DSB have dispatched a team of investigators on site.

The airport reported, the aircraft touched down with its main gear on grass ahead of the runway, a number of threshold lights were damaged forcing the closure of the runway for about an hour for repairs of the runway lighting.

The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Amsterdam about 12 hours after landing, it's next flight to Boston,MA (USA) DL-259 was cancelled.

On Jan 16th 2023 the FAA reported: "AIRCRAFT LANDED EARLY SHORT OF THE THRESHOLD DAMAGING RUNWAY LIGHTS, AMSTERDAM, DENMARK.", reported there was UNKNOWN damage and rated the occurrence an incident.

On Jan 19th 2023 the DSB reported the aircraft touched down about 12 feet short of the runway threshold. The occurrence was rated a serious incident and is being investigated by the DSB.

On Jul 18th 2024 the DSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

On 12 January 2023, the crew of an Airbus A330-300, in an attempt to mitigate the perceived risk of an overrun on Runway 22 at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, inadvertently increased the risk of an undershoot. This contributed to the aircraft touching down before the threshold.

The psychological impact of landing on a seemingly short runway under adverse conditions, without specific training, likely led to a subconscious effort to land as early as possible. The crew therefore, focused more on speed control over maintaining the glide path, and descended below the published glide path as they perceived an overrun as a greater threat than an undershoot. This imbalance between the risk of a runway overrun and an undershoot, and additional operator-imposed constraints, skewed their risk assessment. By continuing below the glide path, the crew eliminated critical safety margins.

Fatigue may have influenced the crew’s performance, particularly in controlling and monitoring the aircraft’s flight path, though the exact extent remains uncertain.

The DSB analysed:

Initial Approach

The Airbus A330 flew a stabilized approach towards the Runway 22 touchdown zone following the Instrument Landing System (ILS) glideslope. Because the autopilot (AP) and autothrust (A/THR) were engaged, the flight path and speed were managed by the aircraft and it maintained the ILS glideslope. During the approach in managed speed, the Ground Speed Mini system functioned as designed. As soon as the aircraft descended below the clouds, the pilots could see the precision approach path indicator (PAPI), which indicated the aircraft was on the trajectory towards the touchdown zone (two red lights and two white lights). This trajectory would have the aircraft’s main landing gear cross the Runway 22 threshold at six metres (19.72 ft) and touch down 110 m (362 ft) beyond the runway threshold in the touchdown zone.

Despite being shorter than other runways at Schiphol, Runway 22’s length of 2,020 metres was sufficient for an A330-300 landing. Calculation from the Landing Performance Request and Airbus confirmed this, accounting for a 15% safety margin.

Manual Control and Trajectory Alteration

The flight crew’s apprehension about Runway 22’s length, perceived as short despite being adequate for an A330-300, influenced their approach strategy. The flight crew were particularly preoccupied with the potential for an overrun and focused more on speed management than maintaining the glide path. During an aircraft’s landing, it carries an amount of energy based on its weight and speed. Excess speed has a higher influence on the landing distance than weight as the force required to stop the aircraft increases with the speed squared. It is therefore important to land at the appropriate speed. However, it is equally important to land at a point on the runway (in the touchdown zone) that leaves the aircraft sufficient runway to bring it to a stop before the end of the runway.

According to the operator’s Flight Operations Manual, automatic landings are not authorized on category 1 ILS approach runways. After disengaging the autopilot at 240 ft radio altitude (RA), the captain manually controlled the aircraft’s flight path using the sidestick. The A/THR was still controlling the aircraft’s speed. The captain commanded a nose down input to the aircraft, leading to an increased vertical speed and descent below the ILS glideslope and PAPI glide path30. The ILS glide slope indications on the PFDs gradually changed to indicate the aircraft was two dots below the glide slope and the PAPI lights gradually changed from two red and two white lights, to three red and one white light and eventually four red lights. Despite correcting to necessary vertical speed for a 3 degree glide path, the aircraft did not recover from its below- glide-path position. The aircraft was now on a trajectory towards a touch down close to the Runway 22 threshold.

Metars:
EHAM 121055Z 24024G34KT 9000 -DZRA FEW009 BKN011 BKN017 12/10 Q1003 TEMPO 7000=
EHAM 121025Z 24024G34KT 210V280 9999 FEW010 SCT012 BKN017 12/10 Q1003 TEMPO 7000 -DZ BKN014=
EHAM 120955Z 24025G38KT 210V270 9999 FEW010 SCT013 BKN017 12/10 Q1002 NOSIG=
EHAM 120925Z 24025KT 210V270 9999 FEW011 SCT013 BKN017 12/10 Q1002 NOSIG=
EHAM 120855Z 24026KT 210V270 9999 FEW011 SCT017 BKN021 12/10 Q1002 TEMPO BKN017=
EHAM 120825Z 24023G34KT 210V290 9999 SCT012 SCT017 BKN021 12/10 Q1001 TEMPO BKN017=
EHAM 120755Z 24027G38KT 9999 FEW010 SCT012 BKN017 12/10 Q1001 TEMPO BKN022=
EHAM 120725Z 24027G39KT 9999 FEW009 SCT012 BKN016 11/10 Q1001 TEMPO 6000 -DZ BKN014=
EHAM 120655Z 24027G38KT 6000 -DZ FEW007 SCT009 BKN011 11/10 Q1000 TEMPO 8000 BKN015=
EHAM 120625Z 24028KT 210V270 5000 -DZRA FEW007 SCT008 BKN010 11/10 Q1000 TEMPO 8000=
EHAM 120555Z 23028KT 200V260 4500 -DZRA FEW006 SCT007 BKN010 10/10 Q1000 TEMPO 6000=
EHAM 120525Z 22023KT 4500 -RADZ FEW006 BKN009 09/09 Q1000 TEMPO 8000 BKN010=
EHAM 120455Z 20026G36KT 3500 RA FEW007 BKN008 09/08 Q1000 TEMPO 5000 BKN010=
EHAM 120425Z 20024KT 170V230 4500 RA FEW008 BKN010 09/08 Q1001 TEMPO 5000 BKN008=
EHAM 120355Z 19020KT 7000 RA FEW005 BKN016 BKN035 09/08 Q1001 TEMPO BKN014=
Aircraft Registration Data
Registration mark
N802NW
Country of Registration
United States
Date of Registration
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TCDS Ident. No.
Manufacturer
AIRBUS
Aircraft Model / Type
A330-323
Number of Seats
ICAO Aircraft Type
A333
Year of Manufacture
Serial Number
Aircraft Address / Mode S Code (HEX)
Engine Count
Engine Manufacturer
Engine Model
Engine Type
Pounds of Thrust
Main Owner
Nhdlmlblimld ffncehAkefidhjfcbkjAmgcdjgnjgcbffAbghm ccdehmi bjhdmqld idmepkgAbAbmpmdchhej hgcjlhkkqkqb pehmipmnebdd l Subscribe to unlock
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 12, 2023

Classification
Incident

Flight number
DL-134

Aircraft Registration
N802NW

Aircraft Type
Airbus A330-300

ICAO Type Designator
A333

Airport ICAO Code
EHAM

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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