COPA B738 at Panama City on Sep 25th 2022, runway excursion on landing

Last Update: November 17, 2023 / 21:02:12 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Copa Airlines HP-1539CMP, Boeing 737-800 — Copa Airlines HP-1539CMP, Boeing 737-800 (Photo credit: wiltshirespotter / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Sep 25, 2022

Classification
Accident

Cause
Runway excursion on landing

Airline
Copa Airlines

Flight number
CM-135

Departure
Mexico City, Mexico

Destination
Panama City, Panama

Aircraft Registration
HP-1539CMP

Aircraft Type
Boeing 737-800

ICAO Type Designator
B738

Airport
Tocumen International Airport, Tocumen

Airport ICAO Code
MPTO

A COPA Airlines Boeing 737-800, registration HP-1539CMP performing flight CM-135 from Mexico City (Mexico) to Panama City (Panama) with 159 passengers and 7 crew, landed on Panama City's runway 03R at 21:12L (02:12Z Sep 26th), in the flare drifted towards the right hand edge of the runway, touched down inside the touch down zone and runway, then veered to the left and went past the left edge of the runway crossing the runway edge at about 110 knots over ground. The aircraft continued parallel to the runway, crossed a high speed turn off beginning to correct towards the runway but came to a stop about 2200 meters/7200 feet down the runway and about 21 meters/70 feet to the left of the left runway edge. The aircraft was evacuated via slides. There were no injuries.

The airport reported the aircraft suffered a mishap during landing. No serious injuries were being reported, emergency protocols were immediately activated, the airport was closed. Panama's Civil Aviation Authority opened an investigation.

The airline reported the aircraft went off the runway upon landing, no injuries were reported.

Panama's Civil Aviation Authority reported an investigation has been opened, personnel to collect the necessary information to conduct the investigation remain at the airport while resources to move the aircraft to the apron are being deployed.

Tropical Storm Ian passed Panama City about 380nm north of the airport, according to the USA National Hurricane Center there was no influence onto Panama City.

On Oct 28th 2022 the Oficina de investigacion de Accidentes Aereos de Panama (OFINVAA) that according to crew testimony thrust reverser #2 had been inop under minimum equipment list requirements. If the runway was wet and in case of an asymmetry the thrust reverser #1 would not be used. They performed an approach according to standard operating procedures, upon touchdown they felt a different sensation however with vibrations like if a tyre had burst, the aircraft developed a strong yaw to the left. The crew applied right hand rudder without success and activated the thrust reverser on the #1 engine, also to no avail. Near taxiway Q the aircraft went off the runway. After coming to a stop the crew analysed the situation, perceived a strong burning odour, the nose gear was collapsed, they decided to shut the engines down, start the APU and perform an evacuation. OFINVAA confirmed the aircraft had been dispatched under MEL with the #2 thrust reverser inop. No other reports of other system malfunctions had been recorded in the previous days.

The OFINVAA further wrote:

A detailed inspection of the aircraft revealed the presence of soil and vegetation at the slat and cowling joints, a collapsed nose gear, both turbines with multiple fractures in the fan blades, and vegetation ingestion.

Within the inspection of runway 03R of the aerodrome, the tracks left by the aircraft in contact with the runway were identified and then in the green area until after the Quebec intersection, where the aircraft stopped due to nose gear collapse.

On Nov 17th 2023 OFINVAA released their final report in Spanish only (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Spanish only or no release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe).

The report concludes the probable causes of the accident were:

- the meteorological conditions at the time of the landing with significant cloud cover, winds from 110 degrees at 11 knots, visibility 6000 with rain, clouds and thundershowers with rain, scattered cloud at 700 feet AGL, scattered cumulonimbus at 1600 feet, overcast at 8000 feet, temperature 25C, pressure at 1090hPa.

- the landing was recorded with the power levers above idle on both engines. Reverse thrust on engine #1 was immediately activated, the left engine accelerated to 84% N1, the right hand engine remained at 41% N1, speedbrakes as well as brakes did not activate automatically

- The surface of the runway strip does not have the load bearing capability for aircraft that suffer a runway excursion for some reason

Contributing factors were:

- the weather at the airport with light to moderate rain over the first 2000 feet of runway

- loss of control of the aircraft after landing leading to the runway excursion because of:
+ changes in wind direction during the last seconds before landing
+ light to moderate rain over the first 2000 feet of the runway
+ loss of situational awareness
+ wrong perceiption by the crew believing they veered off the runway due to a flat tyre
+ lack of training for landings with thrust reverser inoperative in marginal conditions
+ the first officers call out "Speed Brake up" and incorrect verification of the lever moving
+ lack of manual deployment of speed brakes and brakes
+ the crew did not reduce maximum reverse power on the left engine when the aircraft began to veer left

Related NOTAMs:
A0882/22 NOTAMN
Q) MPZL/QFALC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/0904N07923W005
A) MPTO B) 2209260239 C) 2209261000
E) AP CLSD

A0884/22 NOTAMN
Q) MPZL/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/0904N07923W005
A) MPTO B) 2209260337 C) 2209261400
E) RWY 03R/21L CLSD

A0885/22 NOTAMR A0884/22
Q) MPZL/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/0904N07923W005
A) MPTO B) 2209260337 C) 2209272300
E) RWY 03R/21L CLSD

A0879/22 NOTAMN
Q) MPZL/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/0904N07923W005
A) MPTO B) 2209280430 C) 2210010930
D) 0430-0930 DLY
E) RWY 03R/21L CLSD

Metars:
MPTO 260500Z 35008KT 8000 -TSRA SCT007 SCT016CB BKN080 23/22 Q1011 TEMPO 6000=
MPTO 260433Z 34012KT 5000 TSRA SCT007 SCT015CB BKN080 24/22 Q1010 TEMPO 3000=
COR MPTO 260400Z 31009KT 2000 +TSRA SCT006 SCT012CB BKN070 24/22 Q1010 TEMPO 5000=
MPTO 260300Z 29008KT 8000 TSRA SCT007 SCT015CB BKN080 25/23 Q1009 TEMPO 6000=
MPTO 260213Z 11011KT 6000 TSRA SCT007 SCT016CB BKN080 25/24 Q1009 TEMPO 7000=
MPTO 260200Z 01003KT 9999 SCT017CB SCT090 26/24 Q1009 NOSIG=
MPTO 260100Z 07003KT 9999 SCT017CB SCT090 26/24 Q1008 NOSIG=
MPTO 260000Z 10004KT 9999 SCT018CB SCT090 27/24 Q1007 NOSIG=